Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1955, Volume XIV

340. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council (Lay) to Members of the Council¹

Washington,October 17, 1955.

SUBJECT

• Deterrence of Major Armed Conflict between Israel and Egypt or other Arab States

REFERENCES

• A. NSC 5428²
• B. NSC Action No. 1447–c³
• C. SNIE 30–3–55⁴

The enclosed draft report on the subject, prepared by the NSC Planning Board pursuant to NSC Action No. 1447–c, is transmitted herewith for consideration by the National Security Council at its meeting on Thursday, October 20, 1955.

It is recommended that if the Council adopts the enclosed recommendations for revision of NSC 5428, they be submitted to the President with the recommendation that he approve them; direct their implementation by all appropriate Executive departments and agencies of the United States Government; and designate the Operations Coordinating Board as the coordinating agency.

Further review by the Planning Board of U.S. policy in the Near East is under way and recommendations for additional revisions of NSC 5428 will be submitted at a later date.

James. S. Lay Jr.

[Enclosure]

DRAFT

Report on Deterrence of Major Armed Conflict Between Israel and Egypt or Other Arab States

Problem

1. To review the continuing validity of the courses of action set forth in paragraphs 10, 11, 12 and 13 of “Supplementary Statement of Policy on the Arab-Israeli Problem” contained in NSC 5428, approved by the President on July 23, 1954, as a means of deterring major armed conflict between Israel and the Arab states in the light of the present and prospective situation in the Near East.

Analysis

Changes in the Near Eastern Situation Since Mid-1954

2. The analysis of the Near Eastern situation on which the objectives and courses of action of NSC 5428, including paragraphs 10, 11, 12 and 13 of the “Supplementary Statement”, were based foresaw increasing tension between Israel and the Arab states, possibly leading to major armed conflict, and increasing Soviet activity in the Near East directed toward courting and supporting the Arab states. The analysis did not, however, anticipate that the Soviet bloc would make large quantities of heavy military equipment available to the Arab states. The Soviet bloc has now agreed to supply sizable quantities of arms to Egypt and may make similar deals with other Arab states; and has informally indicated that it would be receptive if Israel should seek to purchase Soviet bloc arms. The Western powers no longer exclusively control the means of maintaining an arms balance between the Arabs and Israelis. The new Soviet initiative has serious implications for (a) the Israeli-Arab conflict and (b) the Soviet influence in the area. This paper deals only with the first aspect. The broader review of U.S. policy toward the Near East is now under way.

3. The Soviet-Egyptian arms deal has substantially increased the risk that Israel will launch a “preventive war.” Such Israeli action is not likely within the next few weeks. The Israelis will probably wish to determine more precisely the magnitude of the threat posed by Soviet bloc willingness to arm the Arabs, to exploit the favorable trend of Western public opinion, and, most importantly, to determine how far Israel can realistically depend on Western and particularly U.S. support in maintaining its territorial integrity. In the absence of convincing evidence of Western determination to preserve the territorial status quo against change by force, there is very real danger that Israel will undertake “preventive war,” possibly in the next few months, and it would almost certainly be more willing to take risks which could touch off a new round of hostilities. An Israeli “preventive war” may start in the form of border raids where responsibilities and intentions may initially be obscure. (Paragraph A of Conclusions of SNIE 30–3–55).

4. Assuming that it is actually implemented the arms deal is likely to strengthen a tendency toward Egyptian militancy, and increase the danger that local clashes will develop into large-scale fighting. However, pending absorption of the new equipment Egypt will probably feel constrained to avoid serious difficulties with Israel. Over the longer run, the growth of Egyptian military strength will almost certainly stimulate some Egyptian interest in a “second round” against Israel. (Paragraph B of Conclusions of SNIE 30–3–55).

Effect of Changed Situation on U.S. Objectives

5. The analysis in NSC 5428 led to the conclusion that major armed conflict between Israel and the Arab states would be inimical to U.S. national security interests. This conclusion is reflected in the stated objective of deterring armed attack by Israel or the Arab states. (Paragraph 9–a of the “Supplementary Statement”). It has been argued that the Egyptian acceptance of Soviet bloc arms has so fundamentally changed the Near Eastern situation that it would now be in the U.S. interest if Israel won a “second round” of Arab-Israeli hostilities. This proposition must, however, be assessed in the light of the following considerations.

