Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1955, Volume XIV

342. Telegram From the Embassy in Egypt to the Department of State¹

Cairo,October 18, 1955—noon.

759. This message should be read in conjunction with Embassy telegrams 563, 694, 687, and Tel Aviv’s 342.² It contains our recommendations as to policy U.S. Government should follow with respect to Arab-Israeli relations as result recent Soviet moves.

Although immediate motivation Nasser’s acceptance Soviet arms was domestic pressure to strengthen Egypt in face “imminent Israeli threat”, fundamental factor behind Arab receptivity to Soviet offers is, as we stressed in penultimate paragraph Embassy telegram 694,³ fundamental lack of confidence on part of GOE and preponderant majority area leaders in U.S. and other Western intentions toward Arabs regarding relations between Arabs and Israel. Arabs for many years have resented “pro-Israeli” Western stand but until Soviets were in position intervene on Arab side have been unable to express themselves concretely. Soviets have now given Arabs confidence that they can maintain a firm anti-Israeli stand for an indefinite period of time at same time preventing publicly their pentup frustrations against West. We believe it vital in assessing subsequent U.S. moves to counter Soviet offensive in Middle East that these facts be recognized. We assume U.S. does not intend to abandon Middle East to Soviets by default but feel that there is real risk in our doing so in absence fundamental reassessment our approach to Arab-Israeli problem. Alternative to such reassessment will in our opinion lead to growing identification of West with Israel which identification would be used with increasing effectiveness against U.S. efforts in area and against Iraqi membership in northern tier.

Thus importance of removing or at least substantially reducing Arab-Israeli problem assumes paramount importance since unless this is done we see no hope of establishing any substantial point of political interest in common, with which to “hold” or more correctly “win back” Arab States to attitude they held toward West in 1946.It seems to us self-evident that Israel’s interest in this connection should be identical with that of U.S. Loss of strategic positions in Middle East would be extremely serious to West but isolation in face Soviet-armed and supported Arab States would constitute great danger to Israel and might well mean ultimate extinction.

Prior to February 28, Israeli attack on Gaza there had been reason believe Nasser would welcome modus vivendi with Israel in order permit him devote primary attention to internal political and economic problems. However following signature Turk-Iraqi pact (which Nasser visualized as preliminary to political offensive aimed at isolating Egypt from other Arab States and leaving her alone facing Israel) and as result Gaza attack (which convinced Nasser Israeli action against Egypt of sufficient size to threaten stability his regime was possible at any time)Nasser’s desire cooperate with West on Arab-Israeli settlement perceptively diminished. On contrary GOE adopted counter plan which involved building up Egypt militarily as quickly as possible and politically by opposition to additional Arab adherences to Turk-Iraqi pact. At same time GOE made clear it had not completely discarded possibility of settlement with Israel but on Egypt’s terms i.e. “defensible” land link through Negev with Jordan.

Nasser’s arrangements with Soviet Bloc particularly if similar deals are made by Soviets with Syria and Saudis are unlikely to modify GOE attitude. On contrary there is much risk that if Arabs feel they can obtain effective military aid from Soviets that they will adopt uncompromising position based on 1947 resolutions as minimum. While there is no reason yet to reverse our earlier conclusion that Arabs in absence settlement would continue to harbor vague ideas about an eventual war of extermination against Israel, there is question that they believe that eventually increasing Arab military strength, continuation of blockade and, they hope, falling off of economic aid both public and private from the U.S. would bring about a situation where Israel would no longer present a serious threat to any part of Arab world in which case it could be ignored and eventually absorbed. Given this attitude it is obviously likely to be much more difficult for a peaceful settlement to be reached than was case when Israel out-gunned Arabs, but we believe it must be tried in interests of U.S. and of Israel itself. We exclude as detrimental our own and Israel’s interests, alternative of Israeli launched preventative war for reasons given para 3 of Embassy telegram 694.⁴ We assume Israel has no interest in other alternative to a formal settlement which we have outlined above.

Question therefore arises as to how to go about reaching settlement. In our opinion Secretary’s speech of August 26 still provides proper foundation this effort since it appears sufficiently responsive Arab requirements to permit Arab governments to reach settlement with Israel provided Israelis prepared to make substantial territorial concessions at least in Negev and possibly—if necessary—in regions Western Galilee and Tiberia.

We are of course aware from messages we have seen from Tel Aviv that settlement on these terms offers no attraction to Israel and indeed may well appear completely unacceptable to Israelis. However we think it necessary for Israel, United States and other Western States recognize fully new situation which created by Soviet offensive in this area. While in past we have apparently operated on hope Arabs in state of weakness could be persuaded accept settlement which would generally satisfy Israelis and their supporters in United States, change in Arab capabilities necessitates revision of this point of view. We should recognize that our objective now in seeking liquidate Arab-Israeli problem is not so much to find middle ground but to eliminate as quickly as possible situation which has so poisoned our relations with a vast area of primary strategic importance to West, that we are now in danger of losing it completely. It seems to us improbable that American public would be willing to hand over Western interests in area as a whole to Soviets in order to maintain small foot hold in an Israel threatened with armed attack from day to day, nor to satisfy demands of pressure group in American electorate.

