74. Telegram From the Embassy in Egypt to the Department of State1
1551. There are so many local and external factors that will have a bearing upon success or failure of operation Alpha that it probably useless speculate on chances at present time. It seems to me, however, in contrast many convincing apparent reasons against, there are at least 2 factors which might cause Nasser go forward. Strangely enough these 2 factors have become accentuated as result of events which have followed signature Turk-Iraqi pact. It would be optimistic indeed to say that some good may yet come out of situation which has been locally one of deterioration. Yet there is just a chance, if we play our cards right, this could yet turn out to be the case.
- 1.
-
The first of these is that Nasser is now aware that Egypt, or any grouping of states under leadership of Egypt, will not receive really effective backing and material support from the West, and particularly from the US, because of Arab-Israeli situation.
He sees that other states, more fortunate this respect in geographical locations of the North, can be enticed away from Israeli preoccupations (this probably not as true as he believes) and materially benefited by association with the West. He sees Egypt, geographically separated by Israel be [from?] northern tier, beginning to fall in entirely different light as far as interest of the West is concerned. These feelings of frustration could, on the one hand, lead him to seek neutrality and general non-cooperation with the West. We would under these conditions be confronted with increasing resentment regarding combination of Israeli and West generally, as he would consider this combination basically responsible for box in which Egypt finds herself. On the other hand, these same feelings of frustration could conceivably lead to decision to correct Egypt’s [Page 152] position by going ahead with Israeli settlement and turning far more openly to West for support. Influencing the choice between these 2 alternatives seems to be our greatest task in Egypt to date.
- 2.
- The 2nd of these factors, closely enmeshed with 1st, is an increased desire in Egypt to see line of communications reestablished between Egypt and other Arab States. There has been a growing realization that Egypt is in fact isolated by geography and that this will affect the importance of her role in Middle Eastern matters.
Stevenson and I have discussed general problem several times. We believe that a corridor, or triangular arrangement such as embodied in Alpha, will not be accepted by Egypt. In my last discussion with Nasser2 we discussed Negev sufficiently for me to conclude he would think Alpha proposal extremely unrealistic. In conversation with Stevenson just prior his departure,Fawzi stated Nasser wished US to work up specific proposal during his absence, but reiterated Egypt could not accept corridor and that whole of Negev south of Beersheba was only answer.Stevenson cautioned of course this extremely unrealistic. It occurs to me that Alpha proposal probably based primarily upon psychological and propaganda desirability of symbolic relinking Arab world.Nasser, however, is thinking in terms (which believe he over-emphasizes in practical importance) of actual effective land communication. When considered in this light Alpha proposals, due terrain and road considerations, are in fact unrealistic as study relief map shows.
Stevenson and I hope Department and Foreign Office will continue search for possible alternatives. In this connection, recall discussion with Haim [Nahum?] Goldmann3 in Department some 2 years ago. He volunteered his feeling that a corridor type approach to Negev would be unworkable, and even if accepted, would merely set up ambush trap for future. He stated furthermore approach should be one of trying to get peoples to work together locally rather than drawing of new lines to keep them apart. His own view was that we should seek joint Egyptian-Israeli administration of entire Negev. I remember my surprise at suggestion and queried him as to whether he thought Ben Gurion would accept such a proposal. At that time he stated he believed there was such a possibility.
For obvious reasons would recommend that idea not be further developed with Goldmann. Nevertheless it seemed this might be of interest to Department and Foreign Office in exploring new possibilities. Egyptian position, as stated to Stevenson recently, is certain to be that Negev south of Beersheba should go to the Arab States. Our [Page 153] guess is that they will hold to this position stubbornly unless we can find a better compromise position than present Alpha proposal.
In discussing Goldmann’s suggestion with Stevenson he made following points with which I concur:
- (1)
- if such arrangement were possible it would as well solve problem of gaza which is otherwise an awkward one.
- (2)
- joint israeli-jordanian administration would probably be more feasible than israeli-egyptian.
- (3)
- some type of minimum international supervision probably would be required, at least initially.
Returning to objective Alpha itself, it will be recognized this message does not attempt deal with internal problems which will affect chances for Alpha. Some of these are grave and could well assume such proportions as to dwarf those foreign affairs considerations mentioned herein which give some reason for hope.
Department of course realizes if coming talks go well day will come when net advantages to Egypt and Arab world generally will have to be placed in very specific terms. The cost will not be light as there are few apparent advantages for Arabs in Alpha proposals themselves. We assume here Department fully aware Arab-Israeli settlement, if possible at all, will be costly but believes as we do that net advantages fully justify such expenditure.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/4–1455. Top Secret; Alpha; Limited Distribution. Received at 4 a.m., April 15. Repeated to London.↩
- See Document 67.↩
- Chairman of the Jewish Agency Executive and Chairman of the World Jewish Congress.↩