129. Telegram From the Consulate General at Jerusalem to the Department of State1

361. Paraphrase of Burns telegram to UN SYG regarding his conversation with Sharett February 23 transmitted by Contel 3602 to Department. Burns also made following comments on matter while at ConGen February 24.

While Eytan’s letter of January 43 “confirmed” acceptance UN SYG proposals for El Auja, Israelis have continued “stalling tactics” ever since with regard implementation. … In any event, Eytan’s letter of February 21 (Contel 3584) in addition stating that Egyptians have not yet implemented proposals further stipulates that as precondition GOI action GOE must also implement article 8 paragraph [Page 239] 3 GAA. Thus condition attached to “unconditional acceptance” at last emerges clearly. Burns told Sharett that some time ago Gohar had stated GOE would implement article GAA just cited if Israelis would remove “police” from D/Z.

Burns said Sharett appeared to have little enthusiasm for subject under discussion, and described him as somewhat evasive. Sharett had observed at one point that “he only came into this business in the later stages,” indicating possibly that he shouldn’t be blamed for mess made by Eytan. Latter “conspicuously absent” from BurnsSharett meetings. For a time Sharett endeavored maintain argument that one could draw definite distinction between “unconditional acceptance” and “implementation.” He thereafter dropped that theme in favor of thesis that new situation has now arisen because Egyptians have augmented their forces and equipped them with Czech weapons. Burns maintained that such considerations should not invalidate acceptance UN SYG proposals but gained impression Sharett doing his best enmesh them in broader context of provisions GAA. Burns recalled that UN SYG had especially wished make progress through obtaining acceptance proposals for El Auja before tackling problems involving wider considerations of Israeli-Egyptian relations. For that reason Burns has refrained from endeavoring see Ben Gurion in order suggest, for instance, possible obtainment “cease fire” Gaza area from Nasser on basis Israeli agreement draw back motor patrols from D/L (Contel 3385). He had feared chances implementing El Auja proposals would be lost amid discussion other outstanding issues.

Burns said that his February 23 conversation with Sharett was limited to above matters and did not include problems with Syrians nor reports Syrians shooting at Israeli fishermen Tiberias February 23.6 Burns added observers now investigating Israeli complaint, while Syrian MAC delegate7 has informed chairman8 orders against firing across D/L will be “reinforced” if allegations verified.

Cole
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 674.84A/2–2556. Confidential. Received at 1:26 p.m. Repeated to Amman, Beirut, Cairo, Damascus, London, Paris, and Tel Aviv.
  2. Supra.
  3. See footnote 2, Document 25.
  4. Not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 674.84A/2–2356)
  5. General Burns informed Cole on February 6 that the Gaza Strip situation remained unchanged. “He will suggest that Israel’s desire for cease-fire be connected with the question of keeping patrols 500 meters from frontier; he will urge that if Nasser issues cease-fire Ben Gurion concurrently accept 500 yard ‘buffer zone’ to which Nasser has already agreed.” (Ibid., 684A.85322/2–656)
  6. The Embassy in Tel Aviv in telegram 841, February 24, informed the Department that, according to Israeli sources, Israeli fishermen had come under Syrian rifle fire on three occasions on February 21, 22, and 23. (Ibid., 683.84A/2–2456)
  7. Lieutenant Colonel Bakri Kottrash.
  8. Lieutenant Colonel J. P. Castonguay of the French Army.