Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Arab-Israeli Dispute, January 1–July 26, 1956, Volume XV

296. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State¹

Tel Aviv, April 19, 1956—6 p.m.

1120. Evidence available points to conclusion that GOI believes crisis with Egypt is at an end for time being. Roadblocks into Tel Aviv have been discontinued, home guard brigade demobilized; and portion of reservists have been returned to inactive status.

In our judgment most recent crisis reached much more critical point than any of its predecessors since signing of armistice agreements. There were a larger number of troops on active service and positioned for actual warfare than heretofore. Opinion of both public and IDF was highly inflamed during period Fedayeen activities; judgments of both Ben Gurion and Sharett at times appeared to be subject more to emotional than intellectual influences; and finally repeated failures Egyptian Government to respond to General Burn’s entreaties, firstly, to adhere cease fire and, secondly, to refrain sending in Fedayeen, placed Israel Cabinet in position of believing onus would be on Egypt in case outbreak general hostilities. Information reaching Embassy from several Israel military sources points to probability that initial decision had been made for a large-scale military counteraction night of April 19-20 and that this was called off at last moment. Department will recall that news of Hammarskjold’s success in obtaining commitment from Nasser to conform Article II, GAA,² reached Israelis 1 a.m. April 19 and it appears retrospectively that this was factor which resulted change of program by IDF. Influence of Hammarskjold’s [garble] presence in area at that moment was greatly strengthened by White House statement³ and President’s personal messages.⁴

We believe that experience past several weeks points to two conclusions. Firstly, we believe underlying situation is such that Security Council can no longer afford to ignore a chronic source of friction between Israel and one or more of the Arab States even if at any given moment such friction appears of small magnitude. Although for a period of several months Nasser’s unwillingness to adhere to a cease fire and periodic by firing his soldiers, largely Palestinians, along Gaza strip did not appear serious, time arrived when such a course of action caused Israel fatalities and reprisal tactic of shelling Gaza towns was prompt and disastrous. With Israel approaching point desperation and Arabs with new-found confidence (or possibly over-confidence) in their military power, possibilities in similar circumstances of retaliation and counter-retaliation will be greatly enhanced. Furthermore, situation will remain hazardous as long as the two parties have unusually large military forces in close proximity to each other. The conclusion reached is that on any given issues and after General Burns had had first try at solution and failed, the problem should immediately be seized at higher level.

Secondly, experience in past fortnight has brought out certain weaknesses in UNTSO structure which obviously need correction. There has been serious time lag between occurrences and reports of UNTSO investigations; so much so in fact that had general hostilities broken out at any given moment the decisive battles would probably have been waged and terminated before Washington or UN would have had clear picture of circumstances precipitating them or have been able accurately to place responsibility. In addition to need for freedom of movement of UN observers which Hammarskjold is attempting to obtain, it is also apparent that UNTSO badly needs additional personnel and improved facilities such as tracking equipment and its own staff of interpreters if it is going to be able to investigate, analyze and report with reasonable promptness.

Finally, recent experience reinforces Embassy’s judgment that no time should be lost by USG in dealing actively with water problem with a view to providing formula which will either solve matter or postpone development of an explosive situation at Banat Yaacov.⁵

White

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 674.84A/4–1956. Secret; Priority. Received at 8:56 a.m., April 20. Repeated to Cairo, London, Paris, Amman, Damscus, Beirut, and Jerusalem.
2. see infra.
3. See footnote 2, Document 258.
4. See Documents 263 and 264.
5. Ambassador Byroade informed the Department on April 23 that he agreed with the conclusions reached in telegram 1120. (Telegram 2116 from Cairo; Department of State, Central Files, 674.84A/4–2356)