208. Note From the British Ambassador (Makins) to Secretary of State Dulles1
Washington, March 21,
1956.
On Selwyn Lloyd’s instructions, I
enclose for your personal and confidential information, three copies of
a paper on the situation in the Middle East which has been approved by
the Prime Minister.
Selwyn Lloyd asked me to explain
that it represents their ideas reached after a good deal of thought. He
himself, as a result of the visits which he paid2 after seeing you in Karachi, is very
worried about the need for urgent action.
[Page 384]
[Enclosure]4
Ever since the signature of the Suez Canal Agreement we have taken
the view that the revolutionary regime in Egypt under Colonel
Nasser was disposed to
work with the West and could be brought to cooperate in the task of
securing peace in the Middle East. We and the United States
Government have hoped that Colonel Nasser would take the lead in the search for a
Palestine settlement. We showed willingness to help him over his
long term plans for the welfare of the Egyptian people, notably the
Aswan Dam. Although he has opposed the Bagdad Pact because of the
prominence which it gave to Iraq, we have hoped that he would
eventually be reconciled to the need for common defence arrangements
for the Middle East. We have relations with the West despite his
acceptance of the Bandung policy of non-alignment.
- 2.
- These hopes have in recent months become increasingly
difficult to sustain. I am afraid the time has now come for a
reappraisal of the situation.
- 3.
- Since Colonel Nasser
decided to obtain arms from the Soviet Union his attitude to the
West has steadily deteriorated. Although he is severe with the
Egyptian Communists and anxious not to be compelled to rely
solely upon Soviet support, he is, I believe more deeply
committed to the Soviet than we have thought. He is already
becoming a prisoner of his arms policy and may no longer be in a
position to free himself from Soviet control. Like Mussolini
before him, he has become beholden to a ruthless power. His
pride will not allow him to extricate himself. This will be
relentlessly exploited by the Russians whose technicians and
experts are entering Egypt in increasing numbers (in hundreds)
and on whom Colonel Nasser is now dependent for the repairs and
spare parts for the armaments which he has obtained.
- 4.
- The popularity which the acquisition of Soviet arms has gained
to Colonel Nasser in
the Arab world is tempting him to seek fresh successes against
Israel and there is evidence that he may contemplate an attack
this year. The efforts which we and the United States Government
have made over the past two years to obtain a Palestine
settlement through Colonel Nasser have recently failed. We are driven to
the conclusion that he is not prepared to take any real
initiative towards a settlement. Why should he? As champion of
the Arab cause against Israel he consolidates his position with
the Arabs. The more intransigent he is towards Israel the
stronger he becomes. Egyptian propaganda has been openly
directed [Page 385] against the
Western position in all parts of the Middle East and Africa even
where no direct Egyptian interest is involved. Their attitude
towards our relations with Iraq, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, the
Persian Gulf states and Libya suggests that they are determined
to eliminate British and other Western influences from the whole
area. With the aid of Saudi money they are inflaming
anti-Western feeling.
- 5.
- A final illustration of his double dealing is to be seen in
his action since my conversation with him in Cairo.5 He protested on
March 1 that he did not wish to attack the British position in
the Middle East nor was he in any way hostile to our bilateral
agreements with Arab states. Since that date there has been
propaganda directed to the Persian Gulf states against British
and the International oil companies. Another attempt has been
made to detach Jordan from British association. An offer has
been made to Libya to replace the British subvention.
- 6.
- Accordingly I have come to the conclusion that we must change
our policy towards Egypt. Many things which we have hitherto
done or refrained from doing out of concern not to alienate
Egypt must now be reconsidered.
- 7.
- The following steps seem to me to be those open to us to
counter Egyptian policy in the Middle East. The order in which
they are set out has no significance.
- (a)
- Increased support should be given to the Bagdad Pact
and its members, notably Iraq. This involves a further
request to the United States to support and if possible
to join the Pact. If a decision to join is still out of
the question, the possibility of a declaration of
intention should be considered.
- (b)
- Increased aid should be given to the member countries.
We ourselves should consider whether there is anything
further that we can do, particularly to strengthen the
machinery of the pact itself by the creation of an
effective international secretariat, and the provision
of more technical assistance. The United States should
be asked to develop their “solid support”.
- (c)
- Iraq and Jordan should be drawn closer together. This
process has already begun as a result of the meeting of
the two Kings. Its momentum must be maintained.
- (d)
- Saudi Arabia should be detached from Egypt. This
involves reinforcing the existing fears of King
Saud and his
family as to the ambitions of revolutionary Egypt. He
must be made to realise that Egypt is aiming at the
overthrow of monarchical institutions in the Arab world
and the establishment of a union of Arab states under
Egyptian hegemony.
- (e)
-
Further support should be given to Libya in order
to prevent her falling under Egyptian or Communist
influence. The further support over the development
plan is primarily a task for the [Page 386] Americans. We, in
addition to our large existing subvention, might
help over the loan for the Tripoli power station and
the English school.
. . . . . . .
- 8.
- Whatever policy we pursue, we must expect continuing and
increasing hostility from Colonel Nasser. He will intensify his efforts against
Jordan. We must expect renewed attempts to overthrow the
Hashemite monarchy there. There is already fresh evidence of
this. Further attacks upon Nuri, including possible
assassination, must also be expected. The attack upon us in the
Gulf will be strengthened and a general campaign will be
launched to stir up hatred against the West and against any Arab
leaders who cooperate with the West. It is important not to
under-estimate Colonel Nasser. Egypt has powerful means of influencing
Arab opinion and is capable of making a lot of trouble for us.
It is quite possible that we should suffer some casualties in
the conflict. If, however, we postpone taking firm action
against Egypt, worse consequences will follow.
- 9.
- We must also consider the possibility of more direct action
against Egypt herself. The possibilities are as follows—
- (a)
- We could withhold all military supplies, including
instructors and spare parts for British
equipment.
- (b)
-
We could withdraw our offer of financial support
over the Aswan Dam.
. . . . . . .
- (d)
- We could withdraw our tripartite guarantee of Egypt
against Israel aggression.
- (e)
- We could encourage the Sudanese to make trouble for
the Egyptians.
- (f)
-
We could ask the United States to taper off their
economic aid to Egypt.
. . . . . . .
- 10.
- Since the object of our policy must be to isolate Egypt and to
strengthen our position in those Arab countries where we have
interests, it is essential that the steps we take should be seen
to be directed to the defence of Western interests and not
designed to uphold the interests of Israel. One way to
strengthen the Egyptian position is for our efforts and those of
our friends in the Arab world to become identified with what
Arabs regard as undue tenderness towards Israel. For this reason
I have omitted any mention of forcing the blockade of the Gulf
of Aqaba or insisting upon freedom of [Page 387] Israeli vessels to navigate the Suez
Canal. Our policy towards the Arab/Israel conflict must be
concentrated upon keeping the peace through United Nations
action, and threat of possible action against an aggressor under
the tripartite declaration. It will also be necessary to give
some defensive arms to Israel.
- 11.
- I do not believe that it would be permissible for us to carry
through successfully the new policy towards Egypt set out in the
preceding paragraphs unless we and the United States work
wholeheartedly together. The timing and presentation of these
various steps requires careful thought. Above all, the United
States and United Kingdom must clearly be seen to be acting
together. … But in the meantime immediate steps must be taken to
hearten our friends, particularly under the Bagdad Pact.6