6. Should a “second round” occur in the near future, in which the U.S. simply let events take their course, an initial Israeli victory would be almost certain. Under these circumstances Israeli ability to seize and hold considerable portions of all its neighbors’ territories would be limited largely by its lack of reserve supplies and the probability of UK intervention if Jordan were invaded. The effects of a “hands off” policy on the part of the U.S. would have an extremely adverse effect on its position in the Arab world and would retard U.S. efforts to build indigenous Middle East defense. (Paragraph C of Conclusions of SNIE 30–3–55).

7. If the U.S. adopted a “hands off” policy in the event of an Israeli attack on its neighbors, it may be confidently predicted that Egypt and Syria would appeal to the USSR for political and material support which the USSR has indicated it would provide. Jordan and Lebanon would presumably first look to the other Western powers but if dissatisfied with their response might well turn to the USSR. Saudi Arabia and Iraq would be unlikely targets of Israeli invasion, but the former’s bitterly anti-Israel regime would make common cause with the invaded Arab states and would react strongly against the Western powers. Iraq might well succumb to anti-Western emotions and Arab pressures and withdraw from the Baghdad Pact. In the chaotic aftermath of an Israeli success, political conditions in Arab states would be ripe for Communist exploitation. A likely result would be to solidify the Arab world under Soviet political guidance and with further Soviet support.

8. It may be concluded, therefore, that although as a consequence of the introduction of Soviet bloc arms the risk of major armed conflict in the Near East is now more acute and more immediate, this change in the present and prospective situation in the area as compared with that prevailing and foreseen in mid-1954 is of degree rather than of kind. It is still and even more in the U.S. interest to deter major armed conflict between Israel and the Arab states.

Elements of an Effective Deterrent

9. The effectiveness of the deterrent to major armed conflict between Israel and the Arab states will depend on: the extent to which these states are persuaded that effective punitive measures will be applied; the prospect of firm UN action; the number of states that would apply deterrent measures; the economic, financial and military measures which the cooperating states are prepared to take; and whether both sides, but especially Israel, believe that their security can be achieved by measures other than a “preventive war.” U.S. determination to cooperate in preventing major armed conflict is the sine qua non of an effective deterrent. Given, in reasonable degree, the prospect of the deterrent factors mentioned, it is probable that neither Israel nor the Arab states would attempt armed measures to seize and hold territory outside their borders. If, nevertheless, either side should embark upon a preventive war, it would be in United States interest for action to be taken to compel the withdrawal of the aggressor’s forces. The continued holding of Arab territory by Israel (which is the more immediate danger) without Western action to compel withdrawal would alienate the entire Arab world from the West. The immediately succeeding paragraphs consider whether the courses of action outlined in paragraph 10 of the “Supplementary Statement” of NSC 5428 could be put into effect quickly and would impel a Near Eastern state that had seized territory beyond its side of the Armistice Line of January 1, 1950, to withdraw its forces and relinquish such territory.

Discontinuance of U.S. Government Aid

10. The Executive Branch of the U.S. Government could, of course, promptly stop the flow of U.S. aid to and withdraw its technical assistance personnel from Israel or any Arab state. This step would have a psychological effect. It would be more hurtful to Israel than to the Arab states, but it would not have sufficient impact on any of the area states to cause them to abandon seized territory.

Embargo on Trade With the U.S.

11. Statutory authority exists under the Export Control Act of 1949⁵ and the Trading with the Enemy Act of 1917⁶ promptly to embargo U.S. trade, including calls by U.S. ships and aircraft, with the Near Eastern states. As trade with the U.S. is not of major significance to the economies of any of these countries, except that Israel would have to find alternative sources for foodstuffs, this measure would not be particularly effective.

Blocking of Transfers of Funds From the U.S.

12. Authority exists under the Trading with the Enemy Act of 1917 promptly to block transfers of funds from the U.S. to the Near Eastern states. This measure would have extremely serious effects for Israel and would in time almost certainly force Israel to surrender seized territory. Unless other Western powers adopted similar measures, however, the Israelis might hold out for a considerable period during which the Communists would be exploiting the inevitable turmoil in the Arab world. Blocking would have little effect on the Arab states bordering Israel but would provide strong leverage on Iraq and Saudi Arabia.

Adoption of Foregoing Measures by Other Countries

13. Excepting Jordan, no Near Eastern state is receiving significant aid from western governments other than the U.S. The trade of the area with the UK and France is, however, of great importance and if an embargo by these countries and perhaps other Western powers could be brought about the economies of Israel and the contiguous Arab states would be seriously disrupted and critical shortages of such items as petroleum products would develop; it should be noted in this connection that Israel’s stockpile position is better than that of its Arab neighbors. It is, of course, possible that the Soviet bloc and perhaps some other countries would continue to trade with the Arab states, and otherwise to render ineffective the control measures mentioned above; and it is also possible that such states would take the same action with respect to Israel. If this did not happen, an embargo by the Western powers would in time reduce Israel or any of the contiguous Arab states to surrender.

