Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1955, Volume XIV

326. Memorandum of Discussion at the 260th Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, October 6, 1955, 10 a.m.¹

Washington, October 6, 1955, 10 a.m.

Present at the 260th Council meeting were the Vice President of the United States, presiding; the Secretary of State; the Secretary of Defense; and the Director, Office of Defense Mobilization. Also present were the Secretary of the Treasury; the Attorney General; the Acting Director, Bureau of the Budget; Mr.Harold E. Stassen, Special Assistant to the President; the Federal Civil Defense Administrator; the Director, U.S. Information Agency; the Deputy Secretary of Defense; Mr.Robert Bowie, Assistant Secretary of State; the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence; Mr.Dillon Anderson, Special Assistant to the President; Brig. General Theodore W. Parker for Mr.Nelson Rockefeller, Special Assistant to the President; the Assistant to the President; the Deputy Assistant to the President; the White House Staff Secretary; the Executive Secretary,NSC; and the Deputy Executive Secretary,NSC.

There follows a summary of the discussion at the meeting and the main points taken.

[Here follows a report by Sherman Adams concerning President Eisenhower’s health and plans for future interviews by government officials with the President.]

1. Significant World Developments Affecting U.S. Security

The Deputy Director of Central Intelligence² informed the Council that the intelligence community believed that the arms deal between Egypt and the Soviet Union was firm. He also pointed out that Colonel Nasr was convinced that he could avoid the dangers attendant upon this link with the Soviet Bloc. The first arms shipments had already arrived in Egypt. General Cabell warned that this development could substantially advance Soviet objectives in the Middle East. The economic tie-up between Egypt and the Soviet Bloc resulting from the arms deal, would provide a potent vehicle for advancing Communist political interests in the Middle East.

Besides their maneuver in Egypt, the Soviets were duplicating their offers of arms to Syria and to Saudi Arabia. Meanwhile, the Israeli Government was demanding action by the Western Powers to deter Arab aggression which they believe is sure to come. They insist that they will not be caught in the position of “sitting ducks” and they wish both Western arms and Western guarantees.

[Here follow Cabell’s comments on the death of Prime Minister Papagos of Greece, the impending referendum in the Saar territory, the position of the Faure government in France, and the results of the Indonesian elections.]

The National Security Council:³

Noted and discussed an oral briefing by the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence on the situation, with specific respect to the Middle East, Greece, the Saar referendum, the position of the Faure Government and the Indonesian elections.

2. The Situation in the Middle East (NSC 5428;⁴NSC Action No. 1394– b⁵)

[Here follows an analysis by Secretary Dulles of the repercussions of the Soviet-Egyptian arms agreement; the question of Iran’s adherence to the Baghdad Pact; the issue of providing military assistance to Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and Turkey; and an examination of the state of relations between Iraq and Syria.]

The Vice President⁶ asked Secretary Dulles whether the time had now come for a thorough re-examination of U.S. policy in the Middle East. Secretary Dulles agreed that the time for such reexamination had come as did Admiral Radford who pointed out that the British were pushing us very hard to build up the armed forces of the Middle Eastern states. Of course, added Admiral Radford, largely at our expense. Secretary Dulles said that undoubtedly we would have to respond to this appeal and help the Middle Eastern states to build up their armed forces.

Dr.Flemming inquired whether the situation was not one which called for an interim policy paper both on Iran and on the Middle East in general. Mr.Dillon Anderson reminded the Council that something like an interim policy paper was done with respect to Austria last spring. He furthermore informed the Council of his conversation recently with Secretary Dulles⁷ and the latter’s feeling that a revision of NSC 5428 would presumably be in order. Finally, he indicated that the last time the National Security Council had considered the situation in the Middle East, it had decided to leave up to the Secretary of State the determination of the time when it would be appropriate to undertake a review and re-examination of NSC 5428 (NSC Action No. 1394–b).⁸ Mr.Anderson summed up by saying that it was his understanding that Secretary Dulles was now indicating that the time had come to review the U.S. policy paper on the Middle East either on an interim or on a broader basis.

