Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Arab-Israeli Dispute, January 1–July 26, 1956, Volume XV

100. Memorandum of a Conversation Between the Third Secretary of the British Embassy (Parsons) and the Deputy Director of the Office of Near Eastern Affairs (Burdett), Department of State, Washington, February 18, 1956¹

Washington, February 18, 1956

SUBJECT

• Tripartite Representations re the Johnston Plan

Mr. Parsons stated that in accordance with the agreement reached at the tripartite meeting of February 15² the Foreign Office sent instructions to the British Ambassador at Cairo on February 17 to concert with his U.S. and French colleagues in an approach to the Egyptian Government urging Egypt to call a meeting of the Arab states to accept the Johnston Plan. He assumed that the U.S. had already sent similar instructions. The British Ambassador in Cairo was requested to advise Amman, Beirut, and Damascus of the action taken so that the British Embassies could inform the other interested Arab governments. The Foreign Office suggested the British Ambassador might point out to Egypt that acceptance of the Johnston Plan would involve no greater recognition of Israel than proceeding with the Yarmuk scheme. Approval from General Burns would be required to proceed with the Yarmuk development and such approval could not be expected without simultaneous approval by General Burns of the Banat Ya’qub project.

The Foreign Office instructed the British Ambassador at Tel Aviv³ to ascertain whether the press reports of Ben Gurion’s statement re Banat Ya’qub accurately reflected Israel policy. If so, the Ambassador was to state that HMG welcomed the statement as wise and statesman-like. After consulting his U.S. and French colleagues,⁴ the Ambassador was instructed to inform the Israel Government that the three powers intended to exert all their influence to secure acceptance of the Johnston Plan and were suggesting that Egypt call a meeting of the Arab states for this purpose. The Foreign Office requested the Department to send similar instructions to Tel Aviv.

The Foreign Office also had asked the British Ambassador at Ankara⁵ to inform the Turkish Government in general terms of the results of the tripartite meeting after consulting the U.S. and French Embassies.

Mr. Parsons referred to a telegram from the Foreign Office, left by Mr. Morris with Mr. Wilkins on February 17,⁶ suggesting that the three powers make clear publicly that they would use force in the event of aggression only in response to UN action or at the request of the victim of aggression. He stated that the UK Delegation to the UN thought the statement might be too restrictive, and, consequently, the Foreign Office might wish to reconsider its suggestion.

I agreed to inform the British whether we had sent instructions to Cairo regarding a tripartite démarche. With respect to Ben Gurion’s statement, I said that our Ambassador in Tel Aviv learned from a talk with Sharett that there had been in fact no change in the basic Israel position.⁷ Israel reserved the right to start work any time after March 1 but made clear it had not taken a decision to do so and would be unlikely to resume work if negotiations were in progress or there were prospects of an agreement on the Johnston Plan. I suggested that it might be advisable to delay informing the Israel Government of the proposed approach to Egypt until after the three Ambassadors in Cairo had acted, and said I would inform the British Embassy of any instructions we sent to Tel Aviv along the lines of the British suggestion.

After consulting Mr. Wilkins, I subsequently telephoned Mr. Parsons that Mr. Allen had discussed Arab acceptance of the Johnston Plan on February 17 with Ambassador Hussein when he called on another matter.⁸ In view of the Ambassador’s negative reaction, we thought it would be advisable to consider the question of a démarche in Cairo further with the British and French before sending instructions to Cairo. Mr. Parsons said he would inform the Foreign Office.⁹

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.85322/2–1856. Secret. Drafted by Burdett.
2. See footnote 8, Document 87.
3. Sir John Walter Nicholls.
4. Pierre-Eugene Gilbert.
5. Sir Reginald James Bowker.
6. No copy of this telegram has been found in Department of State files.
7. See Document 98.
8. The memorandum of conversation is not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 811.2321/2–1756)
9. Later that same day, the Embassy in Cairo, in telegram 1949, was informed of the substance of this conversation. (Ibid., 684A.85322/2–1856)