Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Arab-Israeli Dispute, January 1–July 26, 1956, Volume XV

259. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, April 9, 1956, 10 a.m.¹

Washington, April 9, 1956, 10 a.m.

SUBJECT

• Middle East

PARTICIPANTS

• The Secretary
• Mr. MacArthur
• Admiral Radford

[Here follows discussion of future United States policy with respect to the Baghdad Pact.]

The Secretary then said he wished to speak to Admiral Radford about another matter. He had been thinking about the question of meeting the Israeli demand for arms without turning over equipment to them, and had come up with the idea that perhaps it would be feasible to locate a pool of US aircraft in the area and notify both the Israelis and the Arabs that if there were aggression, the victim of aggression would receive the aircraft. There was some general discussion of this possibility, in the course of which the Secretary said he had thought about using Cyprus as the place to locate a pool of aircraft and equipment, but this raised political difficulties in view of the Cyprus situation. He was now thinking of Adana in Turkey, where there was an airfield where we had certain SAC rights.

Admiral Radford and Mr. MacArthur expressed the strong doubt that the Turks would agree to our pooling aircraft there to be delivered to the Israelis under certain contingencies. It was also pointed out that the base at Adana was a Turkish base, and while we had some military operating rights and facilities in agreement with the Turks which would permit certain training operations, etc., it was not a US base, as were the bases in Libya and Saudi Arabia. It was also mentioned that while equipment could be stored in Libya, the Libyan Government would not agree to aircraft and military equipment being delivered to Israel from Libyan territory.

Admiral Radford said that while the Secretary’s idea was interesting, as a practical matter it was not militarily feasible because if the Egyptians attacked Israel they would bomb the airfields, and planes from outside would be unable to operate from the smashed up Israeli airfields. Furthermore, it would take a certain amount of time for the Israelis to assimilate the planes and to become able to use them in combat. He said the idea did not seem feasible to him.²

There was brief discussion of the Hammarskjold mission, and the Secretary said that if Hammarskjold could get agreement on a neutral zone along the present demarcation line between Israel and the Arab States, and if there could be adequate UN supervisory personnel, the danger of aggression would be greatly diminished since it would be fairly easy to identify the aggressor, and neither the Arabs nor Israel wished to be branded by the UN as an aggressor.

1. Source: Department of State, S/S–NEA Files: Lot 61 D 417, Omega #1. Top Secret; Omega. Drafted by MacArthur.
2. Later that day, MacArthur informed Dulles in a memorandum that Radford had informed MacArthur that any agreement to put planes in Adana would require governmental agreement. The memorandum reads:

   “Admiral Radford feels that the proposal to have a pool of military equipment in the area to be turned over to someone who is aggressed against after aggression has occurred is not realistic and does not serve the purpose for which it was intended. He also believes it would lead to irresistible pressures to turn the equipment over to the Israelis before Arab aggression occurred.

   “I am inclined to share his views and I do not believe that it would be possible to use any place but Cyprus as an area for storing equipment and Cyprus itself would present us with very serious complications.” (Ibid., Omega #2)