260. Telegram From the Embassy in Egypt to the Department of State1
2020. Eyes only for the Secretary. Saw Nasser in compliance Deptel 24472 as soon as Jerusalem’s 4043 containing data on Burns request for cease fire arrived.
Gave Nasser all arguments I could think of for prompt and positive reply to Burns request for cease fire. Nasser replied he could not honestly agree with immediate cease fire as he was in no position to carry out his promise. He had made decision after Israeli shelling of civilian center in Gaza to retaliate in kind with only comparable effective weapon at his disposal. He had sent commandos inside Israel. Their mission was to insure sixty dead and 100 wounded which was number of civilian casualties in Gaza resulting from Israeli shelling. He could promise Burns that there would be no more commandos sent in if there no more action from Israeli side but he could not stop present operation—commandos take no communication equipment into action—and would not do so even if he could. He drew map to show how Israeli artillery had been brought up to Demarcation Line. From there they could shell effectively heavily populated centers inside Gaza. He had replied with artillery fire but there were really no targets on Israel side of line. Then nature of the settlements on opposing sides of the line were so different that he could not accomplish any results by adopting Israeli tactic. (Produced battle record for me showing that with considerable expenditure of ammunition in one operation Egyptian counter-fire only resulted in damage to one cow.)
I tried to impress Nasser with gravity of present situation, which believe he shares but he repeated often that he had no alternative he could not sit by and do nothing in face of Israeli attack and Fedayeen were really only thing at his disposal unless he [Page 499] chose to launch outright war which he did not wish to do. I told him that sufficient publicity had been given commando activities so that Arab world probably had impression already that Egypt had retaliated sufficiently. He replied that pressure from Arab world were not affecting him. There was nothing political about his decision. It made on military grounds and was designed solely to impress upon Ben Gurion that he would henceforth receive equal retaliation. Nasser recalled that only other time he had made deliberate decision to have major retaliation was on occasion first commando operation last August. He now however had come to conclusion Ben Gurion would be responsive to no other type of persuasion and from here on out he was adopting Ben Gurion’s own policy of an “eye for an eye”. If the Israelis now launch retaliatory raid of Khan Yunis type of last fall he would take steps to see that there were exactly that many more casualties inside Israel.
Told Nasser that if Israelis wanted war he was walking straight into their trap and reminded him of his dreams for a better Egypt which could become irrevocably jeopardized. He replied that he could not head a government working for a better Egypt if he sat idly by in face of slaughter of civilians under his protection. Ben Gurion must learn that lives of Arabs could not be considered as second class.
Made no effort conceal from Nasser that I felt if commandos could not be retrieved subsequent events might lead to full-scale war. Asked his own opinion as to possible dangers to United States lives and property in Egypt in event war developed. He replied that he thought we would be all right in Egypt itself but things were less stable in some of northern countries where control could not be as effective. He returned to this point after some minutes stating that our protection was his responsibility in Egypt and he did not think we need be concerned, although public would obviously be stirred up if we should take side of Israel in event of hostilities. Embassy has underway preparation of measures to be taken in accordance established plan.
Throughout this conversation he repeated often that what he was telling me should not be passed to General Burns. I eventually told him that he must realize I would have to report to our President. This took him back a bit and I could see him wondering if on basis personal relationship he had told me too much. Nevertheless he did not object.
Fawzi was leaving Nasser’s office when I arrived. In brief conversation he told me he was sending message to Burns today which he hoped could be satisfactory. Gained from him gist of message was that Nasser would convey GOE position to Hammarskjold [Page 500] and Burns when he arrived Wednesday.4 Having in mind deadline set by Israel, told him I thought this hardly good enough. Fawzi looked worried.
Comment: We may have additional thoughts and recommendations soon but desire report conversation itself quickly in view of implications. These thoughts however occur immediately. We doubt Israelis will restrain themselves (unless perhaps their anti-commando measures surprisingly effective) and there could be quick buildup to full hostilities within three or four days. Our personnel in the area and particularly Syria and Jordan it seems to us should be alerted. I believe chances are we would have less trouble here but am concerned as to reaction that might develop against us if information given me in confidence by Nasser is suddenly widespread. This I believe could have a bearing upon GOE determination to assist us here. It is for this reason that this message not being repeated so as to give Washington full discretion as to how to disseminate information.
Another thought is that possibly only way to stop hostilities is prevent another retaliation from Israelis. It is difficult to see how this can be done as Israelis will not know that commando activities are to be restricted to equate with deaths caused by Israelis. Department might wish consider most secret high level communication with Israelis as to what state of affairs is, i.e., commando directive is to inflict damage equal that caused by Israeli shelling and that subsequent retaliation measures by Israel will be met to greatest extent possible by equivalent damage inside Israel. This in a way leaves to them the decision as to general hostilities. It might be a deterrent on them to know that we look upon it in this way. They would probably be suspicious as to accuracy of our information. I can only say I convinced Nasser gave me honest picture.
It was clear from Nasser’s remarks that he would rely heavily upon Fedayeen type operations in event of war. I begin to wonder whether he does not look upon this as his primary offensive arm and might even plan withholding regular forces forcing Israelis to come after him.
Have not told British here. Leaving this as well to Department. With current mood in London re Nasser am somewhat concerned their reaction.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/4–956. Top Secret; Eyes Only; Niact; Omega; Limited Distribution. Received at 5:24 p.m.↩
- See footnote 2, Document 257.↩
- Document 256.↩
- April 11.↩