Secretary Dulles stated that events were moving so fast in this area that he was finding himself obliged to make decisions and that he would prefer to make these decisions with more guidance than it might be possible to get from the Planning Board and the National Security Council in the time permitted. Over and beyond these urgent considerations, there was every good reason to review our basic policy toward the Middle East at the present time. Secretary Dulles again commented on the specific courses of action which, according to NSC 5428, the United States was supposed to take in the event of hostilities between Israel and the Arab States. As he looked over these courses of action, which ultimately included the possibility of physical intervention, he did not find them very attractive.

Dr.Flemming again expressed the opinion that the situation seemed to call for an interim policy paper having top priority in the Planning Board’s schedule. Admiral Radford added that the Joint Chiefs of Staff would also appreciate having a firmer basis on which to plan for the contingency of Israeli-Egyptian hostilities. Things could happen very fast in this area and the main point was that the United States should be ready to stop the fighting.

Governor Stassen wondered whether a blockade of North African ports might not be an effective course of action. In his opinion, after the Egyptians began to receive Soviet arms, the Egyptians would play a role toward French North Africa very much like that played by the Chinese Communists in supplying weapons to the Viet Minh in Indo-China. Secretary Dulles pointed out to Governor Stassen that the Soviets are alleged to have said that if the Western Powers tried to interfere with the shipment of arms to Egypt, those arms would be sent into Egypt by air.

Referring to the pleas from Iran and Pakistan for additional military assistance from the United States, Secretary Wilson counselled that if, after examination, we find that there are controversies between the United States and these nations, or if we prove to be behind in promised deliveries of arms, we could certainly speed up these deliveries. Most of the arms which we have promised to the Pakistani and to Iran could be found somewhere and in a hurry if this proved to be necessary. Admiral Radford warned Secretary Wilson that the matter of getting additional arms to Iran and Pakistan might be more complicated than this. He pointed out that these deliveries of arms were slowed up by complicated U.S. administrative procedures as well as by internal politics and arguments within Pakistan itself. He was afraid that this “hassle” had never really been settled despite lengthy conversations. Secretary Wilson replied that, nevertheless, it would be downright foolishness to let such obstacles prevent the delivery of timely American aid to these nations. Secretary Dulles also advised with emphasis that we cut red tape and get the military supplies moving. Secretary Wilson assured Secretary Dulles that he would do his best.

The Vice President warned the Council that this Middle Eastern crisis came at a very unfortunate time. If things go badly for the United States in this area, there will be many who say that our misfortunes result from the lack of leadership. Accordingly, we must think of what the President would want us to do in these circumstances. Secretary Wilson replied that he was at least sure of one thing that the President would want us to do; namely, to carry out all agreements we had made with the nations of the Middle East.

As for the three policy decisions which the Secretary of State was now facing with Iran, Iraq and Saudi Arabia, the Vice President said that there were so many nuances and so many difficulties that it was best to rely on the judgment of the Secretary of State. The Vice President said he also assumed that the National Security Council Planning Board would promptly step up its review of existing U.S. policy in the Middle East and that the Department of Defense would promptly see what it could do to loosen up on additional U.S. assistance to the friendly nations in the Middle East.

Admiral Radford again stressed the fact that from the point of view of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Israeli-Arab problem had the highest priority. However, he also agreed again that the government would have to ask Congress for more money for increasing the scale of U.S. assistance to the Middle East. Secretary Wilson added that if Israel should attack Egypt, every effort should be made to secure United Nations intervention. Above all else, we must attempt to stop the outbreak of any such war.

