Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Arab-Israeli Dispute, January 1–July 26, 1956, Volume XV

288. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State¹

Tel Aviv, April 18, 1956—4 p.m.

1110. When Ben Gurion and Sharett were informed of my proposed departure for US² they immediately set up a meeting in Ben Gurion’s home at 9 p.m. last night. This meeting was somewhat dramatized by the assignment of a 5-man police escort to accompany me from Tel Aviv through the Jerusalem Corridor, although the Fedayeen situation no longer appears acute.

Purpose of this meeting was obviously to: (1) Inform me that unfortunate controversy between Hammarskjold and Ben Gurion had been completely and amicably resolved. They wished to clear books completely of this episode in order that there might be absolutely no prejudice on part of US Government with regard to situation.

Sharett did most of talking but everything he said was attended to by Ben Gurion who seemed somewhat tired from their 2 conferences with Hammarskjold during day lasting a total of 5 hours.

Sharett made it clear that this unfortunate controversy had been cleared up; that both sides had agreed to forget incident; that there had been a further clarification of Hammarskjold’s miscalculation regarding the publication of Ben Gurion’s letter; that the “decks had been cleared for action” for the talks; that limited progress had been made during the talks; and that atmosphere was an entirely congenial one.

At this point, Sharett addressed his remarks to Ben Gurion and related some of his conversation with Hammarskjold in the car en route from Lydda to Jerusalem. …

Sharett … asked Hammarskjold why he took it upon himself to assure that Nasser does not want war. Hammarskjold replied that he was prompted to this conclusion because Nasser had resisted very strong pressures from other Arab states to take military action after latest Gaza incident. Hammarskjold said he concluded Nasser does not want war now …³ perhaps later he may wish it and after few months he could not say what situation would be. For moment however he convinced Nasser had no war intention.

Hammarskjold said therefore, he had reasoned that getting public commitment from Nasser that he did not want war would create position from which Nasser would be unlikely to move. He thought this would help stabilize situation.

Sharett said Hammarskjold had asked Ben Gurion for letter undertaking that Israel would engage in no shooting and no crossing of lines by regulars or irregulars (he had included irregulars to meet Nasser situation although we do not have any in this country). He said Hammarskjold was at moment engaged in trying to secure similar letter from Nasser. I understood Ben Gurion has agreed to supply such letter. In both instances undertaking will become effective from 6 p.m. Israel time Wednesday night.⁴ Although Hammarskjold has Ben Gurion’s assurance of letter he is not publishing it until he gets Nasser’s reply. He hopes this firm and public undertaking on both sides will assure complete quiet while his negotiations are continuing.

2. To comment on Dulles press conference Sharett referred to radio comment on Secretary’s press conference in Washington.⁵ He said Dulles was asked about arms from Canada. The report of Secretary’s reply was interpreted by both him and Ben Gurion to mean Dulles had merely said he not imposing world embargo on Israel. At this point Sharett turned to Ben Gurion and related to him substance his conversation with me Independence Day (Embtel 1106⁶) ending up with his proposal re F84s. Ben Gurion nodded complete assent.

3. To comment on new Soviet policy Sharett and Ben Gurion both referred to new Soviet policy statement issued April 11.⁷ Sharett referred particularly to Soviets willingness recognize demarcation lines. When I inquired whether this might not displease Arabs, Ben Gurion not sure that it would have any material effect on Arab-Soviet relations, but Sharett convinced there would be what he termed “ripple in Arab press.” They considered this completely new development with regard to middle eastern conditions and interpreted good word said for France and Britain as a “sop” …⁸ a sop to British prior to upcoming visit of Bulganin and Khrushchev and a sop to French before Mollet’s proposed visit to Moscow.⁹ Sharett is of opinion Soviets giving much more consideration to friendship recently and as they realize there is present favorable attitude of French toward Israel they are a little careful not to upset French in Middle East area. He also referred to UP dispatch from Moscow theme of which was that, despite this new statement of Mollet’s [Moscow’s] regarding demarcation lines, Soviets would retain Arab friendship.

In discussing changes in Soviet Union later and especially the anti-Stalin line now Sharett referred to visit to Russia recently of Syrian Communist who returned to Syria and publicly expressed great bitterness toward Moscow because he feared Soviets not willing to go all out against Israel. Near close of conversation both Sharett and Ben Gurion asked me to convey their most respectful greetings to Secretary.

Sharett concluded conversation by saying “in light of your numerous conversations with Prime Minister and myself we confident you will know what to tell Secretary”. I remarked that I should be pleased to give him fair and objective report on exact situation and attitudes which existed here.

Sharett then referred again to his conversations about F84s and other items which United States Government might find “manageable” and thus influence French and Canadian Governments to move in direction of supplying arms to Israel. Ben Gurion made one remark in this connection saying “if you could bring 72 planes to Israel you would find peace in this area”.

Lawson

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 674A.84/4–1856. Secret. Received at 5:47 a.m., April 19. Repeated to Cairo.
2. Lawson arrived in Washington on April 21 for consultations.
3. Ellipsis in the source text.
4. April 18.
5. For text of Secretary Dulles’ press conference on April 17, see Department of State Bulletin, April 30, 1956, p. 710.
6. Document 286.
7. Presumably reference is to the Soviet policy statement of April 17 regarding the Middle East. See Document 291.
8. Ellipsis in the source text.
9. French Prime Minister Guy Mollet and French Foreign Minister Christian Pineau traveled to Moscow on May 15 for an official visit. Mollet and his party returned to France on May 20.