14. As most of the Arab states clear their international accounts through and have sizable funds on deposit in London, blocking action by the UK would have marked adverse effects on their economies and would in time force them to capitulate. The effect of U.S. blocking of Israel would be reinforced if the Federal Republic of Germany ceased its reparations payments and the Union of South Africa blocked transfers of funds from its highly organized Jewish community.

Blockade

15. It would be desirable to establish a blockade as soon as possible after the outbreak of major armed conflict between Israel and one or more Arab states. Since a blockade would involve the use of military force, its legal basis would have to be found either in an appropriate UN resolution or in Congressional authorization. It should be possible to secure a UN resolution in a matter of days and if advance consultation had enlisted Legislative Branch support for Executive Branch plans, to obtain Congressional authorization without undue delay. Even if a UN resolution were obtained as a legal basis for the blockade, it would still be desirable to obtain Congressional authorization before applying the blockade.

16. A maritime blockade of Israel, surrounded by hostile states and with limited sea coasts, would be relatively simple and almost completely effective. Additionally, an aerial blockade, while unproved, would undoubtedly augment the maritime blockade. A full blockade would reinforce the effects of any trade embargo and blocking of transfers of funds and would almost certainly force Israel to surrender seized territory in a matter of months. Blockade of any one Arab state would present more difficult problems, because supplies could filter through from adjacent friendly countries, and the Soviet bloc might attempt to force the blockade. It is nevertheless probable that the blockade would be reasonably effective in minimizing the inflow of supplies, and it should in time bring about the capitulation of the Arab state affected.

Military Intervention

17. a. The most powerful and possibly the only effective deterrent to major armed conflict between Israel and the Arab states would be their conviction that aggression would be countered by the armed forces of the U.S. or other free world powers. The U.S. and UK have in the Mediterranean area and in Europe forces which could be brought to bear possibly within hours and certainly within a few days. If this power were applied promptly against troop concentrations, it might well check a major armed conflict before it was fairly launched. Air and naval intervention might be sufficient to accomplish the mission, but we cannot rule out the possibility of intervention on the ground. Failure to take all measures, required to check Israeli aggression, including armed intervention if necessary, would disastrously weaken the U.S. position among the Arabs.

b. On the other hand, armed intervention would have certain undesirable effects. It would put the U.S. in a disadvantageous position aggravating the maldeployment from which we now suffer and force the U.S. to expend manpower and ammunition against forces other than communist forces. If it became known that the United States was prepared to commit troops in this area, the Soviet bloc might well attempt to create a situation in the Near East or elsewhere which would force our hand to our disadvantage. If U.S. troops were committed against Israel, we could alienate Israel as well as cause adverse domestic reaction; on the other hand, in committing troops against any of the Arab states, there is grave danger of alienating all the Arab and Moslem nations.

c. In any event military intervention would have to be based either on UN action or on the request of the victim of aggression.

UN Action Prior to Hostilities

18. The UN has a continuing responsibility for the situation in the Near East as Israel was established by UN action and the existing armistices and armistice lines between Israel and the contiguous Arab states were established under UN auspices. It is, therefore, necessary to consider whether early and additional UN action would serve to deter major armed conflict in the present situation of heightening tension. This action might consist of a Security Council or General Assembly resolution calling upon the parties to the Palestine Armistice Agreements to take all steps necessary to bring about order and tranquility, to continue the existing cease-fire in full force and to conform to their obligations under the armistice agreements and the UN Charter not to resort to force. The resolution could also express the determination of the Council or the Assembly to take any requisite action in the event of a deterioration of the situation and could set up subordinate instrumentalities and procedures for observing and reporting developments.

19. UN action of this type would focus world opinion on the present dangers in the Near East and might strengthen the more moderate and responsible elements in Israel and the Arab states. The instrumentalities and procedures established might also make it easier to determine responsibility for an outbreak should it occur. As against these advantages, an attempt to utilize the UN in the present context and in the shadow of the Soviet bloc-Egyptian arms deal might well have the effect of drawing the Arab states and the Soviet bloc closer together, of leading Arab and Israeli representatives to take public positions even more extreme than in the past and of further inflaming the situation in the area. The resolution described would very probably be adopted, but it would add little to existing resolutions and would have slight deterrent effect. A more vigorous resolution looking toward the imposition of sanctions if major armed conflict should occur would have difficult passage in either the Security Council or the General Assembly. On balance and unless there are further developments which would alter the preceding adverse assessments, it does not appear that an attempt to obtain UN action at the present time would be constructive.

