37. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State1
743. For the Secretary. Sharett called me to Jerusalem last night to inform me of Eban’s appointment with you2 and, as he put it, to use my “good offices” to send few personal words in addition to those you will hear from Eban this afternoon.
He showed me copy his January 16 letter,3 endorsed its contents, then spoke full hour on following lines:
- (1)
- He reviewed development Israel’s request to United States for arms and how [garble] which he had led himself to hope would be favorable “at least to modest extent” had been frustrated or delayed by Kinneret, leisurely Security Council deliberations, and seasonal holidays.
- (2)
- Meanwhile Egypt’s strength grew apace both in equipment and skill of its personnel in use of new weapons.
- (3)
- Time for decision had arrived for United States and Israel. To trust Nasser’s humanitarianism or statesmanship to refrain from attacking is to “tax quite unduly Israel’s capacity for wishful thinking”, to trust outside guarantees would be irresponsible. In first place there is none; if they existed they could not avail against swift blitz attack which could destroy Tel Aviv and Haifa in matter of hours. Therefore Israel must know where she is going. United States must decide in manner consistent with its traditional sense of fair play and its responsibilities to those nations, large and small, which have chosen to cast lot with west.
- (4)
-
He then broached his main point. If it were present disposition of United States to decide to supply Israel with arms but if in existing circumstances we were inhibited from announcing it, he would personally guarantee complete secrecy of any such decision made known to GOI until it was mutually agreed to disclose it.
Sooner or later, decision would have to be known; first, because such decisions eventually are known; and second for whatever deterrent effect it would have on aggressive intent of “other side”. Public knowledge can be indefinitely delayed but it is most important for government “or possibly only leading members of government to know”. I asked him what sort of communication he required. He replied that most informal word from me to him or [Page 73] from you to Eban to effect that decision in principle had been taken plus assurances of early discussion of types, quantities and deliveries, would be eminently satisfactory.
Discussion could be on basis of Israel list but there were many possibilities for flexible adjustment. US might choose to eliminate whole categories, reduce others. It might choose to encourage existing negotiations with France (presumably for Mystere IV’s).
But Israel must have assurances as basis for formulation of policy. “It must know”, he repeated “where it is going”.
- (5)
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Sharett said they had one report British line of argument in Eisenhower–Eden talks would be that present critical circumstances Middle East require short-cut to peaceful settlement between Israel and Egypt, essential element of which would be “far-reaching concessions” by Israel. This thesis has it that Israel is so desperately pressed she can be persuaded to make such concessions if permitted to survive. Hence she must understand she can obtain no arms until she agrees.
“Those who so believe are due for sharp disappointment. We will not make concessions which threaten our survival. We shall resist”.
He developed extensively theme of British self-delusion as to their infallibility in Middle East despite record of failure after failure year after year. He cited Jordan where he said British had “position” which they had shaken to foundations by failure to foretell consequences of attempting to obtain Jordanian adherence to Baghdad Pact. “Now status quo ante is very best they can hope for”.
- (6)
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He challenged theory attributed by press to Byroade that “if United States gives or sells arms to Israel it will push Arabs, particularly Egypt, closer to Soviets and only result in Soviets supplying even greater quantities of arms to Arab States (Embtel 7224). We are told that Israel must jeopardize her own security to avoid Egyptian appeal to Soviets for couple score more MIGs to add to 200 she has already received or has been promised.
If Egyptians demanded additional arms of Soviets as result of United States decision to supply arms to Israel, it would be clearly established that Nasser’s intent was annihilation of Israel. “He already has advantage that we cannot hope or do not want to overtake quantitatively. Why should he want to increase it if his intent is not offensive? We cannot entertain such counsel. Time is running against us. Other side has very considerable start but within limits we can still overtake them, not quantitatively, which we are not interested in, but qualitatively”.
- (7)
- I asked about public pressures, Sharett replying that opinion had not yet crystallized because public could still hope in absence of United States rejection. “If public ever despairs of favorable United States reply they will be in difficult mood.”
Comment: Sharett spoke with all exterior manifestations of his usual urbanity, but he was more serious than I have seen him in months. I believe he was speaking on line previously agreed by top leadership, including Ben Gurion. He is sincerely incredulous that we can entertain other than his evaluation of substance items 3, 5, and 6 above. He believes Israel has suffered consequences of its Kinneret action and having been censured for this transgression, chapter should be closed.
Meanwhile, public is being conditioned to regard United States arms decision as key to their security. If disappointed, reaction will be unpredictable but I am confident it won’t be one of docile resignation to whatever fate holds.