Mr. Secretary:
There is attached a first rough cut (done on a crash basis) regarding the
stockpiling of aircraft in the Mediterranean area.
The paper does not deal with the possibility of using aircraft carrier
borne planes but Defense will have some information on this Monday.2 Using carrier planes would
involve considerably greater difficulty insofar as training Israelis is
concerned, but we will get the dope on this.
We have learned that the Israelis asked the Italians to train Israel
pilots in Italy on F–86’s last March but the Italians turned them down,
because of an adverse U.S. reaction. It seems to me one of the best ways
might, if we decided to proceed on this project, be to say to Israel
that we would permit (if aggression occurred) Italy to sell Israel
F–86’s assembled in Italy. In the meantime, we could tell Italy we don’t
object to Italy training Israeli pilots on F–86’s. Then, if planes were
turned over to Israel in the event of aggression, they could be flown to
Israel via Greece and Cyprus. Israel would have to help get transit
rights from the Greeks as in the case of the Mysteres.
I do not recommend this course of action at this juncture as it requires
much more thought and has some NATO
angles but I believe it might be the least complicated and most feasible
way to do it.
I’ll be interested in your general reaction. When we have it, Francis Russell and I will re-work the
paper.
[Attachment]
PROPOSAL FOR STOCKPILING WEAPONS FOR BENEFIT OF VICTIM OF
AGGRESSION IN MIDDLE EAST3
It has been proposed that between 24 and 48 F–86’s be stockpiled at
some point in the Middle East from which they could be quickly made
available to Israel in the event that the latter were, or appeared
about to be, the victim of aggression. This paper considers the
practicability of this proposal, the ways in which it might be
carried out, and its effectiveness and possible consequences. It
will also suggest an elaboration of this proposal in stockpiling
additional equipment that might be made available to the Arabs in
the event they were the victims of aggression.
1. Place of Stockpiling:
From the point of view of quickness of availability, the two places
which suggest themselves are the Adana base in Turkey and the
British base in Cyprus. One problem in connection with the use of
Adana would be that Turkey is associated with Iraq in the Baghdad
Pact and the use of Turkey as the base for planes that were going to
be made available to Israel could damage the position of Iraq in the
rest of the Arab world and might, for that reason, be protested by
Iraq. In addition, the Turkish Government is pressing the U.S. for a
number of things and an approach to them on this question might be
utilized by them as an occasion for further pressure on us.
(Memorandum on storage of aircraft in Turkey attached at Tab A.) 4
Cyprus, of course, is the locus of current violence. Also the
presence of F–86’s on Cyprus might be regarded as U.S. support for
Britain’s position there.
Another possibility would be to stockpile aircraft in Italy or
alternatively to draw on available aircraft in Italy to meet the
need. This would require some understandings within the NATO framework but would appear to be
politically feasible. It would also entail problems of transit
rights through Greece, which presumably could be obtained.
(Memorandum on military transit rights through Greece attached at
Tab B.)4 Brindisi Air
Field in Southern Italy offers the best possibilities for storage.
The F–86 has an endurance, combat
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loaded, of 800 nautical miles. The distances
are Brindisi to Athens, 472 nautical miles, Athens to Cyprus, 586
nautical miles, and, Cyprus to Israel, 200 nautical miles.
2. Training:
A stockpile of F–86’s would be of no use to Israel unless its air
crews had been trained in their use. If Israel is to obtain F–86’s
from Canada or Italy on the basis of our approaches to those
governments, this would not be a serious problem. The training time
required to convert a Meteor jet pilot to a combat ready F–86 pilot
requires a minimum of 4 weeks and 40 flying hours. For ferrying
purposes, one week and 10 hours of training is required. All
required training could take place in Germany, Italy, France or
Greece. Last March Israel asked the Italian Government whether
Israel pilots could be given F–86 training in Italy. The Italians
were disposed to agree but consulted the U.S. MAAG which, after consulting Defense,
said that in view of NATO training
requirements, it was inclined to disapprove the proposal but said
the decision up to the Italians. The Italians turned down the
request. It can be presumed that the Italian Government would be
willing to reconsider.
3. Secrecy:
If the Israelis are not to be told of the possible availability of
aircraft to them, secrecy could probably be maintained if the whole
project is handled unilaterally or as a U.S.–UK undertaking. If, however, the Israelis are to be
informed—and it is difficult to see what practical benefits would
result from the proposed action unless they were informed—secrecy is
obviously out of the question as they would certainly let it be
known publicly.
