371. Telegram From the Embassy in Egypt to the Department of State1
2347. Deptel 27982 reference High Dam prompts following observations in this restricted channel in addition those in Embtel 2346.3
History on High Dam indicates that we thought vaguely about trying help Egypt on High Dam for number of years. It was our hope day would come when this would be possible. Word that Russians might do project prompted desire quick action. We then undertaking Anderson mission which added additional stimulus our own desire of appearance of pushing project. Our thinking on High Dam had thus become naturally but unfortunately overly concentrated around political issues connected with East-West or Arab-Israeli matters. Merits of project as dramatic example America’s desire help under-developed countries and raise standards of living became to extent at least submerged.
Although we knew that odds were against success due to practicalities in area, time had come when effort such as Anderson mission should be tried. This I wholeheartedly agreed with. My concern from moment of being first informed this mission was entirely around question of what would happen if it failed. Spoke of this often in East and with Anderson at that time. I felt it only human nature that there would be reaction against Nasser and Egypt. Detailed analysis as to whether Nasser or Anderson was more reasonable, under practical considerations confronting them, would soon be forgotten. Point would remain that we had placed our hopes in an Arab leader to accomplish settlement and there would be sharp disillusionment with him if it did not work. Fact that he would be honest enough to tell us frankly and bluntly what he felt he could [Page 683] and could not do rather than play us along in typical manner Middle East probably only increased the danger.
Nasser and Egypt have done many things to displease us, but it seems to me that real change in our attitude came about at time we concluded no early miracles towards settlement could be accomplished through Nasser. Our special stimulus for High Dam was off. Other countries including Israel continued receive economic aid, PL 480 supplies and other assistance. Nothing new has been approved for Egypt since that time. We have been very good in public statements trying to preserve a position here, but did not an element somewhat akin to punitive thinking become at least a part of our private attitude? I repeat do not wish ignore acts of Egypt inimical to our interests but to extent, if any, the above may be true, respectfully suggest this is negative thinking which does not put us in proper frame of mind to carry out best policy approach to our problems.
Above is furnished in effort be constructive and not critical, as my disappointment lack success of Anderson mission as keen as any. If this analysis useful at all, perhaps it relates itself now for action only as regards other states of this area with whom we wish to retain good relations and special interests. I should not think, for instance, we would wish Nasser to use his influence with persons such as King Saud convince them that cooperation with America would someday be cut short unless they could help us as regards Israel—for we would be taking long chance indeed if we doubted that history both arms negotiations and High Dam negotiations will not leave this long-term impression.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 874.2614/5–2656. Top Secret; Priority; Limited Distribution; Omega Handling. Received at 10:51 p.m.↩
- Printed as telegram 226, Document 362.↩
- Supra.↩