UN Action in the Event of Hostilities

20. If major armed conflict does break out, it should, of course, be possible to obtain a Security Council or General Assembly resolution calling upon (a) the parties to cease fire and to withdraw their forces behind the armistice lines and (b) all other member states to assist in re-establishing the status quo and to withhold support from the party or parties refusing to comply with the resolution. Such a resolution would provide a basis for the collective application of the sanctions of embargo on trade and blocking of transfers of funds previously discussed. It would also provide a basis for blockade or military intervention by the U.S. and other powers.

21. If it acted in the absence of a UN resolution, the U.S. would expose itself to the charge of interference in the affairs of other nations, to an adverse reaction in world opinion, and to greatly increased enmity from the nation acted against. These adverse effects would be greatly intensified if hostilities followed a confused series of events tending to obscure the identity of the aggressor. Finally, failure to invoke the UN would tend to impair its future effectiveness. On the other hand, under a UN resolution the USSR might decide to tender armed forces for use in the area. While this would remove the onus of interference from the U.S., it would increase Soviet influence with either the Arab states or Israel and would give the USSR a stronger voice in Near East affairs. On balance, the risks of seeking a UN resolution appear far more acceptable than the disadvantages of proceeding without one.

Collaboration With the UK and Other Western Powers

22. The UK has been working closely with us in matters relating to the Arab-Israeli dispute, retains considerable influence in the Near East, and has armed forces in the area. We should as a matter of great urgency plan fully with the UK for appropriate UN action, the application of economic sanctions, the establishment of blockade and such other military measures as are decided upon in the event of major armed conflict.

23. France is a party to the U.S.–UK–France Tripartite Declaration of May 26, 1950 and undoubtedly shares the U.S. and UK desire to deter Arab-Israeli conflict. However, France has tended to pursue its own independent course in the Levant, is exceedingly unpopular among the Arabs because of its North African policies and could make no significant military contribution to quelling major armed conflict between Israelis and Arabs. Accordingly, we should not discuss blockade or military intervention with the French, but we could be reasonably forthright in consulting with them on the broad outlines of our plans for UN action and economic sanctions. Some of this might well leak from the French to the Israelis, a development that would not necessarily be disadvantageous.

24. Paragraph 11 of the “Supplementary Statement” refers to collaboration with Turkey as well as the UK and France. We should keep the Turks generally informed of our plans and urge them to use such influence as they possess among the Arabs and Israelis in the direction of peace.

Possibility of Unilateral US. Action

25. If despite all deterrent efforts major armed conflict should occur, there are situations in which we might wish to respond unilaterally. In a clear case of aggression we might choose to react immediately and in anticipation of subsequent and early UN action. Similarly if the UN for some presently unforeseeable reason should fail to act, we might decide to move alone. Even in these unlikely situations, the UK would almost certainly be willing to apply sanctions with us. Hence, although we should on principle not tie our hands against acting alone, the chances that we should find it necessary or desirable to exercise this freedom of action are slight.

Problem of Identifying the Aggressor

26. There is a strong probability that major armed conflict between Israel and one or more of the Arab states would develop in circumstances that would make it difficult to establish, particularly in the minds of the general public, the identity of the aggressor. This situation would make it more difficult to act unilaterally. However, once a UN resolution had been adopted calling upon the parties to the struggle to withdraw behind the armistice lines, the identity of the party in defiance of the UN would quickly be established by non-compliance with the UN directive. It would thereafter be possible to apply sanctions to the offending party. Should both parties stand in defiance of the UN order, sanctions could be applied impartially to both, a situation which might have certain advantages from the U.S. point of view.

Informing Israel and the Arab States

27. We should seek an early opportunity to impress upon the governments of Israel and the Arab states, in accordance with Paragraph 12 of the “Supplementary Statement”, our determination: (a) to deter major armed conflict between them and to prevent any territorial change by force, and (b) to impose vigorous sanctions and to take such other action as may be necessary for this purpose. As regards Israel, it will be necessary to persuade the government that the U.S. determination is continuing and will provide a shield for Israel against aggression if and when the armed strength of the Arab states is significantly increased. As regards the Arab states, their governments must be persuaded that the U.S. can and will restrain Israeli expansionism. At the same time, the U.S. should emphasize its continued interest in constructive solutions of Near East problems.

