Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Arab-Israeli Dispute, January 1–July 26, 1956, Volume XV

313. Telegram From the Embassy in Egypt to the Department of State¹

Cairo, April 29, 1956—2 p.m.

2165. Reference Department telegram 2598.² As this exchange messages has revealed, I tend be more hopeful than Department that by continuing lines followed since last October we should be able obtain at least minimum required support from growing events of Arab world (Nasser) for free world objectives ….

Feeling, therefore, that we are again heading into period of tension, believe my most useful contribution can now be to make every effort assure that GOE fully understands our viewpoint, hoping that in process Washington will obtain clearer understanding theirs.

To do this, propose, if Nasser takes initiative of type envisaged by Department (and there is greater possibility that he will not), to follow fairly closely presentation set forth points 1 through 5 referenced Department telegram, prefacing my remarks with general statement US historic policy on colonialism and post-war activities in defense of freedom and independence. Would plan to emphasize particularly stoppage of attack against Baghdad Pact. Would like de-emphasize point 2 (d) as Egypt’s present representative Fawzi far more capable handling SC matters than member of RCC and shouldn’t think it appropriate to push this too far. Would like also to limit 2(e) to less specific suggestion, namely that he do something positive advance objectives of Jordan Valley plan. Believe visit by Johnston should not be pressed as it appears other Embassies in area agree with us that high US citizen in area publicly endeavoring secure approval the project now counter-productive.

In any discussion Nasser now, I will be vulnerable on subject high dam and Senator George’s statement³ may be on his mind. He might ask if we dragging our feet because of failure Anderson mission and in order apply pressure on GOE for “political advantage”.

If he takes this tack, I would point out we responded very quickly last November, leaving him draw own conclusions re our present policy and reason therefor. We must anticipate that … Nasser’s conclusions in this matter will have strong bearing future Egyptian-US relations.

If it now appears we will endeavor have UN mediate broader issues of Arab-Israeli conflict, would it not be advantageous defer implementation … policy for a bit … in order avoid in short run risks we foresee? Nasser’s position in such an effort would probably set tone for other Arab States just as it has on current mission of Secretary General. Nasser’s intelligence, which extends inside every political party in area, will tell him immediately of facts which seem against him, and I should think we would not wish this state of affairs if UN effort to be made.

Byroade

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/4–1956. Top Secret; Priority; Limited Distribution; Omega Handling. Received at 2:36 p.m.
2. Document 310.
3. On April 27, Senator Walter F. George, Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, declared his opposition to the U.S. offer of long-term assistance for the construction of the Aswan Dam.