Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1955, Volume XIV

321. Telegram From the Embassy in Egypt to the Department of State¹

Cairo,October 1, 1955—7 p.m.

632. From Allen. Ambassador Byroade and I had an hour and forty-five minute conference with Nasser this morning at his office. Highlights are following:

1. Despite excited public atmosphere Nasser was relaxed and obviously making special effort to be friendly.

2. He assured us with emphasis that he was “even more concerned to prevent Communist activity through military technicians than Secretary Dulles could possibly be, because Egypt is country directly involved”.

3. Conversation was slightly stiff at beginning. He did not express any opinion during first twenty minutes. I stated purpose of my visit was to try understand as clearly as I could (1) factual situation regarding arms deal and GOE policy and intentions in its regard and (2) to explain US point of view. I said this was not to be construed as indicating US Government had not been fully and correctly informed by Ambassador Byroade but Secretary State wanted me to emphasize his own deep personal concern over situation. I would speak as frankly as I could so our two governments could at least act on basis of understanding even though we might not agree on certain aspects.

4. I then read verbatim text your letter,² reading slowly and enunciating carefully. He asked for repetition at one or two points and clearly understood full contents. At conclusion I pointed out that our analysis was naturally based on such information as we had and expressed interest in further facts which Nasser might wish to let us have.

5. He then responded pleasantly but intently. He pointed out that fundamental basis for 1952 revolution was lack of military equipment, and reviewed three years of efforts by Egypt to obtain such equipment. He and his government had been most anxious from beginning to achieve economic progress but would simply not have remained in power if he had not also endeavored to equip army. For three years his efforts were unsuccessful, but he had nevertheless been able to live with situation until Israel attacked at Gaza on February 28, 1955. From that moment onward military equipment had become absolute priority and all other considerations had to be put aside. It would do no good, he said, how many schools, hospitals and irrigation dams he might build if Egypt were to be overrun.

6. As regards efforts to obtain military equipment from US he alleged that prior to October 1952 he had sought arms only from US. At that time Under Secretary of Defense Foster had “promised” Egypt 60 million dollars worth of military equipment.³ Nothing resulted, due to British objections. Early in 1955 two American officers, . . . from Pentagon had expressed full understanding of his needs. Again nothing happened. Then in June he had made urgent representations to Ambassador Byroade. US expressed concurrence in principle and he submitted list. After considerable delay we had indicated he could buy the arms for $27 million. He pointed out, with a wry smile, that that happened to be exactly Egypt’s total dollar resources. He had asked us whether he could buy in Egyptian pounds. We had given him no affirmative response.

7. Nasser then recalled that he had been assured in part by American sources, prior to February 28 that Israel had no aggressive intentions. He had consequently reduced his forces on Gaza front materially. Then came Gaza incident and Israeli boasts that they would “teach Egypt a lesson”. He added “I have been through a nightmare since then which your Secretary State may not be able to realize”. He referred to doubling of Herut representation in Israeli Parliament at last elections, expressed confidence that neither Ben Gurion nor present Israeli Parliament would last more than one year and that Herut would again double its representation at next election. He remarked that Herut policy is “Israeli domination from Nile to Euphrates”.

8. During his desperate efforts to obtain arms following February 28 incident he turned to France among others, and in April or May this year, paid 10 million Egyptian pounds on account for sizeable arms purchased. Not one gun has been delivered. Two weeks ago France placed complete embargo against this shipment. Today he asked French Ambassador to give him back his money.

9. In summary he said that in all frankness he had the conviction that US Government was trying to keep Egypt weak and that this resulted from Jewish influence in US.

10. I expressed appreciation for his frank expose but said his statement had revealed to me clear misunderstanding between us. I recalled our offer of grant military aid agreement in 1954⁴ and our offer to let him obtain very sizeable amounts of arms in US very recently. I asked if that indicated we were determined to keep Egypt defenseless.Nasser explained at length the reason Egypt could not accept grant aid agreement, partly due to our requirement for MAAG mission. He said he had finally been able to remove British from Egypt, had refused to permit Americans to replace them. Was it likely he would now let Communists do so? I pointed to statement in your communication recognizing his good intentions in this regard but said we had had much experience with Communists and knew how hard it would be to prevent gradual encroachment.

