Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1955, Volume XIV

327. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, October 6, 1955¹

Washington, October 6, 1955

SUBJECT

• The Middle East

PARTICIPANTS

• Sir Roger Makins, British Ambassador
• Sir Hubert Graves, British Embassy
• Mr. Willie Morris, British Embassy
• The Secretary
• Mr. Hare, Acting Assistant Secretary for NEA
• Mr. Francis H. Russell

Ambassador Makins called at his request. He said that the British Cabinet had discussed the Middle East problem following Mr.Macmillan’s return to London. As a result of the Cabinet discussion, the Foreign Office had sent a telegram to the British Ambassador in Cairo saying that the line toward Nasser that had been agreed upon between the Secretary and Mr.Macmillan was approved by the Cabinet (see “Consensus of Meeting” attached) but that it was doubtful that much could be done at the present moment to influence Nasser. The Ambassador was therefore instructed to leave Nasser alone for a bit and let events work on him. Ambassador Makins said that perhaps Nasser will find that the arms deal is not working out exactly as he had hoped. After a while he may be willing to cooperate in limiting the extent of his deal with the Soviet bloc, in a Palestine settlement and in the Jordan Valley plan. As regards Iran, London is prepared to tell the Shah before his October 8 speech to the Majlis that Great Britain would, after the speech, make a statement welcoming it. The statement would also contain language similar to that of the British declaration of 1950 declaring Britain’s vital concern in the independence of Persia.²

The Secretary said that he was still hopeful that as a result of the talks with Molotov the Soviets might be willing to treat the Egyptian arms deal as a one-shot affair, limiting the amounts of arms and not opening new fronts in the Middle East. If Iran joins the Baghdad Pact, Moscow may regard it as a counter-move. The Soviets are extremely sensitive to such pacts. Iranian adherence therefore might nullify the efforts we are making to get the Soviets to quiet down. The Secretary said he would prefer to have the Iranian move not take place before we have a real indication as to Soviet intentions. The visit of the French leaders to Moscow is already off and the Soviets may be concerned about “the Geneva spirit” and therefore willing to limit their activities in the Middle East. The Secretary wondered whether it was a matter of “now or never” with respect to Iran’s adherence. Ambassador Makins said that it might be possible to put it off until after the Geneva meeting of the Foreign Ministers but he felt London must have taken these various considerations into account and had concluded that we had better take advantage of the present opportunity to get Iran into the pact. The Secretary said that if Iran decided to join the pact we would give it our blessing but he was not inclined to say anything to them beforehand to urge them to take the step now.

Ambassador Makins said that his Government had received from the Prime Minister³ and King of Iraq⁴ a list of equipment that Iraq would like. He said his Government was going over the list and believed that it might be possible to provide some of the items quite soon. The two British Centurion tanks previously discussed have already been shipped. The Foreign Office would like assurance from us that the offshore procurement procedure with respect to the ten Centurions also previously discussed, was well under way. Given such assurance the British could take ten such tanks off the assembly line and ship them right away. The Secretary assured the Ambassador that we would do everything we could to that end.

Ambassador Makins said that the British Government had decided, subject only to the views of its Governor General in the Sudan,⁵ to make a statement that the UK was prepared to recognize Sudanese independence as soon as the Sudan authorities might declare it. He said that the Governor General might want to get British troops out of the area first. The British position is that all of the political parties in the Sudan want independence, so why wait to take a plebiscite. The Foreign Office does not regard this as a matter of “tit for tat” toward Nasser but just doing something that is desirable in itself. The Secretary said that although the Foreign Office might not regard it as “tit for tat,”Nasser probably would. The Secretary said he would be happier if this development took place more slowly.

Ambassador Makins remarked that Mr.Dulles had told Mr.Macmillan that the United States was going to see what it could do for “the good Arabs.” The Secretary said that we are looking into that and hoped to be able to do something for Iraq. He said the Saudi Arabian Ambassador had called on him yesterday and said that his Government wished to purchase some tanks. The Secretary said that he had informed the Ambassador in principle that they could buy them under the existing cash reimbursable agreement between the United States and Saudi Arabia. The Secretary said he thought it would not be wise to say no, as they might go elsewhere. The Secretary said he realized that the British were having their difficulties with the Saudis but hoped they would agree that the problem of Soviet penetration in the area made this reply necessary. Ambassador Makins agreed, saying, however, that he hoped any delivery of tanks to the Saudis while the Buraimi difficulty was still active might be both little and late.

