370. Telegram From the Embassy in Egypt to the Department of State1
2346. Reference: Deptel 2798.2 Subject: High Dam. Agree that if U.S. cannot or will not assist in financing High Dam, every effort should be made minimize gain which Soviets can obtain through this key project. Difficulty we have here is conceiving of methods by which this can be done. I feel most strongly that scheme outlined reftel is certainly not the method. Consider it would not only fail to deny Soviets this possibility but would most probably in end substantially enhance Soviet influence by undermining diplomatic and moral position U.S. in Egypt and area.
Rightly or wrongly we made decision long ago to pursue course quite opposite, and this decision has long been public knowledge. It was with our blessing that IBRD undertook serious survey High Dam in cooperation GOE officials in absence survey of total Nile Valley. Again it was with our blessing and indeed urging that Bank understood public negotiations culminating in highly publicized agreement. It is also public knowledge that U.S. and U.K. had been prepared to commit public funds this project even in advance of agreement with Sudan and that GOE itself reversed this position.
From practical point of view there seems to us no possibility at all that this … approach could escape becoming public knowledge. Even if this could be avoided doubt if we could keep knowledge from Egypt and most certainly we could not if we so much as mentioned this concept to anyone in Sudan… . GOE has already been alerted to possibility of such a switch by debate House Commons last week which prompted statement GOE spokesman that issue to be resolved by “agreement between ourselves and brothers in Sudan without interference from any quarter”.
Should think without doubt when Egypt sees this type of approach it would accept Soviet offer. She has reacted strongly for years to any approach which would subordinate her very real present day need to up river areas who have done little or no planning. … It should not be overlooked that Sudan and Egypt might still go ahead with agreement and part of deal might be Soviet construction in Sudan in exchange for Sudanese products. If things did not work out this way we would on other hand be in position of encouraging Sudan-Egypt differences and creating new area of conflict [Page 681] and tension, for it must be expected that GOE will react with all-out effort subvert any government in Sudan going along with suggested scheme.
We are dealing here with most fundamental of problems and cannot afford a mistake. My feeling on this question goes far beyond any difficulty such a scheme might create for us at this particular post… .
What is involved is future of Egypt over long period years and whether there can be any stability in this country regardless in whose hands lies control of government. It is an issue that should in our own interest transcend to greatest extent possible current political irritation. Fact that millions of people are now living at what approaches near starvation level, with unalterable worsening demographic situation, has political implications of its own as regards basic U.S. interests as well as involving cause of humanity. While Department is correct legal argument could be used, these factors certainly should not be ignored and furnish basic reason why Egypt has perfected plans while others have not.
Department’s suggestion comes at time when situation already deteriorating and when, whether logical in our opinion or not, there is deepest suspicion and feeling around our intentions towards Egypt. We are daily impressed with depth of emotion which, surprisingly enough for Egypt, is not being manifested in all its intensity as yet by local press. It is almost a certainty that if things continue such as they are there is going to be long-term impression left as regards negotiations both on arms and High Dam that Egypt’s security requirements and most basic economic program have been subordinated by us to protection of interests of state of Israel.
If we really believe that Congress will refuse to approve funds which include High Dam as illustrative example under regular economic aid appropriations on yearly basis for this area, we would be better off to admit this frankly the case and prepare ourselves as best we can to live with what comes thereafter. Other countries have never accepted such statements without grain of salt, but at least it is an honorable position and can never be disproved against us. We should at same time maintain positive approach this project and suggest to GOE that despite developments which limited administrations ability follow through on original concept, we are still interested in project and are willing explore with them possibility of developing European consortium, perhaps with major West German participation.
In any event let us try to avoid public posture of trying to prevent this necessary work by an essentially negative approach [Page 682] which really seems to me unworthy of our country’s traditions and full of danger for our long-term interests.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 874.2614/5–2656. Top Secret; Priority. Received at 8:36 p.m. Repeated priority to Addis Ababa, London, and Khartoum.↩
- Printed as telegram 226, Document 362.↩