Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Arab-Israeli Dispute, January 1–July 26, 1956, Volume XV

316. Telegram From the Embassy in Syria to the Department of State¹

Damascus, May 1, 1956—8 a.m.

1015. Embtel 1001.² Reliable source reports following as gist communications exchanged between Hammarskjold and GOS since former left Damascus:

(1). In message to Prime Minister-Foreign Minister Ghazzi April 26 Hammarskjold (a) noted Damascus press reports attributed to “official source” linking GOS acceptance cease fire to question respecting SC decisions (Embtel 998³); (b) stated such reports obviously based on misunderstanding his discussions with GOS; and (c) asserted that, if GOS had insisted on attaching condition to cease fire, he would have been obliged report that it refused abide by its obligations under UN Charter.

(2). In second cable to Ghazzi April 28 Hammarskjold (a) stated Israel had agreed cease fire with all Arab States, and Jordan and Lebanese agreement expected soon; and (b) requested Syrian confirmation unconditional cease fire under Article III, paragraph 2 of GAA⁴ with reservation only re rights legitimate self-defense, as agreed during his discussions Damascus, in order permit him report agreement all parties to Chairman SC early week April 30.

(3). GOS replied same day asking Hammarskjold return Damascus for clarification certain points.

(4). In message delivered GOS April 29 Hammarskjold (a) replied his travel plans make return Damascus difficult; (b) stated he assumed clarification desired by GOS related question “legitimate self-defense”; (c) repeated personal opinion previously expressed to GOS that, re specific situation raised by it during his visit Damascus (i.e., Jisr Banat Yacub Canal), determination of what would constitute legitimate self-defense (in event Israelis resumed work) could be made only by SC; (d) again requested Syrian confirmation cease fire; and (e) repeated assurance he would attempt separately obtain Israeli commitment abide by SC decisions.

GOS expected reply today to Hammarskjold’s April 29 message.⁵

Local press featuring report from Beirut that Hammarskjold does not consider Israeli diversion Jordan River violates GAA. Typical headline: “UNSYG ignores SC decision and says Syria not entitled prevent diversion of Jordan”. According press this question discussed by Ghazzi with Egyptian Ambassador Damascus,⁶ and by Foreign Office Secretary General Tarazi with Lebanese Foreign Minister⁷ in Beirut April 29. Most journals allege Egypt and Lebanon will support Syrian position (cf. Embtel 1004⁸).

Comment: Whether GOS continues insist on linking cease fire to satisfactory assurances re Jisr Banat Yacub will probably depend, in part at least, on extent other Arab States willing associate selves with Syrian position. Embassy has so far been able obtain no information here to confirm or deny press reports re what pledges, if any, GOS may have received from Egypt, Lebanon and Jordan. First sentence Beirut telegram 1359 to Department,⁹ however, suggests Lebanon has adopted Syrian position.

Moose

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/5–156. Secret. Received at 8:20 a.m. Repeated to Amman, Beirut, Cairo, Jerusalem, London, Paris, and Tel Aviv.
2. Document 309.
3. See footnote 2, ibid.
4. Article 3 (2) of the Israel-Syria General Armistice Agreement stated that no military or paramilitary elements of the land, sea, or air forces of either party were to commit any warlike or hostile acts against the military or paramilitary forces of the other party. (U.N. doc. S/1353/Add. 1 and 2 and Corr. 1)
5. See Document 320.
6. Brigadier Mahmoud Riad.
7. Salim Lahoud.
8. The Embassy reported in telegram 1004, April 26, that some newspapers had been saying “that Jordan and Lebanon will follow Syrian lead in refusing give Hammarskjold cease fire guarantee until Israel agrees terminate Jisr Banat Yacub Project.” (Department of State, Central Files, 684A.85322/4–2656)
9. The first sentence of telegram 1359 from Beirut, April 29, reads as follows: “Foreign Minister told me yesterday ceasefire and diversion Jordan waters tied together and to seek Israel commitment not to divert Jordan waters until agreement for their use can be reached.” (Ibid., 684A.86/4–2956)