406. Telegram From the Embassy in Egypt to the Department of State1
2538. Black departed for London this morning following talks with Kaissuny and Nasser last evening.2 Visit went well in spite of obvious difficulties facing Black on stop here at this time.
Black reports he found both Kaissuny and Nasser extremely friendly. He described both as giving appearance of being “disappointed, puzzled, and a bit hurt” over fact that no word has been received from US or UK to their suggested changes in aides–mémoire3 for 16 weeks, but that neither showed any sign of bitterness. Black, who says he often used by foreign dignitaries to bear brunt of indirect criticism of acts of member governments, said this was not case on these visits, although Kaissuny was very disturbed that there had been no 56 funds allotted at all for Egypt. Kaissuny said he guessed he did not have any right to be critical as decision entirely up to us, but found this very difficult to understand and explain to his colleagues.
There was no mention by Nasser of any deal with Russia and Black remarked that conversation proceeded just as though Shepilov had never appeared on scene. Black assumes of course that discussions have been under way with Shepilov but attitude he received was one of “we want very much to follow through with negotiations started with West. Please help us with US and UK governments”.
Nasser talked much of question of population pressure and that Egypt’s immediate problem was one of land. He said he did not agree with those around him who believe everything depends upon industrialization as this in his mind was no alternative to problem of providing additional land for Egypt’s people.
Nasser appeared to have no doubt but that negotiations with Sudan could be carried forward successfully and stressed that High Dam project should proceed immediately thereafter.
Following visit with Nasser, Black and Kaissuny had additional talk late last night. In effort draw Kaissuny out, Black stated that there had been some criticism of him for appearing willing to go ahead with High Dam in view of Egypt’s policies. He said he would like to really know whether Kaissuny thought Egypt was by choice going down a path leading to domination by Russia. Kaissuny said [Page 743] he felt definitely not, although there were a couple of ministers who had leanings in that direction. Kaissuny then almost pled with Black not to “force us to take aid from Russia”. He said he was well aware of dangers of getting too much involved with Russia and cited as example their manipulation of cotton in which Russia and satellites were acting as a bloc. They could all buy cotton or as easily stop all purchases to apply pressures. Kaissuny said if Russians ended up doing High Dam he would probably resign but that would make very little difference because problem was far bigger than personalities. Russia would then have opportunity of almost complete control of Egypt’s economy and hence eventually policy.
We believe our prediction that no agreement would be signed while Shepilov is here will turn out to be correct… . reports available to Department have indicated probable nature of Soviet offer which if true we obviously unable to match. Whether or not Nasser would go through with present Western approach we cannot tell, but seems that there is still a chance this would be so.
I can think of no new argument to try to convince Department that proceeding on this project is in our best long range interests. Even if we are in the end out maneuvered by Russians and fail, would like to see our own record much better than it is at present. Earnestly hope high levels in Department will set aside adequate time discuss with Black situation here, as this probably more effective means present current atmosphere, even though his visit was brief.4
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.74/6–2156. Secret; Priority. Received at 5:52 p.m. Repeated priority to London.↩
- Black visited Cairo, June 19–21, on his return from an official visit to Iran and Saudi Arabia.↩
- See Documents 121– 124 and 127.↩
- On June 22, Rountree provided Ronald Bailey and D.B. Pitblado of
the British Embassy with the substance of telegram 2538. Bailey informed Rountree of Trevelyan’s comments, as
follows:
“If the Soviet proposal on the Dam was of the scale reported, it is questionable whether the Western powers could meet the terms. Although the language of the aides–mémoire given Egypt in December, 1955, could be construed to cover an agreement with all the riparian states, the discussions made clear that we had in mind only an understanding with the Sudan. The Ambassador urged that the US and UK carry through with the offer made in December arguing that the conditions prevailing now were essentially the same.” (Memorandum of conversation by Burdett; Department of State, Central Files, 874.2614/6–2256)
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