Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Arab-Israeli Dispute, January 1–July 26, 1956, Volume XV

305. Paper Prepared by the Secretary of State’s Special Assistant (Russell)¹

Washington, April 25, 1956.

PROPOSAL FOR STATEMENT BY THE UNITED STATES THAT IT WILL MAKE WEAPONS AVAILABLE TO VICTIM OF AGGRESSION IN THE MIDDLE EAST

The Proposal:

It is proposed that, if the state of tension in the Middle East should reach a point where it appeared that either Israel or the Arab states were likely to initiate hostilities, the United States should announce that it was prepared to make certain weapons available to the victim of aggression. The announcement would be intended to serve the political purpose of creating an additional deterrent to aggression.

While there are a number of considerations which support the thesis that we should limit the announcement to a general statement along the foregoing lines, the situation existing at the time of the announcement might render it a more effective deterrent to be more specific. In this case it could be stated that if Israel were the victim 24 (or 48) F–86 jet fighters would be taken from operational units in Europe together with 30 days’ supply of ammunition and spare parts, computed at U.S. wartime rates, and assembled at Cyprus. The planes, together with their ammunition and spare parts, would be delivered at Cyprus to Israel pilots to be flown by them to Israel. Alternatively, if it were desired to create a sharper impression of the immediate availability of the planes, it could be announced that the F–86’s were forthwith being removed from their operational units and flown to Cyprus where they would be maintained in an operational ready condition. However, if they were maintained in an operational ready condition on Cyprus, it would require U.S. personnel and maintenance and would tend to inject us more into the Cyprus situation. It would also be stated that there would be loaded on an AKA (attack cargo vessel), to be operated with the Sixth Fleet, for delivery to the Arab states in the event they were found to be the victims of aggression by Israel, the following: 36 AAA weapons 75 mm (Skysweeper), 280 105 mm Recoilless Rifles mounted on 1/4 ton trucks, 1000 3.5 inch Rocket Launchers, 35,000 cubit feet antitank mines and 10,000 cubit feet of miscellaneous ammunition.

Advance Notification to Other Governments:

If this proposal is adopted, the British, Italian and Greek Governments should be informed of the possibility of our making such an announcement and their assent obtained for the use of air bases in Italy, Greece and Cyprus for transit or for deliveries.

Training:

This Government is presently endeavoring to induce either the Canadian or the Italian Government to make F-86’s available to the Israel Government. If these efforts are successful, the Israel Government would shortly be training pilots in the use of F–86’s so they would be in a position to utilize any F–86’s which would be delivered to them pursuant to this proposal. In any event, the Israel Government last March asked the Italian Government whether Israel pilots could be given F–86 training in Italy. The Italians were disposed to agree but consulted the U.S. MAAG which, after consulting Defense, said that in view of NATO training requirements, it was inclined to disapprove the proposal but said the decision was up to the Italians. The Italians turned down the request. It can be presumed that the Italian Government would be willing to reconsider and that ground crew training as well as pilot training could be provided. Such training, for pilots who had previously qualified in jet aircraft, requires approximately five weeks.

With respect to the Arab stockpile, recoilless rifles and rocket launchers do not require extensive training. Although the Arabs could not initially employ the Skysweeper with maximum effectiveness, they would be of utility in the defense of urban areas and would be more nearly a psychological equivalent of the F–86 planes in the eyes of the Egyptians.

Availability of Weapons:

All planes, weapons, ammunition and spare parts could be provided from U.S. war reserves. A Presidential authorization would be required to release the war reserves and expedite implementing action. The provision of an AKA to store and carry matériel presents greater problems as all U.S.N. AKA’s assigned to the Atlantic Fleet have existing operational commitments. However, if the decision is made, an AKA could be moved from the West Coast.

Delivery of Weapons:

F–86 aircraft could be flown, combat loaded, from U.S. operational bases in Europe to Cyprus in a few hours with stops at Brindisi and Athens. The distances are Brindisi to Athens—472 nautical miles, Athens to Cyprus—586 nautical miles, and Cyprus to Israel—200 nautical miles.

The AKA vessel with the stockpile for the Arab states should be operated with the Sixth Fleet which is within 24 to 60 hours sailing time of Alexandria, Beirut and Latakia.

Action Required:

In order to be in a position to activate this proposal, if subsequently this were deemed desirable, the following steps would have to be taken:

1. Obtain Presidential authorization for:

a. the transfer of F–86’s from their operational units in Europe to the Israel Government in the event we decide to go forward with this proposal.

b. the constitution now of an Arab stockpile (as outlined above) from U.S. war reserves and for an immediate assignment of an AKA for the purpose of this proposal. Such action should, of course, be kept secret until such time as a decision may be taken to make a formal announcement. If any “cover” is needed it could be that the AKA and its contents are for the use of the Sixth Fleet. It would be necessary to make the decision on the AKA now, rather than later, as it will presumably take at least several weeks to make the AKA available (it may have to come from the West Coast), and to assemble the equipment dockside.

2. On a strictly confidential basis, inform the U.K. and request its assent to the use of Cyprus as the final storage point for the delivery of the planes to Israel in the event it was decided to implement this program. If this is to be explored with the U.K., the Paris meeting with them on May 3 would provide an excellent opportunity.

3. Inform the Italian Government that the U.S. favors the Italian Government training Israel pilots and ground crews on F–86 aircraft.

4. Immediately prior to implementation and announcement of this program, the Italian and Greek Governments would be informed and their concurrences would be sought in the use of Brindisi and Athens airfields for transit to Cyprus. We should also inform the French Government.

1. Source: Department of State, S/S–NEA Files: Lot 61 D 417, Omega #3. Top Secret; Omega. According to a chit from Russell to Dulles, attached to the source text, Captain Wagner of the Department of Defense and Mathews of the Policy Planning Staff assisted Russell in drafting this paper; Russell also obtained MacArthur’s approval; and a copy was sent to Hoover. The chit also bears a notation that Secretary Dulles saw the paper.

   On May 5, Fisher Howe transmitted a copy to Dillon Anderson under cover of a memorandum, which requested Anderson to return Russell’s paper to the Executive Secretariat after he had read it. Anderson complied on May 7. (Ibid., Omega #4)