322. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Jordan1
141.Eban called on Secretary September 30 to discuss Soviet-Egyptian arms deal.2
Eban made following points: Agreement makes mockery of Soviet pretensions at Geneva about relaxing tensions and desiring disarmament. Although Israel had at times shared US hopes re Nasser, it became apparent before arms deal that Egypt element of [Page 541] instability. Egyptian willingness accept Soviet arms passed all limits. Now every affirmative appraisal of RCC collapses completely and irrevocably. Similar sales to Saudi Arabia and Syria must be expected. Following conclusions resulted from Egyptian action: (1) US should not attempt prevent deal by appeasement i.e. giving arms to Egypt; (2) West should sell Israel arms to correct threatened imbalance; (3) US should guarantee status quo now and invite any power in area to enter into treaty guaranteeing status quo. Treaty would not bar peaceful changes but would prevent changes by force. Essential take quick action deter aggression in light new situation. General reaction in Israel summed up as “let’s not sit here like rabbit waiting for kill.”
Secretary replied: Development one of gravest in recent years in sense that it means USSR opening new area of mischievous activity—Middle East and Africa. Problems posed for Israel and US not similar in all respects. US must consider matter in terms of worldwide confrontation with Communism. Matter of such gravity that we cannot make quick decisions. It unlikely transaction will be cancelled out entirely, although conceivable quantities involved will be reduced. Re Eban’s three conclusions: (1) We have no intentions competing with USSR in supplying arms to Egypt. Although we did not wish make absolute commitment that we would never offer Egypt arms, we have no intention doing so now. (2) More definite information may indicate otherwise, but we must assume now transaction will transform military balance in area—not immediately but after 12 or 15 months. We have not reached conclusion that giving considerable military equipment to Israel would be best way to offset effects of Soviet-Egyptian arms deal. (3) US Security guarantee of status quo raises problems about likely effect on Arab world as whole. We do not want, and assume Israel does not want, situation where USSR backing all Arabs and US backing Israel.
Secretary inquired whether Israel had considered action by UN.Eban replied this unlikely prove effective in view Soviet veto in SC and strength of Soviet and Arab blocs in General Assembly.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 774.56/10–255. Secret. Drafted by Burdett and approved by Hare, who signed for Dulles. Also sent to Baghdad, Beirut, Cairo, Damascus, Jidda, and Tel Aviv. Repeated to Moscow and pouched to London and Paris.↩
- The memorandum of this conversation is not printed. (Ibid., 774.56/9–3055)↩