Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Arab-Israeli Dispute, January 1–July 26, 1956, Volume XV

265. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, April 10, 1956, 9–10:35 a.m.¹

Washington, April 10, 1956, 9–10:35 a.m.

SUBJECT

• Situation in the Middle East

PRESENT

• Senators Lyndon B. Johnson, William F. Knowland, Walter P. George, H. Alexander Smith, Styles Bridges, Leverett Saltonstall
• Representatives Sam Rayburn, Joseph W. Martin, Jr., James P. Richards, John M. Vorys, John W. McCormack, Charles A. Halleck, Leslie C. Arends, Carl Albert
• The Secretary, Francis Russell, Douglas MacArthur, George V. Allen, William M. Rountree, Robert C. Hill and Roderic L. O’Connor

The Secretary said that he had been asked by the President to meet with the Congressional leaders. He stated that our policy in the Near East had basically two major aspects. The first was the preservation of the State of Israel; the second was to maintain friendly relations with the Arabs in order to preserve the flow of oil from the area. The Secretary described, briefly, the oil situation, pointing out that Western Europe was dependent on Middle East oil. Oil from Iran, Kuwait and Saudi-Arabia came by tankers through the Red Sea and Suez Canal in the amount of approximately 1.2 million barrels a day. Oil by pipeline from the producing states to the Mediterranean total approximately 900,000 barrels a day. The total production of the area is divided, roughly between Iran, Kuwait, Saudi-Arabia and Iraq, although the Iranian production is not yet at full capacity. The oil can be lost by loss of either production facilities or transportation facilities. Pipelines can be blown up and we suspect they are already mined. The Suez Canal can be blocked. The loss of this oil, which represents virtually all of the oil used by Western Europe, cannot be made up by the West. Its loss would be a devastating blow to Western Europe industry and to the U.K. industry and foreign exchange position.

We have long believed that the only way the two policies of maintaining Israel and our position with the Arab states can be achieved is by achieving peace in the area. We have been actively working for that goal during the summer and fall but about a month ago developing events forced us to abandon, for the moment, hope of achieving a peaceful settlement of the Arab-Israel dispute and to turn to the immediate problem of preventing an outbreak of hostilities. The Secretary recalled his speech of August 26, 1955, in which he outlined a basis on which we felt a long range settlement could be achieved. Since that time the sale of Czech arms to Egypt and other evidences of Soviet support have caused the Arabs to raise their demands for a settlement. The Arabs now entertained hopes of squeezing Israel out of the Near East. Under the circumstances we have concluded that there is no hope for an over-all settlement now. We do still have hope of solving some problems on a piecemeal basis but not in achieving a final settlement of the Arab-Israel problem. Perhaps the Jordan water plan and the matter of refugees can be worked out but our primary efforts now are directed to preventing open warfare.

The Secretary said there was a good deal of thinking in Israel in terms of war. The Israeli feel that time is running against them. They could probably win initial victories in the next month or two but realize that in the face of growing Arab strength they are falling behind. Many Israeli feel that Israel cannot exist at its present size; that it must either expand or be swept away. We do not believe that their thinking has crystallized in this respect but it is tending in this direction.

The Secretary described three alternative policies which have been advocated for the area:

1. To supply Israeli with arms, as much as they can usefully absorb. However, no one believes that we can maintain the balance of arms indefinitely in the face of Soviet shipments to the Arabs. We do not think arms shipments to Israel is the answer because it would alienate the Arabs and result in cutting off Arabian oil. This in turn would greatly weaken Europe economically and bring NATO to a standstill. All the gains of the Marshall Plan would be cancelled and Europe would be forced to turn to the Soviet Union for economic survival and for its oil imports. Thus we would save Israel but lose Europe.

2. Others have suggested that the United States join the Baghdad Pact. The original concept of this Pact was a regional grouping to oppose Soviet expansion. Actually it grew out of the Secretary’s Near Eastern trip of May 1953. It has since been exploited by the British for their own purposes in the area. The U.K. has a great interest in Iraq, both because of its oil and military bases. U.K. adherence to the Pact provided a new basis for their relationship with Iraq which previously had been covered by treaties which were expiring. The U.K. has used the Baghdad Pact to build up the Iraqi and to try to spread Iraqi and British influence to the south. The British pushed the Pact rapidly and in some instances without consulting the U.S. It brought Iran into it against our advice. The U.S. has not consented to join the Pact, in spite of British pressure, for a variety of reasons, but primarily because the Pact is not now chiefly an instrument for collective defense against the Soviet Union but has become an instrument of Arab intrigue. The Iraqi are using their position in the Pact in their efforts to build up influence in the Arab world, and to challenge Egyptian leadership. It might be necessary for the United States at some future time to join the Pact in order to prevent its collapse, but at the moment we do not wish to do so because of the many extraneous elements involved in it.

