Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1955, Volume XIV

323. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, October 3, 1955, 10:01 a.m.¹

Washington, October 3, 1955, 10:01 a.m.

SUBJECT

• Call of the British Foreign Secretary re Soviet-Egyptian Arms Agreement

PARTICIPANTS

• UK
  • Mr. Harold Macmillan
  • Sir Roger Makins
  • Mr. Evelyn Shuckburgh
  • Mr. Willie Morris
  • Mr. Patrick Hancock
• US
  • Mr. John Foster Dulles
  • Mr. Livingston Merchant
  • Mr. Douglas MacArthur II
  • Mr. Raymond A. Hare
  • Mr. Francis H. Russell
  • Mr. Fraser Wilkins

The British Foreign Secretary suggested the discussion commence with a review of developments in Cairo and inquired how we analyzed them. The Secretary said that we had no new information with respect to quantities of arms or dates of delivery under the Czech-Egyptian Agreement. The Secretary added that Mr.Allen had had a report that the Soviet Union was also offering economic aid, help on the Aswan Dam and related matters.²

Mr.Hare analyzed the situation along the following lines: When this problem had first come to our attention we had hoped that, by prompt action, it might not be too late to block it completely, or at least to convince Nasser to so reduce and modify the transaction that it would be less objectionable. It now seemed clear, following talks of the British Ambassador and Assistant Secretary Allen with Nasser, that blocking the deal completely was out of the question and that even the possibility of substantial modification was doubtful. The question therefore arose whether a new equilibrium might be accomplished by inducing Nasser to take some other step or steps which would not only be of substantive importance but would also serve as a gauge of Nasser’s sincerity when he said he had no intention of reorienting Egypt politically. Steps toward some sort of settlement with Israel, including assistance in gaining acceptance of the Johnston plan, could fall in this category of action. Simultaneously, attention should be directed to preventing other countries of the area from following Egypt’s unfortunate example. In other words, we would endeavor to create a situation with which we could live although it might be far from to our liking.

If this policy failed, consideration could then be given to the application of progressive pressures but, in so doing, we should bear in mind the complications which could arise if Nasser were forced out with no better candidate in sight; difficulty in taking any constructive regional steps if Egypt were forced into a hostile position; and the ominous prospect of promoting a real split in the Arab world with the West backing one group and the Communists the other.

The Secretary said that he would like to express his own reaction. He believed we should not take any threatening or drastic step at this time. There should be no public indication of our displeasure. Unpleasant events which we might instigate should have the appearance of happening naturally. If we did not proceed in this way the entire Arab world might be aligned against us, which would make it more susceptible to Communist penetration. We should not allow developments to take this direction because Middle Eastern oil was important not only to NATO but to the Western world. Egypt, the Secretary believed, wished to adopt a position similar to that of Tito’s in Yugoslavia. Egypt wished the best of both worlds and hoped to play one against the other. Egypt as a neutralist would be more tolerable than as a Communist satellite. For these reasons the Secretary was more inclined to temporize regarding Egypt at this stage in order to see how matters developed there. For example, how many arms are actually acquired—what use was made of them and similar matters. We would have to be watchful of the effects elsewhere in the Middle East; but here the key factor would be Soviet rather than Arab actions. If the Russians decided to go into economic and military aid in a big way, it might gravely disturb our relations with the Soviet Union. In this case we might have to put pressure on the Soviet Union to desist. It seemed best however to try to insulate the present incident. This was not a very attractive policy and he put it forward only for lack of a better alternative. If it came to bringing pressure on to Egypt, the Sudan seemed to offer a suitable opening.

The British Foreign Secretary replied that he had the impression from the report of the British Ambassador’s conversation with Nasser³ that the Egyptian Prime Minister had been rather shaken by the U.S.–UK reaction and was not in fact anxious to quarrel with us. Mr.Macmillan considered that we must accept this diplomatic defeat and try to narrow or limit it. There would be no agreement between the Soviet Union and Egypt but only between Czechoslovakia and Egypt. No Soviet technicians would go to the Near East. The Egyptian Foreign Minister, now in New York, had hinted as much to Mr.Macmillan. We should now talk to Nasser more in sorrow than in anger and tell him that he must endeavor to reduce his commitment with the Soviet bloc. At the same time, Mr.Macmillan said,Nasser would have to give evidence of good will if we were to accept his action.Nasser could give such evidence by throwing his whole weight behind the Johnston Plan or in progress toward a settlement with Israel. Mr.Macmillan concluded that if Nasser were unwilling to proceed along these lines, we would have to bring pressure to bear upon him.