11. Nasser emphasized that agreement with Czechoslovakia⁵ was without any conditions whatsoever. He had already transferred to Prague one million Egyptian pounds on account and Egyptian cotton and rice would be shipped “more or less parallel” with arms received. I asked him whether he could draw down large amount of arms on credit—“say, 20, 30, 40 million pounds”. After some hesitation he said “agreement is like ones we have with Germany, Italy and other countries on strictly commercial basis”. When I pressed him further on this point he said any unusual features were in Egypt’s favor. I asked whether Egypt might be led into position of being under special obligations to Soviet bloc. He insisted he would not permit such. Agreement did not specify any technicians and there would be none unless he requested them. He said his own technicians had assembled Vampire and Meteor fighter jets from handbooks and could also assemble MIGs. His only problem was to assemble fighter bombers. He would prefer that they be flown into Egypt and thereby avoid any Czechoslovakian technicians but since closest base was Albania out of range he might have to have one Czechoslovakian team for brief period to demonstrate assembly. He commented, lightly, that Greece or Cyprus were only refueling points available. Difficulty with Cyprus was that Israelis would be able to “count them” if they landed there.

12. Soviet Ambassador had been waiting in anteroom and conversation terminated at this point,⁶ but I informed Nasser that I had further views to present to him.⁷ He said he would be at my disposal at anytime. We had dealt only with past and he was anxious to consider future.

13. I shall be seeing Nasser again tomorrow or Monday.⁸

14. Comment: During two days here I have been impressed by fact that absolute determination of GOE and Egyptian people to obtain arms following Gaza attack of February 28 can hardly be conveyed by cable.

Byroade

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 774.56/10–155. Top Secret;Niact. Repeated priority to Paris, London, Tel Aviv, and Damascus. Repeated on October 2 to Beirut, Baghdad, Amman, Jidda, Tripoli, Ankara, Karachi, Moscow, and USUN.
2. See Document 315. On September 30,Allen recommended that he only read Dulles’ letter to Nasser and not leave the text, on the grounds that “written document likely to be dangerously misused.” (Telegram 623 from Cairo, Department of State, Central Files, 774.56/9–3055)Dulles, in reply, told Allen to use his discretion on this matter. (Telegram 642 to Cairo, September 30,ibid.)
3. A memorandum of October 5 from Ben F. Dixon to Russell states that although he had not located any records of these talks, he had learned that during 2 days in Egypt in October 1952,Foster talked to General Naguib and indicated that the United States “might give favorable consideration to Egypt’s request for military equipment providing a satisfactory base agreement were reached.” (Ibid.,NEA Files: Lot 59 D 518, Alpha—Memos, etc., beginning after Sec’s Speech—Aug. 26–Oct. 29, 1955)
4. For documentation on the question of military assistance by the United States to Egypt, see Foreign Relations, 1952–1954, vol. IX, pp. 1743 ff.
5. On September 29,Byroade informed the Department “that actual agreement on arms was with Czechoslovakia.” (Telegram 600 from Cairo; Department of State, Central Files, 774.56/9–2955)
6. According to a report dated October 2 Solod made the following points in his interview on October 1 with Nasser: that United States and the United Kingdom had made strong representations to Molotov in New York to halt the arms deal; that the United States was planning to terminate all economic and technical assistance to Egypt as a result of the arms deal; that the Soviet Union was prepared to furnish Egypt with large scale economic and technical aid, including financial support at 2½% interest for the Aswan Dam; that if other powers interfered with Soviet ships transporting arms to Egypt, the Soviets would raise vigorously the issue of freedom of the seas; and that if Egypt became the object of a marine blockade, the Soviets would airlift the necessary machinery for the construction of munitions factories in Egypt. (Ibid.,NEA Files: Lot 59 D 518, Alpha—Anderson talks w/BG &Nasser.Carbons of incoming and outgoing tels)
7. See Document 325.
8. October 3.