75. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel1
605.Eban called on Secretary April 132 to deliver letter from Sharett3 and summed up Israel policy as follows:
- 1.
- Israel takes affirmative attitude towards US efforts create area defense against outside aggression but desires to know what her place will be in security arrangements.
- 2.
- Her policy based on maintenance of armistice agreements despite Gaza incident.
- 3.
- Israel desires see Jordan River Development plan succeed and thinks solution should be sought in Washington before another Johnston field trip. Israel engineers sent here for this purpose.4
Eban emphasized Israel’s need for security agreement, in view of network of pacts being woven in area and said Sharett merely requesting that Secretary take him into his confidence re US thinking.
Secretary replied that heart of problem was arranging some form of security treaty between US and Israel. He pointed out that except in Western Hemisphere only security treaties signed by US directed against Soviet communism. In case of Manila Pact5 we expressly excluded regional controversies. Security treaty requires consent of Senate which in turn depends upon settlement major issues between Israel and her neighbors. Although all problems between Israel and Arab states might not be settled for long period we could attempt this year solve major ones such as border adjustments, water arrangements, refugees and others. Our investigation indicated basis for settlement exists although settlement will not be wholly acceptable to either side. Summing up Secretary said security treaty must guarantee stability and not war; settlement of major issues not unobtainable; and we must decide now on procedure and timing. Although Israel might think plans too ambitious progress of kind indicated necessary to get type of treaty Israel wanted. Otherwise some interim device such as renewed and possibly strengthened Tripartite Declaration would have to suffice.
Secretary stated he felt approach should be made on substantially simultaneous basis to Israel and Arab states. Among latter US thinking of approaching Egypt first. Gaza incident and Nasser’s trip to Bandung had upset time-table. Secretary added that Israel might have ideas on tactics. He hoped that shortly after Nasser returned from Bandung presupposing quiet along border we could make up our minds definitely whether to approach Egypt.
Eban stated Secretary’s remarks opened new vistas. His Government also felt Egypt offered best opportunity. Fundamental point was whether assurances regarding Israel’s security would have to wait settlement with Arabs. He urged that present agreed frontiers be guaranteed. Regarding procedures Eban thought Johnston’s method [Page 155] proved effective on water question and could perhaps be used again.
In reply to any additional inquiries from GOI Embassy Tel Aviv should state further elaboration of US thinking at this time not possible. Essential point is restore calm on frontiers and establish suitable atmosphere for progress.
Department informed British Embassy April 14 of above conversation.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/4–1455. Top Secret; Alpha; Limited Distribution. Drafted by Burdett and approved by Russell, who signed for Dulles. Repeated to Cairo and London.↩
- A memorandum of the conversation isibid., Secretary’s Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199.↩
- See Document 73.↩
- Telegram 604 to Tel Aviv, April 14, stated that Israeli water engineers were in Washington for technical discussions concerning the Jordan Valley development proposal. (Department of State, Central Files, 684A.85322/4–1455)↩
- The Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty was signed at Manila on September 8, 1954. For text, see 6 UST (pt. 1) 81.↩