38. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, January 25, 1956, 10:40 a.m.1
PARTICIPANTS
- Mr. Abba Eban, Ambassador of Israel
- Mr. Reuven Shiloah, Minister, Embassy of Israel
- The Secretary
- NEA—George V. Allen
Ambassador Eban repeated the urgent Israeli request to buy arms in the United States, stressing that four months had passed since the Egyptian-Czech deal, during which time Israel had not been able to obtain one single item of equipment relevant to the Egypt arms increment. As regards the possibility of a peace settlement with the Arabs, he said Ambassador Byroade had confirmed to him that a considerable slice of the Negev would have to be surrendered to obtain peace. This was added reason to think that peace was unlikely. He said his Government could understand that the United States might not wish to make a public announcement of [Page 75] the sale of arms to Israel at this moment due to the reaction in the Arab World, but he earnestly hoped that some assurance could be given in confidence to Ben Gurion and Sharett that arms would be available before long. Reports of large numbers of Soviet technicians in Egypt indicated that Nasser was hastening his preparations, to be ready by summer.
The Secretary said relations between Israel and the United States were close enough to enable him to discuss the situation with full friendliness and frankness. Even if agreement could not be reached, there should be understanding of our respective points of view due to our common objectives. He stated that the preservation of Israel “in all its essentials” was basic to United States policy, and that this policy was bipartisan.
The Secretary then pointed out that a reappraisal of the means for achieving common objectives in the Middle East had been made necessary by Soviet activities in the area. Almost unlimited Soviet arms were available to Egypt. Perhaps these arms were not of the most modern type but they were formidable. Israel might obtain enough arms to improve its security position for a few months but the end result might well be that a year from now Israel might be less secure than it is today.
The new situation in the Near East opens up new dangers and calls for a reappraisal of the situation and how the United States shall achieve its objectives in that area. The State of Israel is presumably also reappraising the situation and it has concluded that its preservation requires more arms in order to deter possible attack from Egypt and other unfriendly countries.
This is a natural conclusion for Israel to come to because it has no other deterrents at its command.
However, the United States has other deterrents. Egypt wants to develop its economy. Egypt wants markets for its cotton. Egypt wants leadership among the Arab states and is jealous of the potential position of Iraq as a member of the Baghdad Pact. Egypt is involved on the Saudi Arabian side of the territorial dispute with the British.
All such factors need to be weighed.
The United States is not today in a position to conclude that its policy with respect to Israel will be best advanced by putting primary reliance upon the capacity of Israel to defend itself by force of arms. We do not exclude the possibility of coming to that conclusion nor do we exclude the possibility of combining the deterrent of increased Israel military power with some of the other deterrents which may be available. We are not now, however, in a position to say that we go along with the thesis that the best [Page 76] protection of Israel is for the United States now to allow it to purchase arms on a large scale.
These considerations might have caused the US to defer action on the Israeli arms request even if the recent attack on Syria had not occurred. The British Prime Minister would arrive in Washington in a few days. In view of all these factors, which could not yet be fully appraised, he was not in a position today to give a positive answer to the Israeli request.
Mr. Eban said this would be a “heavy blow” to his Government. The Secretary said he did not believe the Israeli Government was justified in regarding his reply in this light, and that if it did, perhaps he had been mistaken in speaking so fully and frankly regarding the U.S. position.
Mr. Eban said he welcomed the Secretary’s frankness but repeated that the news would be a heavy blow. He added that his Government would have to try to scrape together whatever arms it could from anywhere, and that he used the word “anywhere” advisedly.
The Secretary emphasized that what Israel wanted and needed was to feel certain that it would not be attacked by overwhelming forces. The Israelis believed that arms in their own hands were the best deterrents. He could understand this attitude, which was by no means unique. However, like situations in many parts of the world, arms were by no means the only deterrent and were often not even the most effective deterrent. He stressed that he would not do anything at this juncture to upset the present hope for an Arab-Israeli settlement.
Mr. Eban asked the Secretary’s estimate of the time it would take to judge Nasser’s intentions. The Secretary said he supposed some indication should be forthcoming within a couple of weeks or so.2
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 784A.56/1–2556. Top Secret. Drafted by Dulles and Allen. The time of the conversation is from Dulles’ Appointment Book. (Princeton University Library, Dulles Papers)↩
- Later that day, Dulles transmitted a message to
Anderson in which he
summarized the contents of this conversation. (Department of State,
NEA Files: Lot 59 D 518,
Alpha—Anderson Talks
w/BG & Nasser. Outgoing
Telegrams—Jan.–March 1956)
The Department also transmitted a summary of the conversation to Tel Aviv in telegram 525, January 28, repeated to Amman, Baghdad, Beirut, Cairo, Damascus, Jidda, London, and Paris. (Ibid., Central Files, 784A.56/1–2856)
↩