Therefore we recommend Department consider approach designed to convince Israel that United States Government sees itself obliged either work now for basis of permanent Israel-Arab settlement or alternatively must reluctantly give Israel but secondary consideration pending achievement of wider free world objectives in ME on which Israel’s very existence must in any case totally depend. To make United States efforts in favor settlement possible Israel must offer territorial concessions. Otherwise there is no hope of Arab consideration and United States, since February 28 attack and resultant Soviet arms deal, had no leverage to achieve Arab acceptance. In fact, Czechoslovakia arms deal—which may soon be adopted also by Syria and perhaps by other Arab States—makes time short for this effort which United States Government would make pursuant Secretary’s offer August 26. Should Israel instead of signifying its acceptance this view point adopt policy of “preventive action” United States Government will move to restore situation, militarily if necessary, under principles of tripartite declaration (as it would if Arabs attacked), but in so doing it could not abate new and more determined hatred against Israel that would result from such Israeli action which would render permanent settlement out of question in our time.

We inclined believe that if Israel is willing to make move in direction settlement of Negev question,Nasser at least would be receptive, although Nasser and Arabs might adhere at least at outset to standard Arab position on Palestine settlement, that is settlement based mainly on fulfillment 1947 and subsequent United Nations resolutions re borders, refugees, Jerusalem etc. Since Nasser wants land connection with Jordan by Israeli cession of most of Negev to Jordan,Nasser would veto seek [seeking] substantial modification 1947 partition scheme and might reasonably encourage Arab States to move away from these partition lines in favor of “compensatory” cession in Negev by Israel. Such settlement might we believe be politically possible for Nasser by enabling him to represent it to Egyptian army and other Arab States as victory for Egyptian and Arab diplomacy. We cannot of course be sure that Nasser will seek conciliation even if Israelis were prepared to meet his territorial desires. We are however encouraged by his reported approach to Nuri Said this subject (Baghdad’s 76⁵) and in any case believe we cannot afford to overlook what to us seems only way to meet basic issue facing us in this area.

If move is to be made to regularize Arab-Israeli relations and thereby remove greatest obstacle to good Arab-Western (and also Israeli-Western) relations, it must be taken as soon as possible, before Arabs become too strong to be willing to “recognize” Israel and before Israelis—in spite of our warnings—become desperate. Regrettable as it may seem, both we and Israelis must realize that Arabs no longer feel obligated make concessions, and that as time goes by they will be increasingly less willing to consider any form of settlement but will rely on superior numbers, increased armaments, and blockade to bring about Israel’s disappearance. At same time we cannot permit Israeli desperation involve us directly or indirectly in war against Arabs; there is no question whatever that Israeli attack would be interpreted throughout area as United States reply to Soviet arms deal. Our political, economic, and military interests in Arab world are such that we cannot afford at this time to be pushed into role in which we support Israelis in hostilities against Soviet-backed Arab world.

Alternative we have proposed represents, we think, sound policy—in our interest and in that of Israel itself—which in spite of its difficulties offers best and perhaps only hope preventing continued deterioration in Middle East from which only Soviets can gain.

Byroade

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/10–1855. Top Secret. Received at 2:29 p.m. Repeated to Tel Aviv, London, Amman, Baghdad, Ankara, Damascus, Beirut, Jidda, Tripoli, Benghazi,USUN, and Paris.
2. None printed. (Ibid., 774.56/9–2455, 101.21–NIS/10–955, 786.00/10–855, and 101.21–NIS/10–955, respectively)

3. It reads in part as follows:

   “In determining US policies in light this Soviet penetration, we think it of utmost importance we bear in mind fact that basic reason why US suffered this setback is because GOE—and preponderant majority area leaders—had become convinced that US,UK and French arms policy would have indefinitely relegated Arabs to inferior and therefore untenable military position vis-à-vis Israelis.” (Ibid., 101.21–NIS/10–955)

4. It reads in part as follows:

   a

   “If such an attempt were successful we feel it would produce chaos in Middle East and in effect hand area to Russians on silver platter.” If Israeli attack were unsuccessful e.g. as result Russian intervention or long drawn out conflict which would necessarily involve Iraq, Jordan, Syria, Lebanon and Saudi Arabia as well as Egypt Israelis position would be even worse. In latter case we would foresee pressures brought to bear in favor US intervention in support Israeli action which would be vigorously resisted by British and possibly other western European states who depend on Arab sources for oil supplies and who are wary of direct conflicts between US and Soviets. Resulting conflict would strain US relations with NATO allies if carried too far.” (Ibid.)

5. Not printed. (Ibid., 774.56/10–755)