Office of the Historian

344. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense (Wilson)1

Washington,October 19, 1955.

SUBJECT

  • Deterrence of Major Armed Conflict Between Israel and Egypt or Other Arab States
1.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff submit herewith their views regarding a draft report on the above subject2 by the National Security Council Planning Board for consideration by the Council at its meeting on Thursday, 20 October 1955.3 In view of the limited time available for examination of this paper, the comments of the Joint Chiefs of Staff have been directed to the military aspects of the “Draft Revised Paragraphs for the Supplementary Statement of Policy in NSC 5428” set forth on pages 20 and 21 of the report.
2.

Subparagraph 10 d. The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that all possible measures short of military force should be taken to cause the aggressor state to desist and to withdraw within its own boundaries before resorting to a blockade in order to bring this about. However, they feel that the policy should be clear with respect to whether a blockade would or would not be imposed in the event that it appeared unlikely that economic action would end hostilities promptly. The Joint Chiefs of Staff would therefore favor neither of the bracketed phrases in this subparagraph and would recommend substitution of the following:

“d. If it appears that the foregoing actions are not likely to end the hostilities promptly, establish a blockade with Congressional authority.”

3.
Subparagraph 10 e. In the event of major armed conflict between Israel and the Arab States, forces engaged could number between four and five hundred thousand. To intervene successfully in an action of this magnitude would, under existing force levels, require large-scale withdrawal of forces from other commitments. While the Joint Chiefs of Staff do not rule out the possibility that a situation might develop which would impel military intervention by [Page 615] the United States, they are of the opinion that a decision to take such action or to refrain from doing so should be made in the light of the conditions prevailing at that time. They would therefore favor the deletion of this subparagraph.
4.

Other Action. The Joint Chiefs of Staff assume that the actions indicated under subparagraphs 10 f and g under this subtitle would either precede or be concurrent with the actions outlined in the preceding subparagraphs. For clarity they suggest that these other actions be included in a new paragraph 11 (subsequent paragraphs to be renumbered accordingly) to read as follows:

“11. The following actions should be taken either before or concurrent with measures outlined in paragraph 10:

  • “a. Urge other countries, as appropriate, to take action similar to that of the United States;
  • “b. Make every effort to secure United Nations sanction and support for all such actions.”

5.

Paragraph 11. The Joint Chiefs of Staff are of the opinion that the combined planning for the military measures contemplated in paragraph 10 should take place only after it has been established that the United Kingdom, and possibly France and Turkey, are in general agreement with these measures and have indicated a willingness to participate in combined economic and military action pursuant thereto. Consequently, they recommend that old paragraph 11 be amended, and a new paragraph be inserted (subsequent paragraphs to be renumbered accordingly), as follows:

“12. In collaboration with the United Kingdom, and to the extent desirable and feasible with France and Turkey, develop plans to support the measures in subparagraphs 10 a, b, and c above.”

“13. Develop plans, as appropriate, to support military measures in paragraph 10 above; and, at such time later as it may be indicated that combined military action will be taken, collaborate in such planning with the United Kingdom and to the extent desirable with other nations.”

6.
Paragraph 12. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recognize that the timing and manner of disclosure of information, as envisaged in this paragraph, is primarily a matter of political tactics. However, to disclose the circumstances under which certain units of the Fleet would be diverted to a specific task might be unwise. Such a disclosure might also result in stockpiling in order to render a blockade less effective. For these reasons, the Joint Chiefs of Staff would prefer that any reference to military action be of a very general nature.
7.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that, subject to the foregoing comments, you concur in the “Draft Revised Paragraphs.”

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

Arthur Radford4
Chairman
  1. Source: Department of State,S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351,NSC 5428 Memos (Nov.–Dec. 1955). Top Secret. The source text is a copy that Lay circulated on October 21 as an enclosure to a memorandum to the members of the National Security Council as well as to the Secretary of the Treasury, the Attorney General, the Special Assistant to the President on Disarmament, the Director of the Bureau of the Budget, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, and the Director of Central Intelligence.↩
  2. See the enclosure to Document 340.↩
  3. Seeinfra.↩
  4. Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.↩