Ambassador Makins said the British Ambassador in Baghdad had reported that Nuri wants to “take a crack” at Syria. The Foreign Office does not take this too seriously. They believe Nuri expects the British and the United States to say no. The Secretary stated that we could not accede to giving Nuri a free hand in Syria. It would have a most harmful effect both with respect to Israel activism and with respect to Saudi Arabia.

Mr.Russell referred to the draft of “Consensus of Meeting with respect to Policy to be Followed as a Result of the Egypt-Soviet Arms Deal as Discussed by British Foreign Secretary and the United States Secretary of State, October 3, 1955,” which the Secretary and Ambassador Makins had previously read. The Secretary and Ambassador Makins agreed to it as a consensus of the meetings between the Secretary and Mr.Macmillan. The Secretary said, however, that he did not wish to have it regarded as being in the nature of an inter-governmental commitment.

[Attachment]

CONSENSUS OF MEETING WITH RESPECT TO POLICY TO BE FOLLOWED AS A RESULT OF THE EGYPT-SOVIET ARMS DEAL AS DISCUSSED BY THE BRITISH FOREIGN SECRETARY AND THE U.S. SECRETARY OF STATE

October 3, 1955

1. It appears from Trevelyan’s and Byroade’s discussions with Nasser that there is no likelihood of our being able to dissuade Nasser from proceeding with the Czech arms agreement. We should as quickly as possible attempt to ascertain whether there is any possibility of obtaining his undertaking that the Egyptian Government will attempt to so arrange matters under the deal that Soviet opportunities for penetration in Egypt and elsewhere in the Middle East will be reduced to a minimum; and also his agreement to cooperate in such things as the Jordan Valley project and working toward a settlement with Israel. If there are indications that Nasser will cooperate in such ways, our policy would be to take measures that would encourage him and show that Egypt would benefit by such a policy.

2. If Nasser is unwilling to cooperate in the ways mentioned in paragraph one, our policy would be directed toward having things work out in such a way as to make it appear to Egypt that such a policy in fact does not work out well. We would not give any public indications of sanctions against Egypt, which might serve to rally the rest of the Arab world around Nasser, but we would quietly take measures that would keep Nasser from appearing to have followed a policy that worked well for Egypt. Measures in pursuance of this policy might include a declaration of independence by the Sudan, difficulties in connection with agreement on the division of the waters of the Upper Nile, difficulties in connection with the marketing of Egyptian cotton, a reduction (though not complete elimination)in United States aid to Egypt, and an effort to alienate as many of the Arab countries from Egypt as possible.

3. We should immediately take steps to dissuade other Arab states from entering into an arms deal with the Soviet bloc.

4. We should take steps to convince the Arab states that are cooperating with us, notably Iraq, that such a policy of cooperation with the West is a wise one from their point of view. This might involve encouraging Iran to join the Baghdad Pact and indications of United States support for, and cooperation with, the signatories to that Pact.

5. We should take steps to dissuade Israel from embarking upon a policy of aggression, using its superior military strength before the ratio of power in the area changes. This would involve efforts to assure Israel that it was not without friends and helpless in the face of this new development in the Middle East. Consideration should be given to giving Israel a firm reaffirmation of the tripartite declaration. This is the minimum that would create a feeling of assurance on Israel’s part, while any new security undertaking by the Western powers for Israel would alienate Arab countries who are still cooperating with the West.

6. The only apparent way of avoiding (a) an early Israel outbreak, (b) an attack by the Arab world when it has increased its military strength, or (c) an arms race with the danger of an ultimate and more disastrous outbreak, is to bring about a settlement between Israel and the Arab states. The Egyptian-Soviet arms deal obviously makes this even more difficult than before but it is possible that the increased sense of independence and strength which Nasser will have even from just the arms agreement and the commencement of arrival of equipment will enable him to move toward a settlement. Also the sense of disaster in the area from an all-out arms race may bring both sides to feel the need of a settlement.

7. It would not be wise to attempt to have the problem of control of arms shipments into the Middle East dealt with in the United Nations.

8. The United Kingdom and the United States should agree upon the position to be taken by them in the event the USSR moves to have the question included in the agenda of the Foreign Ministers meeting at Geneva.

9. The United States and the United Kingdom should continue to consult closely, especially with respect to measures which can be taken to implement the above points.

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 774.56/10–655. Secret. Drafted by Russell.
2. Reference is to British Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin’s statement of May 19, 1950. For text, see the Royal Institute of International Affairs,Documents on International Affairs, 1949–1950 (London, Oxford University Press, 1950), 78–79.
3. Nuri es-Said.
4. Faisal II.
5. Sir Alexander Knox Helm.