Mr.Russell thought that the situation might be portrayed to Nasser in the following way: the Soviet Union appeared to be moving into the area with determination and on the basis of a well-thought-out plan. In addition to arms, they had referred to assistance for the High Aswan Dam in Egypt and had made approaches to Saudi Arabia and Syria. If Nasser went along with the Soviet Union, he would be putting Egypt’s neck in the Soviet noose. The action of the Soviet Union in Egypt was not isolated but part of the Soviet pattern. Would Nasser wish to facilitate Soviet penetration or to prevent it?

The Secretary mentioned that it would, of course, be necessary to find specific funds for the Johnston Plan and also wondered what attraction there would be for Egypt in this general approach. Mr.Russell replied that help with respect to the Aswan Dam and the other matters to which reference had already been made in the Secretary’s letter would be advantageous to Egypt.⁴

The British Foreign Secretary speculated that Nasser might be glad to represent the Czech Agreement as something that was necessary for him to conclude but that he might actually play it down.Nasser could say he did not look on the conclusion of the Agreement as a political act but merely as one for the necessary purchase of arms. At the same time we could follow a policy of assistance to other parts of the Arab world—to Iraq and some of the others. Together these two lines of action might offset the effect of an apparent Soviet diplomatic victory.

The Secretary asked if the UK had any information that Nehru had played a part. Mr.Macmillan said no, to which Mr.Dulles said he had the feeling Nehru was involved.

Mr.Hare thought Egypt’s action might set a dangerous example in the eyes of the Arab world and that Nasser should say something which indicated he was not moving toward the Soviets. Whatever he might say privately, his public statements thus far had been to the contrary.

The Secretary said that we have to take into account that this development in Egypt might take place elsewhere. It may flow from a change in Soviet policy. Up until the time of Geneva, Soviet policy was based on intolerance which was the keynote of Soviet doctrine. Soviet policy is now based on tolerance, which includes good relations with everyone and basically alters many other things. It would not be possible for the West to reserve to itself good relations with the Soviet Union and to say that Egypt might not develop good relations with the Soviet Union. Perhaps this Soviet move in the Near East is the first example of a policy with which we must deal. It may be that internal changes are taking place in the Soviet Union which we will find welcome. As long as we accept visits between ourselves, we cannot object if Egypt does. We cannot be very stern with Nasser for accepting the fruits of change in Soviet policy. It may be necessary for us to accept the desire of Near Eastern countries to deal with both the East and the West, otherwise a stern Western position may force them to deal only with the Soviet bloc. It was surprising the Soviet Union had not been able to deal with Afghanistan more effectively.

The Secretary continued that it was easy for the Soviet Union to supply arms to Egypt in return for cotton. The United States and the United Kingdom and other countries were spread thin world-wide. It was necessary for us to sustain the whole structure in the Far East, especially in Korea and Japan, which totaled annually about $1,000,000,000. If it were not for these commitments, we could take $100,000,000 and buy Egypt off. It was Soviet policy to work and subvert other countries one by one. In these circumstances we needed patience in handling the current situation. We should wait and see how the Czech-Egyptian Agreement developed. It might be that Soviet military assistance to Egypt would create heavy economic burdens there. Our experience has been that arms programs cannot be handled on a one-shot basis. Soviet military assistance to Egypt might not work out well and Egypt might regret it. We should therefore approach the matter with patience and without drastic action.

The Secretary also believed that the Russians might not wish to invest heavily in Egypt because this country could be pinched off in the event of hostilities. In general, if the Russians were going to start on a mutual security program, they might be in for considerable difficulty and it might turn out to be a liability rather than an asset. Mr.Macmillan commented that Mr.Dulles’ analysis and conclusions seemed consonant with his suggestions. The Secretary added that Nasser might be pushed along on the Johnston proposals and a settlement with Israel.

The British Foreign Secretary returned to the question of the approach to Prime Minister Nasser and emphasized that he should be urged to begin the process of negotiation with Israel. In order to limit the scope of the Czech-Egyptian agreement it should be pointed out that if Egypt buys arms, Israel will buy arms. Mr.Macmillan asked what the Israeli reaction might be.

