Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Arab-Israeli Dispute, January 1–July 26, 1956, Volume XV

283. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom¹

Washington, April 14, 1956—3:51 p.m.

6146. Makins discussed with Secretary April 13 answers Lloyd should give Parliament April 17.² Secretary recommended British take following line:

Strong emphasis on supporting Hammarskjold mission; fact that UK Ambassador in close and continuing contact with Secretary; that UK representative in UN in similar close touch with US UN representative; and that similar contacts being maintained by British/ French and US/French. If questioned about tripartite meeting, Lloyd might take position that such a meeting would be held when it would serve the best purpose, but at present everything should be done avoid any action which might be construed to conflict with Hammarskjold mission.

Secretary said he thought that generally speaking line he informed British would take with Bulganin and Khrushchev pretty good.³ He agreed it important emphasize with Soviets action in UN rather than in Tripartite Declaration framework since he agreed Soviets disliked tripartite framework.

Makins confirmed UK opposed Pineau suggestion immediate tripartite ministerial meeting but proposed meeting Ambassadorial level Washington next week. Secretary said he opposed Ambassadorial meeting at this time stressing that primary emphasis at this juncture should be on action through UN rather than three powers. Referring to his private meeting with Congressional leaders April 10,⁴ Secretary inquired whether British couldn’t do something similar with key members Parliament to reduce pressures for public debate which would only serve create more confusion at this time. Mentioned draft of President’s speech next week⁵ had only one paragraph dealing with Middle East and in general terms.

Dulles

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/4–1456. Secret. Drafted by William D. Fisher, Staff Assistant to the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs, and approved by MacArthur who signed for Dulles. Repeated to Paris.
2. The memorandum of conversation is not printed. (Ibid., S/S–NEA Files: Lot 61 D 417, Omega #2)

3. Lloyd informed Aldrich on April 11 of the four-point presentation the British proposed to make to Khrushchev and Bulganin:

   • “(1) Make clear to Soviets that situation in Middle East and their activities there may well lead to hostilities which in all probability could not be localized.
   • “(2) Give them clear statement that ‘British are determined to fight for oil in area
   • “(3) Suggest that, if Soviets are really interested in maintenance of peace, they should announce publicly that they will accept and support any recommendations Hammarskjold makes re strengthening UNTSO.
   • “(4) Suggest that Soviets should agree that in event of hostilities they will not veto Security Council action in (A) naming aggressor and (B) instituting military action to meet aggression.” (Telegram 4591 from London, April 12; Ibid., Central Files, 684A.86/4–1256)

4. See Document 265.
5. Presumably reference is to the President’s address at the annual dinner of the American Society of Newspaper Editors on April 21. For text, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1956, pp. 399–409.