324. Memorandum of a Conversation Between Secretary of State Dulles and Foreign Secretary Macmillan, Department of State, Washington, October 3, 19551
Mr.Macmillan stayed on after the general meeting on Egypt to talk privately with me alone. He pointed out the concern of Sir Anthony Eden in this situation since Eden had been largely responsible for the Suez Base Agreement and consequently had very definite ideas of his own.
We discussed further the prospective message of Eden to Bulganin and the danger that it might lead to talks which would recognize the Soviet as a great power equally interested in the area.Macmillan thought he could get the message framed to avoid this consequence.2
I said to Macmillan in substance:
“The essential thing is that our two countries should stand together and there should be great caution on your Government’s part in starting a course of action which might lead to consequences which the United States could not share. It is all right for the Egyptians and the Jugs to try to get the best of both possible worlds but that is not a role that the UK could play. Therefore, it seems to me you should try very hard to avoid being sucked into a course of action with the Soviets which we could not or would not share.”
Macmillan said he fully realized this danger and expected to avoid it.
- Source: Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, General Memoranda of Conversation. Top Secret.↩
- Telegram 830 from Moscow, October 5, reported that the British Ambassador had delivered an October 4 message from Eden to Bulganin stating that the British Government viewed the sale of arms to Egypt as a political venture that posed a serious threat to the peace of the area. (Department of State, Central Files, 774.561/ 10–555) A copy of the message is filed with a covering letter of October 27 from Makins to Sherman Adams in Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, International File.↩