Mr.Dillon Anderson said that he deduced from the discussion thus far that the National Security Council desired the Planning Board to study three matters; first, the general problem of U.S.military assistance worldwide. This subject was already about to be presented to the Council unless it was decided to postpone consideration of it until after the President’s return. Secondly, the Council wished the Planning Board to study the broad aspects of existing U.S. policy toward the Middle East, much of which Mr.Anderson thought remained valid. Thirdly, the Planning Board should study the particular matter of Arab-Israeli tensions. This portion of our general Near East policy, continued Mr.Anderson, was one which appeared particularly hard to implement.

As to the proposed broad review of NSC 5428, Mr.Anderson thought that the Planning Board would find this a very difficult job and one which would consume considerable time. As for the specific study of the Arab-Israeli situation in the contingency of hostilities, would it not be appropriate, asked Mr.Anderson, for the Council simply to agree and note its agreement that this particular portion of the policy set forth in NSC 5428 was invalid?

Secretary Dulles pointed out that the Council was of course in no position to invalidate by its action any portion of Presidentially-approved policy. If the Planning Board found itself unable to prepare, in time, recommendations for U.S. courses of action in the contingency of war between Israel and Egypt, the National Security Council would have to make a finding in an emergency session.

Secretary Humphrey said he wanted to stress to the Council the importance of proceeding promptly to consider the entire broad subject of U.S. military assistance programs worldwide. Some decisions in this field were essential in view of the development of the budget process for Fiscal Year 1957.

Mr.Anderson assured the Council that the Planning Board would do its best to provide recommendations to deal with the Arab-Israeli contingency as well as to get underway a re-examination of the broader subject of U.S. policy in the Middle East as a whole. He then enquired of the Secretary of State whether the latter desired to have the Council concur in the Secretary’s proposed decisions with respect to Iran, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia. Secretary Dulles replied that he would be glad to have the concurrence of the National Security Council in his proposed handling of the decision noted in the Record of Actions of the Council.

At the conclusion of the discussion of this item, Secretary Wilson turned to Secretary Dulles and said that if the latter believed that the Defense Department should step up the tempo of the military assistance programs in the Middle East, he, Secretary Wilson, would find means to do so.

The National Security Council:⁹

a. Noted and concurred in actions which the Secretary of State proposed to take in the existing situation with reference to the current U.S. attitude toward provision of military assistance to Saudi Arabia; Iran’s adherence to the Baghdad Pact; and relations between Iraq and Syria.

b. Discussed the current situation in the Middle East in the light of a report by the Secretary of State, in which he observed that recent developments in the area may have made portions of existing U.S. policy invalid and subject to urgent review.

c. Directed the NSC Planning Board to undertake an urgent review of the policy on the Near East contained in NSC 5428, with particular reference to U.S. courses of action in the contingency of hostilities between Israel and the Arab States.

[Here follows discussion of item 3.]

S. Everett Gleason

1. Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSG Records. Top Secret; Eyes Only. Drafted by (Reason on October 7. The time was taken from the President’s Daily Appointments. (Ibid.)
2. Lieutenant General C. P. Cabell, USAF.
3. The following paragraph constitutes NSC Action No. 1446. (Record of Actions by the National Security Council at its 260th meeting held on October 6, 1955, and approved by the President on October 19, 1955; Department of State,S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95,NSC Records of Action)
4. For the text of NSC 5428, “United States Objectives And Policies With Respect To The Near East,” July 23, 1954, see Foreign Relations, 1952–1954, vol. IX, Part 1, p. 425.
5. NSC Action No. 1394–b reads as follows:

   “b. Agreed that a review by the NSC Planning Board of the policies set forth in NSC 5428 should await the advice of the Secretary of State as A timing.” (Record of Actions by the National Security Council at its 247th meeting held on May 5, 1955, and approved by the President on May 7, 1955. Department of State,S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95,NSC Records of Action)

6. Richard M. Nixon.
7. No record of this conversation has been found in Department of State files.
8. See footnote 5, above.
9. The following paragraphs constitute NSC Action No. 1447. (Record of Actions by the National Security Council at its 260th meeting held on October 6, 1955, and approved by the President on October 19, 1955; Department of State,S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95,NSC Records of Action)