28. These approaches to the Near Eastern governments can best be made within the framework of the Tripartite Declaration of May 26, 1950. It is neither necessary nor desirable that this Declaration be publicly reaffirmed, and even specific private reaffirmation can probably be avoided. It is only necessary to imply that the U.S. Government is still guided by the principles enumerated in that Declaration, would act accordingly in the event of major armed conflict, and if necessary would judge for itself where responsibility for the conflict lay. These private approaches should be supported by public statements of high U.S. officials on appropriate occasions stressing our concern over the Near Eastern situation, our conviction that any resort to force would have seriously adverse effects on all concerned and our continuing efforts to preserve the peace and to contribute to a solution of the area problems. The effects of our démarches would be reinforced if the UK made parallel approaches at about the same time. French approaches to the Arab states would probably not be helpful, but France might exert some influence on the Israelis.

Enlisting Congressional Support

29. Unless Congressional opinion has been prepared in advance, substantial Congressional support may not be forthcoming for a program of deterring hostilities with the result that both Israelis and Arabs would question U.S. determination. The increased risk of major armed conflict between Israel and its Arab adversaries now makes it a matter of utmost urgency to undertake the consultations with Congressional leaders contemplated by Paragraph 13 of the “Supplementary Statement”. Any program of sanctions would require Congressional support, while blockade or military intervention would require Congressional authorization.

Conclusion

30. The foregoing analysis indicates that the basic approach outlined in the “Supplementary Statement” of NSC 5428 is that best calculated to deter major armed conflict between Israel and one or more of the Arab states and, should such conflict occur, to bring about a restoration of the territorial status quo. However, recent developments in the area suggest the following proposed revisions in the Supplementary Statement of Policy in NSC 5428.

[Annex]

DRAFT REVISED PARAGRAPHS FOR THE SUPPLEMENTARY STATEMENT OF POLICY IN NSC 5428

10. In the event of major armed conflict between Israel and the Arab states, the U.S. should take the following action against the state or states which are determined by a UN finding or, if necessary, by the U.S., to be responsible for the conflict or which refuse to withdraw their forces behind the Palestine Armistice line of 1950:

Economic Action

a. Discontinue U.S. Government aid.

b. Embargo U.S. trade.

c. Prevent the direct or indirect transfer of funds or other assets subject to U.S. control.

Military Action

d. [If it appears that the foregoing actions are not likely to end the hostilities promptly, consider establishing]⁷ [Establish]⁸ a blockade with Congressional authority.

e. If it appears that the foregoing actions are not likely to end the hostilities promptly, [consider providing]⁹ [be prepared to provide]¹⁰ military forces with Congressional authority in response to a UN resolution or the request of a victim of aggression.¹¹

Other Action

f. Urge other countries as appropriate to take similar action.

g. Make every effort to secure UN sanction and support for all the above actions.

11. In collaboration with the UK, and to the extent desirable and feasible with France and Turkey, develop plans, including military plans as appropriate, to support the measures in paragraph 10 above. (No change from NSC 5428)

12. Make known to Israel and to individual Arab states the policy in paragraph 10 [a, b, and c]¹² above at a time and in a way deemed most likely to deter resort to major hostilities by any of them.

13. As a matter of urgency, enlist Congressional support for the measures in paragraphs 10 and 12 above.

1. Source: Department of State,S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351,NSC 5428 Memos (Nov.–Dec. 1955). Top Secret.Lay sent copies of this memorandum and its enclosure to the Secretary of the Treasury, the Attorney General, the Special Assistant to the President on Disarmament, the Director of the Bureau of the Budget, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, and the Director of Central Intelligence.
2. See footnote 4, Document 326.
3. See footnote 9, Document 326.
4. For text, see Document 335.
5. For text of the Export Control Act of 1949, which became Public Law 11 on February 26, 1949, see 63 Stat. (pt. 1) 7.
6. For text of the Trading with the Enemy Act of 1917, which became Public Law 91 on October 6, 1917, see 40 Stat. (pt. 1) 411.
7. Treasury, Budget and Disarmament proposal. [This footnote, all succeeding footnotes, and all brackets appear in the source text.]
8. State, Defense,JCS proposal.
9. Treasury and Disarmament proposal.
10. State proposal.
11. Defense,JCS and Budget propose deletion of subparagraph e.
12. Treasury, Budget and Disarmament proposal.