3. Still others have suggested that we publicly unite with the U.K. on joint policies for the area. The British have been pressing very hard for us to do so. We believe that unless and until we can bring the U.K. around to our view, it would be a mistake to identify ourselves too closely with them in the Near East. The Secretary believes the British have made a number of mistakes in the area. They are in a state of undeclared war with Saudi-Arabia. The U.K. broke off arbitration on the Buraimi matter and then took over the area by armed force. They acted in this way without consultation with the United States. In view of our relations with the Saudis and our vast oil interests there (the greatest oil reserves in the world), the British action has put us in a very difficult position. In Jordan the British went ahead against our advice in attempting to force Jordan’s adherence to the Baghdad Pact. We counseled against such a move, pointing out that it would involve the Baghdad Pact directly in the Israeli question since Jordan was a neighbor of Israel and also would get the Pact further away from its original northern tier regional concept. The British attempt failed disastrously, largely on account of Saudi opposition …. The dismissal of Glubb Pasha followed. Moreover, in Egypt the British have very bad relations with Nasser.

For all these reasons we are most reluctant publicly to identify ourselves in the area with the U.K. We are working intensively with the British in trying to evolve policies upon which we can agree. However, to accede to heavy pressures from London for premature identification with the British policies would be unwise.

On the matter of arms for Israel, we do not exclude the possibility of shipments when and if we feel it will help the overall situation. We are encouraging shipments of arms from other countries. This follows the historic pattern in which the United States has never been a primary source of Israeli arms. As to the Baghdad Pact, we continue to support it and recently announced sending a very high level delegation to its next meeting. However, we do not think it wise to adhere to it at this time. As for the British, we are working hard for closer cooperation on joint policies and this work continues up to the present time.

Since our efforts to find a settlement for the Arab-Israel dispute have collapsed, we have been concentrating on preventing hostilities. Specifically on the Banat Ya’cub dam project, we have succeeded, at least temporarily, in getting the Israeli to postpone work again as they had threatened in March. We fear resumption of this work would precipitate a Syrian attack which in turn would lead to general hostilities. We are hopeful that Eric Johnston’s plan may yet develop on a piecemeal basis.

The Secretary then summarized activity in the last few days. On the 2nd of April an Israeli soldier had been ambushed and killed in the Gaza strip. On the 5th of April the Israeli retaliated with heavy shelling of a civilian village which killed more than 40 and wounded 100 Egyptians. In retaliation Nasser released several bands of commandos for raids behind the Israeli lines. These commandos operate on their own without radio communication. Israel has agreed to a cease-fire if the commando raids are called off within 48 hours, that time limit being up sometime today. Egypt has claimed she cannot control these commandos for lack of communication. At the present time we do not know what the Israeli plan to do in retaliation.

Hammarskjold is at Tel Aviv today and reaches Cairo tonight. He is in the area as a direct result of a UN resolution sponsored and introduced by the United States.² We are supporting his efforts by our own diplomatic initiative in Tel Aviv and Cairo,³ and by the President’s statement of yesterday,⁴ but no one can tell whether Israel will now launch a major offensive. We fear that there has been a growing desire on both sides for a war. We hope that the pressures of world opinion and fear of possible economic boycotts will allow reason to prevail. Our own policy is to do everything we can think of, alone or with others, to prevent war. If war comes, we hope to stay out of it. However, we are resolved to do everything necessary to support the action of the UN in resisting aggression.

(At this point the Secretary opened the meeting to questions. I will not attempt to indicate who asked each question but will give only the general tenor of the questions.)

Senator Knowland alluded to the problem of determining who might start the aggression and asked whether General Burns had adequate facilities for this task.

The Secretary said that he did not, but that General Burns has refused to accept additional facilities. We have pressed him to do so. We specifically suggested the creation of a neutral zone with additional inspection personnel and helicopters to patrol it. General Burns thus far has not accepted these offers. We hope Hammarskjold will remedy this situation and we have told Hammarskjold that we will support him with any necessary facilities in this respect.

Congressman Richards asked, assuming that somebody is clearly labeled an aggressor, what do we plan to do about it?

The Secretary replied that the United States will not intervene in force without going to Congress. We believe that if we know positively who the aggressor is, we can, by measures short of war, deal with the matter. Economic boycotts and the supply of military equipment to the victim of aggression might be sufficient. The great difficulty is to identify the aggressor. Whether the United States will be able to tell or will be willing to accept the responsibility for telling who the aggressor is, is the great enigma in this situation.

In response to a question as to British intensions in case of hostilities, the Secretary replied that we were uncertain as to their precise plans but that he thought the British and to a lesser extent the French were, in the event of emergency, giving some thought to coming into the area in strength and taking it over by force. This would be a very dangerous move in our view. It should be remembered that you cannot dig oil with bayonets. The most important thing to be achieved in the area now is to bring about conditions where the aggressor can be identified. However, it appears that neither side will cooperate to achieve that objective. They prefer that the situation should remain fuzzy. Under these conditions we may never know who the aggressor is.