The Secretary said that the Israeli Ambassador had come to see him⁵ and had spoken in the following way: the lines in the Near East were now clearly drawn. Egypt’s position was now clear. Israel wished a security pact in addition to military assistance. Mr.Eban had not hinted at preventive war in his initial presentation to the Secretary. Later, however, Mr.Eban had said in response to a question that Israel would not stand like a rabbit waiting for the kill. The Secretary noted however that Mr.Eban had not said “either you give us arms or we will attack”. In this general connection the Secretary wondered about possible UN action.

Mr.Shuckburgh stated that the British Foreign Office was not keen on United Nations action because the Russians would be able to pose as supporters of the Arabs. The Secretary inquired whether use might not be made of the Tripartite Declaration of 1950. Mr.Macmillan observed that the declaration had been written on the assumption of three-power control. This control had now been broken down through the supply of Soviet arms in the Near East. In these circumstances it would be preferable to push ahead with settlement between Israel and the Arab states. Mr.Shuckburgh further commented that it might be useful at least to reaffirm the last paragraph of the Tripartite Declaration with respect to action in the event of violations. Mr.Russell thought we might reaffirm the principles of the Tripartite Declaration in general wording. The Secretary noted that he did not wish to be committed at this time with respect to reaffirmation of the Tripartite Declaration. A number of constitutional problems would confront him on this score.

Mr.Macmillan said that he was not inclined to take the question of arms shipments to the United Nations at the present time. The Secretary agreed observing that debate might result in charge and counter charge together with details of shipments and related matters. It would be undesirable to discuss in public. It would be wise to move slowly in this respect.

The British Foreign Secretary reiterated that our general approach to the question of Soviet arms in the Near East should be played down rather than up. He wondered how we could encourage other Near Eastern states which did not take Soviet arms. Mr.Macmillan believed that one instrument would be through the Baghdad Pact. We might encourage the accession of Iran. He, himself, for example, could attend the first meeting of the Council of the Baghdad Pact. The U.S. might send observers. Considerations could be given to the repositioning of Britain’s limited forces in the Middle East. Economic aid could be extended. The Secretary said we must look into this problem and agree on measures which might be taken.

The Secretary added that high priority should be given to considering whether economic aid could be switched from Egypt to Iraq. The fact that Iraq had oil revenues seemed to complicate this. Mr.Shuckburgh said that the Iraqis were devoting their oil revenues to economic development and were very reluctant to devote them to arms. It would therefore be preferable if additional aid to Iraq could be devoted to military assistance. It would not be desirable to discourage Iraqi interest in economic development. The Secretary agreed and added that Iraq seemed to be the only country with oil revenues which was using them constructively. This progress should be encouraged. Mr.Dulles inquired whether a public announcement had been made regarding the supply of Centurion tanks to Iraq. Mr.Shuckburgh replied that no publicity had been given to it although the Iraq Government had been informed.

Mr.Macmillan agreed that we should concert with respect to details of measures which might be taken to support our friends in the Near East and thought they might be divided into two broad categories: (1) symbolic; (2) material. He wondered in this connection if it would be possible for the United States to join the Baghdad Pact.

The Secretary replied negatively that constitutional problems made it difficult and pointed out that adherence by the U.S. would necessarily be followed by a security pact with Israel. These two developments might make the situation in the Near East worse. It was not, however, beyond the realm of possibility that both steps could be taken but the Secretary was not sure that it would be wise under present conditions. The British Ambassador noted that the United States had informed the British in August that it could only consider joining the Baghdad Pact after progress had been made toward a settlement between Israel and the Arab states.⁶

Meanwhile, our approach to Nasser might be delayed briefly until he cooled off and it would not appear as a surrender by us.

The British Foreign Secretary noted that we now appeared to be in general agreement as to how we should proceed. An approach to Nasser by the UK or the U.S. in Cairo and for the other measures which we might later take to support countries friendly to us in the area. The Secretary concurred and said that Mr.Shuckburgh, Mr.Hare and Mr.Russell could work out the details. All of these various ideas could be written down and agreement could be reached on courses of action. Mr.Shuckburgh said that if we approach Nasser now it might indicate undue anxiety. Mr.Macmillan concurred and it was agreed that further approaches to Nasser would be postponed for a few days. Meanwhile, if necessary, Mr.Shuckburgh could return to Washington from London.

