Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Arab-Israeli Dispute, January 1–July 26, 1956, Volume XV

405. Memorandum of a Conversation Between the Secretary of State’s Special Assistant (Russell) and the Israeli Chargé (Shiloah), Department of State, Washington, June 21, 1956¹

Washington, June 21, 1956

SUBJECT

• Statements by Reuven Shiloah

I met with Mr. Shiloah, Chargé d’Affaires of the Israel Embassy, today at his request. It was our first meeting since he returned a short time ago from a visit to Israel of several weeks. In the course of discussion he made the following statements:

1. There will be no change in Israel policy as a result of the resignation of Mr. Sharett as Foreign Minister² and the assumption of that post by Mrs. Myerson. He said that the difference in temperament between Ben Gurion and Sharett had for a long time caused more or less strained relations between the two and that for various reasons the situation had just now come to the breaking point. I told Shiloah that nevertheless the departure of Sharett at this time was bound to cause disquiet in many quarters over the extent to which IDF influence in the Israel Foreign Office would increase. Shiloah said that Sharett’s inability to obtain arms from the West, particularly the United States, and other failures of his policy had weakened his position. I said that it must be obvious to the IG that the major part of Israel’s difficulties stemmed not from the Sharett policies but from those for which Ben Gurion was responsible. I said I had not had much contact with Mrs. Myerson when I was in Israel but the one or two experiences I had were not reassuring. I referred particularly to a speech she gave to a group of American Jews in Israel in the spring of 1954 in which she asserted that the blood of Jewish youth who had been killed in fighting against the Arabs was on the hands of the American Department of State, that the Department had always been callous of Jewish lives, even those suffering under Hitler, and that the members of her audience should go back to the United States and so inform their fellow American Jews.³ I said that, aside from the expression of such sentiments, the fact that she had uttered them at a meeting when the United States Chargé d’Affaires also was a speaker on the same platform was bound to raise a question about Mrs. Myerson’s attitudes and the policies she would be likely to follow as Foreign Minister.

2. In referring to the article by Drew Pearson this morning predicting that Ambassador Eban would be retiring and that Shiloah would be taking his place,⁴ Shiloah said that there had been discussion about Eban’s replacement when he (Shiloah) was in Jerusalem. Shiloah said that General Yadin, former head of the IDF, had been mentioned. Shiloah thought it unlikely that Yadin would accept the position as he is busy with archeological excavations in the Huleh. Shiloah said that his own name had been mentioned but that he preferred to return to the Foreign Office.

3. With respect to possible resumption of construction at Banat Yaacov, Shiloah said there would be no such resumption as long as the IG felt there was real hope of a plan which would provide for a solution of this problem. Israel would take action on its own only if it felt that everyone concerned had abandoned planning and negotiations and that Israel had no other alternative. I commented that I thought this was an encouraging improvement in the IG position.

4. Shiloah said he thought that Nasser’s present military planning was based upon an intention to put Egypt in a position where it could, if Nasser should so decide, attack Israel at any time after July–August. (This appears to constitute a change from Eban’s and Shiloah’s previous estimates, namely that Nasser was definitely planning to attack some time in July or August.)

5. In commenting on the policy that the West should adopt toward Nasser, Shiloah said he felt at the present stage of developments, it would not be wise to attack Nasser politically head–on but to act by way of strengthening other elements in the area, specifically Israel. He said he thought the Western countries should attempt to identify and work with elements in Egypt who were unhappy with the present Nasser policies; that they should strengthen their relations with the Sudan and Ethiopia; and that such things might be done as having Western Ambassadors in other capitals of the world give marked attention socially to Egyptians in those countries who were anti–, or at least not pro–, Nasser.

6. Shiloah said that he had talked on the phone with the Israel Ambassador in Ottawa and had been informed that there was no prospect of any decision by the Canadian Government on the F–86’s for at least a month and very little reason to believe there would be a decision at that time unless Canada felt it was acting as part of a general program of assistance to Israel by the United States and other Western countries. Shiloah asked me what I felt the U.S. Government’s position on arms to Israel was likely to be in the light of this information. I told him I had been away from the Department for a couple of weeks and did not feel I could express an opinion.

1. Source: Department of State, NEA Files: Lot 59 D 518, Omega—Memos, etc. fr April 24, 1956 to June 30, 1956. Secret. Drafted by Russell.
2. Sharett resigned on June 18.
3. Reference is to a speech by Golda Myerson, Israeli Minister of Labor, to an audience of Israeli and American members of Hadassah on May 4, 1954.
4. Reference is to Drew Pearson’s column entitled “Aldrich and Eban To Quit as Envoys;” see The Washington Post and Times Herald, June 21, 1956.