267. Telegram From the Embassy in Egypt to the Department of State1
2025. Eyes only Secretary. Just returned seeing Nasser at his home deliver message from President your niact 24542 as well as White House statement.3 Nasser re-read message several times, asked clarification of each phrase that puzzled him due to English complexities, then showed understanding. He obviously pleased with tone of message and appeared to sense a note of understanding on behalf of President. It had a good effect.
As Nasser had given me such complete picture yesterday,4 and as he knew I had transmitted same, there was little he could add today. Nevertheless am less gloomy than when preparing yesterday’s report and feel that if situation can be held another 12 to 24 hours we may again be past immediate crisis point.
Had seriously tried suggestion paragraph 3 Deptel 24535 in yesterday’s meeting. He would not agree at that time as he still taking position that he was not telling anyone but me that he had deliberately ordered commandos inside Israel. Tried again today with more success as he finally agreed that his full position if known would be better than if he simply gave impression that he refused ceasefire. Said he would tell Hammarskjold and Burns full story. He also agreed that he might be better off by making his actual position public rather than be in public position of refusing ceasefire. Believe I might have been able convince him to take this step today but hesitated take step affecting Hammarskjold’s mission immediately prior to his arrival tonight. Also had feeling that Hammarskjold [Page 513] might wish to work out statement with him and that might produce better result.
Nasser was awaiting report as to how many commandos returned from Israel last night but said he thought about half of remaining survivors had come out. I asked how many days he thought operation would continue. Counting on his fingers from time they ordered in last Friday6 he said most of remaining should come out tonight. He said however there may be stragglers and if tomorrow’s report for instance showed say five still inside, he would not know whether they had been captured, killed or still attempting carry out their missions.
I suggested he think seriously along following lines:
- (1)
- Tell Hammarskjold exactly where things stood when he saw him tonight or tomorrow morning.
- (2)
- Work out with Hammarskjold as quickly as possible ceasefire and any statement relating thereto that Hammarskjold thought might be useful.
- (3)
- Unconditionally accept cease-fire with Hammarskjold knowing the truth about possible stragglers.
This would give Hammarskjold means of clarification to other side of actual situation if he thought this wise hoping produce atmosphere where few remaining acts would be tolerated without retaliation. Nasser said he thought this looked like good plan.
While above assuring if situation can be held next 24 hours, he told me one thing that may tend increase danger. Said Israelis had sent aircraft over Suez base night before last. They had therefore sent aircraft last night to photograph Tel Aviv and (I think he said) Jerusalem. Even though they dropped flares for photography purposes they had not been molested. Am afraid this will make Israelis think they may be in for early bombing.
Nasser today, as yesterday, was in serious mood but very friendly and quite calm and soft-spoken throughout. As conversation was at his residence, members of press not present upon my departure. As have been seeing much of him publicly lately, he may see some reason for today’s meeting not even being mentioned by press. Would hope that under these circumstances fact I delivered letter from President would not be made known publicly at home without at least advance clearance here.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/4–1056. Top Secret; Niact; Limited Distribution—Omega Handling. Received at 2:48 p.m.↩
- Document 263.↩
- See footnote 2, Document 258.↩
- See Document 260.↩
- See footnote 2, Document 261.↩
- April 6.↩