252. Telegram From the Embassy in Egypt to the Department of State1
1996. Saw Nasser yesterday for long, general discussion subsequent to my talk with Fawzi (Embassy telegram 19892). Had this week taken steps to see that Nasser received through other sources the same general impressions my general concern as given to Fawzi. Believe this line has had effect upon him and is at least partly responsible for new upturn here in United States-Egyptian relations.
Nasser stated that he concerned I felt Government of Egypt getting such bad reputation abroad and wished to discuss all possible means of remedy. He talked a great deal about the psychological nature of the problems in this area, stating that he had not changed the nature of his thinking on any important aspect since we first came to know him in 1952. He referred often to his own book on “The Philosophy of the Revolution” and to his talk with the Secretary here in 1953.3 Said he remembered we took record of what he said and wondered whether Secretary would have time to reread that transcript. He felt no differently about the United States and wanted to be friends.
He would like to be friends with the British also, but they were now treating him publicly as an enemy. This was a deliberate plan on part of British. He had collected all newspaper filings of British press reporters here and was certain they were being deliberately briefed to be hostile by British Embassy. The charges that were being hurled at him from London were the same as those that were [Page 485] in those reports. He had told press here that they not go on general anti-British campaign but were to throw back at the British every breath of propaganda used by British against Egypt. He is certain that British felt they could intimidate him by this method, but they were wrong. Their propaganda against him was doing two things: It was raising his prestige in Arab World, and it was giving him material to analyze and throw back at them.
Rather than proceeding as direct advocate of British, I talked at length of indivisibility of certain interests between the British and ourselves in this area: access by the West to Middle East oil was no less vital from a security viewpoint to the United States than to the United Kingdom. Furthermore, any disruptive efforts against British oil interests directly affected United States, as contrary to popular impression, over 50 per cent of Middle East oil holdings were American owned. Did he know, for instance, Bahrein oil interests were 100 per cent American owned? This surprised him greatly, as I thought it would. Left with him chart showing extent of American holdings in Middle East.
One example of extent to which things have gone was when he referred to case of 61 drilling leases which have been pending with Socony-Shell combination for many months and on which have been trying to exert some favorable influence. He said he would not give Shell any more leases while Britain was treating him as an enemy. If Socony wished them all, he would finalize the deal immediately. I countered by saying that if Britain was so concerned, it might well be they feared Nasser might eventually move against their oil holdings. This would be a good opportunity for him to prove his intentions. He reaffirmed he had not thought of trying to see Middle East oil denied to Britain, but he would not make any additional agreement of his own with them in the face of their present public attitude. I turned to the question of Soviet influence. Said I believed reassessment in Western world only logical. After analyzing reasons for his arms deal with Soviet Bloc, we had determined to go ahead in constructive manner, although this had not been easy. We had evidenced our willingness to assist on High Dam, and we had withheld arms from Israel for six months which had not been easy for us. Our policy approach had been based upon hope that arms deal would in fact be limited to commercial proposition. Now, however, Western world saw great increase in Soviet Bloc trade and cultural missions and saw an increasing press enthusiasm over Egyptian-Soviet Bloc relations.
Repeated to Nasser as I had to Fawzi my speculation as to Soviet approach to this area (Embassy telegram 1989). He nodded his head in agreement with all my stipulations until I came to Soviet price which was that there should be anti-West campaign. This he [Page 486] denied saying they had never mentioned any such thing. I said speculation existed there might be agreement between Egypt and Russia to this effect. This he emphatically denied. He said again we should get to the root of the difficulty.
His basic philosophy as always was still one of full independence for Egypt, protection from the Israeli threat, and economic progress for his country. Russia was actively helping in both of the latter. Russia had helped him with arms when he sorely needed them and could not get them, at least in sufficient quantity, from West. Russia was offering attractive economic propositions to area and was smart enough to ask for no political strings. Their prices were cheap and it was possible to trade Egyptian products for theirs. Did I think he should refuse trade missions under these conditions? He had had every delegation here under the closest scrutiny. They talked business and were all smiles and politeness. They never committed mistake of conducting propaganda or asking for anti-Western action.
Questioned him closely as to whether he was really aware of daily acts in his ministries which gave impression that there were political motives behind trend toward more business with East. I knew for instance that one large importer of American goods in Egypt had been closely questioned by intelligence types about his friendship for America and reliance on American products. Nasser said there no reason any officer should consider business trends from a political point of view and he would have this matter investigated. However to understand problem we must again go to its roots. They had recently had Cabinet discussion on business trends and they were in impossible position regarding United States imports. He mentioned 9 million export balance to United States as against 21 million import. They simply had to curtail United States imports because of their dollar position. He did not like this but could not change the facts. Perhaps if we analyzed the problem together we might find some answer.
As regards the charges against him Nasser said he had no plan to try to assume leadership of the area. He was superstitious in that regard and considered anyone who planned such achievement would fail. He was not committing acts against us in other Arab States as we assumed although he felt we working against him in certain instances. He regretted reputation of interference in other’s affairs and volunteered that he knew, for example, he accused of using Egypt’s many teachers throughout Arab world for this purpose. He felt such activities would only react against Egypt and him and that these people, including some 200 in Iraq, had received specific orders not to engage in political activities of any kind. He did not say when these orders were issued but I am inclined to think recently.
[Page 487]Nasser at end said we should spend more time together and go through everything of any interest our two governments. He said I will answer honestly any questions that you ask. I will tell you completely of any policy Egypt has that you might be interested in. I am not afraid to do this with you and America because I know you will not misuse it against me. Our problem is not one of hostility but one of misunderstanding.
Regardless of inability give adequate picture of such diverse conversation believe this week’s operation culminating in this conversation has had some effect. He asked that I see him again next week. Unless instructed to contrary believe I should do so as the image held before Nasser as to how others sometimes see him probably good. Certainly he does not get it from his own people and British relations are such here that I doubt he will receive Trevelyan for a long time. If Department questions this approach please remember Nasser is after all an Arab. His understanding of my approach which hasn’t been necessary for me to put to him in words is probably this. “I have explained your position and defended you as a friend. I now wonder where you are taking us both.” I believe he wants to try to reply to me to best of his ability and may be more susceptible now to influence than at any time since I have been here.4
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.74/4–656. Secret; Priority. Received at 1 a.m., April 7. Repeated to Amman, Baghdad, Beirut, Damascus, Jidda, Tel Aviv, and London.↩
- Not printed. (Ibid., 774.5–MSP/4–656)↩
- Dulles and Nasser met on May 12, 1953, at the U.S. Embassy in Cairo. For the memorandum of this conversation, see Foreign Relations, 1952–1954, vol. IX, Part 1, p. 19.↩
- The Department responded on April 12, informing Byroade that it approved “emphasis you have placed in talks with Fawzi and Nasser on concern generated in US by Egyptian policies… . We agree further discussions with Nasser could serve useful purpose but believe you should leave initiative to him. We think logic of events likely be more persuasive in inducing sincere desire on Nasser’s part to change his present policies than specific suggestions from US at this time. We also believe you will want to avoid playing up importance of Nasser to us or desire on our part to work in collaboration with him on area policies.” (Telegram 2484 to Cairo, April 12; Department of State, Central Files, 611.74/4–656)↩