Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1955, Volume XIV

343. Memorandum of a Conversation With the Secretary of State, Washington, October 18, 1955, 3:30 p.m.¹

Washington, October 18, 1955, 3:30 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

• The Vice President
• Secretary Wilson
• Mr. Hoover, Jr.
• Secretary Humphrey
• Attorney General Brownell

I said I wished to discuss certain aspects of the Near East situation which had political implications. We were in the present jam because the past Administration had always dealt with the area from a political standpoint and had tried to meet the wishes of the Zionists in this country and that had created a basic antagonism with the Arabs. That was what the Russians were now capitalizing on.

I said I thought it of the utmost importance for the welfare of the United States that we should get away from a political basis and try to develop a national non-partisan policy. Otherwise we would be apt to lose the whole area and possibly Africa, and this would be a major disaster for Western Europe as well as the United States. There was great danger that this matter would get into politics, particularly during the coming campaign, and that the Israelis would make some moves at that time which for political reasons it might seem to the advantage of some to back, but with disastrous consequences.

I asked whether the group agreed that we should try to deal with this on a bipartisan basis and if so, how. I suggested we might try to get some Democrat to work on this topic in a consultative capacity, much as I had worked on the Japanese Peace Treaty.

The Vice President said he thought it was of the utmost importance to deal with the matter on a non-partisan basis, recognizing that it might alienate much of the Jewish vote. He felt we should try to get a bipartisan basis, but it was doubtful whether in fact this would work out. Other persons present expressed the view that whatever agreement on a major policy might be arrived at at the top level, this would not keep the matter out of politics at the district and precinct level.

The thought was that if I could get a Democrat in whom I had confidence and who had ability to hold the Democrats in line, this would be a good thing, but that it would be dangerous to take someone whom the Democrats themselves proposed as that would destroy the authority of the President and myself. They doubted whether there was anyone who could play in this situation a role comparable to that I had been able to play because of my qualifications and close relations with Vandenberg and Dewey.

I suggested that it might be possible to get someone acceptable to Senator George,Stevenson, and Harriman, but the general feeling was that this would be rather difficult and might expose us to having to work with somebody who did not feel a primary loyalty to the President and myself and did not accept the discipline necessary for the proper conduct of foreign affairs.

The suggestion was made that Senator Mansfield might be used in this situation, but it was recognized that he could scarcely put himself under the order of the President and myself as executor of policy in the day to day conduct of foreign relations.

JFD

1. Source: Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, Israeli Relations 1951–1957. Confidential; Personal and Private. Drafted by Dulles. The time of the meeting is from Secretary Dulles’ Appointment Book. (Princeton University Library, Dulles Papers)