325. Telegram From the Embassy in Egypt to the Department of State1
654. From Allen.Byroade and I had further hour and quarter discussion with Nasser today. I opened by recognizing that America and Egypt were each faced, with serious problem. Our problem was to avoid handling our relations in Middle East in manner which would play into Soviet hands—his was to handle Egyptian relations so as not to play into hands of his enemies. I recognized frankly that if United States reacted emotionally to Czechoslovak arms deal, we might cause Arabs to feel they could depend only on Soviet help. For this reason I had made every effort, in talks with him and with press, to present United States views with calmness and dignity. I was therefore much disturbed by his accusations, in public speech yesterday, that United States had intrigued to keep Egypt weak and strengthen Israel, and that United States, Britain and France were guilty of “big lie”.2 I said his enemies were probably rubbing their hands with glee over this speech since reaction in United States would be strongly against him.
Nasser said American press, mentioning particularlyNew York Times andNewsweek, had continually carried articles stating that Israel could mobilize 250,000 men (or more than all Arab states together) and could easily defeat Arab states combined. He said he had distinct impression that Americans printed and read this information with pleasure and approval. His most bitter complaint, however, was fact that even though American public had knowledge that Israel is much stronger than Egypt, Americans were nevertheless highly critical of him now for seeking as best he could to redress balance through commercial transaction from only source he could find.
Referring to his statement that Czechoslovak arms deal was “turning point in Egyptian history,” I expressed sincere hope that turning was not in wrong direction. If he had justified his transaction solely on basis of commercial exchange of cotton for arms, American public might be less critical, but when he went further and justified transaction on basis of alleged “intrigue” and “big lie” of Western powers, including United States, I had to question whether he valued continued American good will.
[Page 552]He declared emphatically that he did, but said future depended on United States. I pointed out that arms race in Middle East would be tragic for all concerned and pointed out that United States had done and would continue to do everything it could to prevent this. Ambassador Byroade and I both pointed out that only way to avoid such race would be to find means of relaxing tensions in area. He said he was ready but that Negev constituted partition of Arab lands and initiative rested with Israel.
I said we considered your speech of August 26 as having created basis for progress in this direction. He said he regarded your proposals favorable to Israel since only benefit to Arabs might be some minor adjustment of frontiers.
Nasser then asked about future of United States-Egyptian relations. It seemed clear to me that he was anxious to learn what actions we might take as consequence of Czechoslovak deal, I thought it best to let him remain uncertain in this regard so avoided point. He remarked that he would always be ready to discuss this subject with Byroade.
Comment:Byroade and I feel that Nasser showed considerable concern today, possibly as consequence of his highly emotional speech yesterday. It is clear that he could not, even if he wished, cancel Czechoslovak deal since he would be overthrown.
While talks with Nasser have been inconclusive, I believe we have at least gotten over explosive period without playing into Soviet hands and without forcing Egypt into completely intransigent attitude regarding Israel. Emotionalism here has been so great that I am convinced ultimatum approach would not only have forced vast majority of Arabs into Soviet camp but might well have led to break-off of diplomatic relations and expulsion of United States interests from Egypt and possibly other areas.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 774.56/10–355. Secret; Priority. Received at 12:32 a.m., October 4. Repeated to London, Tel Aviv, and Damascus. Repeated on October 4 to Beirut, Baghdad, Amman, Jidda, Tripoli, Ankara, Karachi, and USUN, and pouched to Paris.↩
- The Embassy in Cairo sent the Department a summary of Nasser’s speech on October 3. (Telegram 651;ibid.)↩