The Secretary was asked as to possible UN action in the General Assembly. Under the “Uniting for Peace” Resolution the General Assembly could be called in 24 hours but quick action was very doubtful. The result would largely depend on who was the aggressor. If Israel was identified as the aggressor, the General Assembly would probably get the necessary vote. However, if the Arabs were identified as the aggressor, it would be very hard to get the necessary votes in view of the Arab-Asian and Soviet blocs. Moreover, any resolution in the Security Council unfavorable to the Arabs would almost certainly be vetoed by the Soviets.

Congressman Halleck asked if we were committed to the preservation of Israel. The Secretary said that we had no formal treaty commitment but that the preservation of Israel was announced United States policy. Moreover under the United Nations Charter we had such a commitment, qualified, of course, as to implementation by the terms of the Charter.

Congressman Rayburn asked what forces we had in the area. The Secretary described the 4 destroyers off the Israeli coast now, the 6th Fleet in the area, our air bases in Turkey, Libya, Morocco, Italy and Egypt. Most of this air power is in NATO and could presumably be withdrawn. Some of it is SAC and can be used independently. There is, he said, ample United States power in the area if needed.

The Secretary reiterated that our fundamental problem was to define the aggressor and that our principal task now was to create conditions under which such an identification could be made. If we could do that, it would create a real deterrent, he thought. Neither side wanted to be labeled as an aggressor. He felt that Hammarskjold, a skillful diplomat, might be able to achieve this result with strong backing from us.

Senator Smith asked what Congress could do now?

The Secretary replied that he did not think Congressional authority was needed at this time and that he had no program or proposal to make to the group. He might have such a proposal in a few days because the situation could blow up, although he did not think that it would. In any event we could not tell today what we might want to ask Congress for. The situation is so fluid that we could not formulate any Congressional program now.

Senator Knowland asked if we were going to follow through on the UN procedures before going to the Congress?

The Secretary replied that he did not definitely want to commit us to going to the General Assembly before asking for Congressional action. He feared that action in the General Assembly might bog down and tie our hands, particularly if the Arabs were the aggressor.

Senator Knowland commented that if we did not go through the entire UN procedures and specifically go before the General Assembly, we would have difficulty explaining our position to public opinion.

The Secretary agreed and said that normally we would, of course, exhaust the UN procedures. However under some circumstances United States national interests might require us getting quicker action and going directly to the Congress. This is what we did with the Formosa resolution. For that reason he did not want to commit us to going to the General Assembly prior to asking for Congressional action.

Congressman Rayburn asked whether the situation could not explode so rapidly that there would be no time to ask for Congressional action?

The Secretary agreed that this was a possibility but said that the President had under these circumstances constitutional authority to act to protect the lives and property of American citizens. The Secretary commented on his and the President’s press conference of last week on this point,⁵ saying that there has been no conflict between his views and the President’s. The President had asserted that he could not declare war without the action of Congress but that position did not exclude military action to protect United States lives or military forces under attack.

Senator Knowland asked if we were taking any action to remove civilians from the area?

The Secretary said we were studying that possibility but that we did not want to precipitate anything in the area and would not want to take any action which would give the impression that we felt war was inevitable. We do not now believe that it is inevitable but our estimate may change in a matter of hours, days or weeks.

There followed a brief discussion of the location and numbers of United States civilians in the area.

Senator Saltonstall raised the question on what our policy of preservation of Israel would mean if Israel were found to be the aggressor.

The Secretary said that we would not support Israel if it was determined that she was the aggressor and said that that position was fundamental to our whole system of resistance to aggression. If we did not maintain this position the entire system of world law and order would collapse.

Senator Saltonstall agreed but raised the question whether any such finding of aggression could be sustained.

The Secretary said that we would not go along with any finding by the United Nations if Israel is the aggressor unless the evidence is very clear. He said we would not concur in any politically motivated decision based on conflicting evidence.

As the meeting broke up it was agreed that the Congressman would say to the press that they had received another periodic briefing on developments in the area and, in response to Congressman Vorys’ question, it was agreed that they might say that Congress had not been asked for any action at this time.⁶

1. Source: Department of State, Secretary’s Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199. Confidential. Drafted by O’Connor.
2. See Document 206.
3. See Document 263 and supra.
4. See footnote 2, Document 258.
5. See footnote 5, Document 245, and footnote 6, Document 240.
6. Dulles subsequently spoke with Eisenhower over the telephone at 1:15 p.m. that day. Dulles “said the meeting went pretty well. There was no particular criticism voiced. Obviously some are worried Israel will be found the aggressor. The Sec. explained that the SC votes on that and we have a vote and won’t so vote until we are sure. The Sec. said the cables to Nasser and Ben Gurion went out.” In conclusion, “The Pres. said he was glad the Sec. had the meeting. The Sec. said he would keep in touch.” (Memorandum of telephone conversation by Bernau, April 10; Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, White House Telephone Conversations)