4. Alternative Methods:
The question will arise as to whether the proposal should be made a
unilateral action on the part of the U.S., as a joint action with
the U.K., or as a Tripartite proposal. It would be difficult to
bring this under the U.N. “umbrella.”
In any case, if it is to be announced publicly, it would be
practicable and desirable to relate it to our plans for economic and
financial sanctions against an aggressor, which have already been
made known. It could also be tied to the President’s recent
statement that we would provide assistance to the victim of
aggression.5 The
rationale would be that in addition to plans for sanctions, we were
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also making plans for
prompt and concrete assistance in the form of aircraft to Israel
should it be attacked.
While it would be feasible for us to proceed with the proposal
unilaterally, there are various reasons, prominent among which is
the need for close coordination generally with the U.K., to take the
British into our confidence and to seek their cooperation where it
may be helpful. Should we decide that the aircraft can best be
stockpiled on Cyprus, British cooperation would obviously be
essential. Whether or not we brought the French into the picture
would rest primarily on our assessment of the utility of maintaining
the Tripartite front.
5. Evaluation:
Unless we made it public that we intended to establish a stockpile of
aircraft for Israel, our action would have no effect in relieving
Israel’s apprehensions or decreasing the prospects of hostilities in
the Near East. If we do announce the project, the Israel reaction
would probably be one of moderate gratification. They would regard
them as replacements for battle losses. They would, however, insist
that aircraft outside of Israel and available only on a contingency
basis are no substitute for outright additions to Israel’s own Air
Force. They would probably continue to press for increased
deliveries direct to them.
Despite the fact that we would make it clear that these aircraft
would be made available to Israel only if it were the victim of
aggression, the Arabs would interpret this move as further evidence
of our underlying predisposition to side with and support the
Israelis. Egypt might well react by seeking additional aircraft from
the Soviet Union. Unless and until such additional aircraft were
obtained, our stockpile might have a deterrent effect on the
Egyptians. This possibility should not, however, be over rated. If
the Egyptians are thinking in terms of a surprise air attack on
Israel, they may well calculate that they could mount this attack
and bomb their important objectives before the stockpiled aircraft
could be brought into play. If they were successful in heavily
damaging a large proportion of the Israeli air fields, their
calculations might well be correct.
6. Balanced Stockpiles:
An alternative to the basic proposal would be to establish in the
area a countervailing stockpile of defensive military equipment that
would be made available to the Arabs in the event that Israel were
the aggressor. If this were done, it would be possible to present
the proposal as an even-handed offer to both sides. This would have
the
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consequence of
decreasing Israel’s gratification and Arab objections. It must be
said, however, that it is fairly doubtful that the equipment for the
Arabs could be made available to them in sufficient time to weigh in
the initial stages of the battle with Israel. (Further study is
being given to the place where equipment for the Arabs should be
stored.) We now assume that if the Israelis were the aggressor, they
would strike hard and fast with the objective of destroying Egyptian
forces presently in the Sinai peninsula. They would very probably
accomplish this objective before the stockpiled equipment could be
delivered to the Egyptian armed forces. The type of arms suggested
for the Arabs are modern anti-aircraft, antitank and rocket
launchers. However, the Arab states now have more modern equipment
than they will be able to utilize effectively for 12 to 24 months.
If additional U.S. equipment is furnished, it will appeal to the
Arabs only if it is “prestige items” such as the 120 mm AA guns. Training of 120 mm AA gun units will take from 9 to 12
months for effective operation of the equipment and from 18 to 24
months for the technical and maintenance personnel.
The effect on the Israelis of the furnishing to the Arabs U.S. Army
material would be one of little concern militarily. They are well
aware of the capability of the Arabs to absorb such equipment and
know that it will not increase the Arab military potential for a
considerable period of time.
7. Conclusions:
a. Further intensive study should be given to the stockpiling
proposed.
b. If the proposal is approved, secret preparations should be carried
out to stockpile aircraft and other weapons which might be offered
to the potential victim of aggression.
c. Israel and the Arab states should not be informed of these
preparations unless it appeared that thereby we could prevent
precipitate military action by one of the parties.
d. If the parties are informed, publicity should be given to the
project, emphasizing that arms would be made immediately available
to a victim of aggression.
e. Stockpiling of jet aircraft should be done in Italy. The planes
would be moved to Israel via Greece and Cyprus.
f. Advance training of Israeli pilots in F–86’s is essential. This
could be provided in Italy, France, or Greece, preferably Italy.
g. The British Government should be informed of this operation
because of the close work we have been doing with them on the
Palestine problem and the good prospects of their maintaining
secrecy.
[Page 537]
Because transit
through Greece is involved, the Greek government would have to be
informed.