The Secretary informed Mr.Macmillan that we might be in a position next week to raise the question of a possible letter from the President to Bulganin.⁷ It would depend upon the President’s progress. Mr.Macmillan replied that if it was not advisable to tackle the Russians in the United Nations we should make it clear to them that they should play fair in the “spirit of Geneva”. Prime Minister Eden would want to say something to them along this line. It would be necessary in view of the public attitude in Great Britain. The Secretary indicated that he realized the Prime Minister’s position but wondered whether we wished directly to involve the Soviet Union in Middle Eastern affairs. Mr.MacArthur noted that Mr.Molotov might in any event raise this general subject at Geneva under the heading of other business.

The British Ambassador pointed out that the approach to Molotov already gave an opening for a response. A letter from the President and the Prime Minister would add nothing in this respect.

The Secretary observed that if the United States, United Kingdom, and France allowed the matter to rest as at present he doubted the Soviet Union would propose further discussions. As Mr.Macmillan had said it was a troublesome problem. The premise underlying the Tripartite Declaration of tripartite control had been shaken. We could not effectively say to the Soviet Union that the Middle East was our exclusive interest. Mr.Macmillan thought, however, that the Prime Minister could say we were trying to work with the Soviet Union but that it was not cooperating. Mr.Macmillan noted that perhaps they had already limited the arms agreement with Egypt to Czechoslovakia and themselves planned to supply no arms. As a result of our earlier approach the Secretary concluded that at this stage he would not want to feel committed to get a comparable letter from President Eisenhower.

Mr.Macmillan said that an approach to the United Nations might be studied further but that he himself was not in favor. The French had not been cooperating in the control of arms shipments to the Near East and that if the general subject of arms was discussed in the United Nations the Western powers rather than the Soviet bloc might end up in the dock. For the time being we would play down the Czech agreement but, at the same time, would study ways in which we could back up the other Arab states. Mr.Hare suggested consideration should be given to French participation in joint action. This point was not pursued.

Mr.Macmillan thought that if we ruled out action in the United Nations, and if our policy was to go “soft” with Nasser and not to follow up with the Russians, we would give the impression that we had simply swallowed the Russian intervention in the Middle East. A letter dealing with the subject, not in terms of the area itself but on a world plane, relating it to the Great Powers’ interest in avoiding causes of friction, would put the Russians on notice that we had serious objections. The balance of advantage and disadvantage was very even. If we did send a letter we risked getting the Middle East put on the agenda at Geneva.

The Secretary recalled that when he had previously discussed Near Eastern arms with Molotov he had pointed out that since Geneva people all over the world had high hopes. He had said he had now heard that the Soviet Union was planning on arms shipments to the Near East. He did not want to argue technicalities of the matter. He had suggested, however, that Mr.Molotov bear in mind that this action would have a serious effect on public opinion and that Mr.Molotov might well wish to take account of this fact. The Secretary believed that a restatement of our views along this line would be useful. The Prime Minister might wish to speak in this vein as well. The matter could be further considered in the light of later developments. The British Foreign Secretary believed that the Prime Minister’s communication to Bulganin should be in the nature of obiter dictum and not an offer. Mr.Macmillan stressed the depth of public feeling in the United Kingdom with respect to Egypt and particularly in the light of current Soviet activities there. The average Englishman knew of Egypt personally or through relatives. They had followed the Suez negotiations with great interest. Egypt was regarded in the United Kingdom as the Pacific area was in the United States. The Secretary remarked that the communication to Bulganin might be cast along the lines of his previous oral remarks to Molotov.

Mr.MacArthur noted, as the meeting broke up, that we would have to reach agreement before the Geneva meeting on how to handle this Near Eastern question in the event either we or the Russians raised it there.

1. Source: Department of States, Central Files, 774.56/10–355. Secret. Drafted by Wilkins. The time was taken from Secretary Dulles’ Appointment Book. (Princeton University Library, Dulles Papers)
2. See footnote 7, Document 321.
3. No record of this conversation has been found in Department of State files.
4. See Document 315.
5. See supra.
6. See footnote 2, Document 201.
7. On October 11,Eisenhower raised with Bulganin the question of arms shipments to Egypt. See Document 334.