14. Telegram From Ambassador Eric Johnston to the Department of State1
1098.Johnston three. Negotiations in Israel2 were extremely difficult, marked by Israel’s resistance to basic assumptions on which our proposals necessarily depend. While we were convinced of genuine interest among influential Israelis in seeking favorable conclusion, actual negotiations hit repeated snags both on points of principle and details of water calculations.
Main points of difficulty were: (1) The quantity of river water proposed for Israel; and (2) use of Lake Tiberias.
Concerning (1) Israelis insisted Jordan underground supplies estimated by them at 100 to 200MCM be included in Jordanian share. Israelis also took strong exception to B-Harza3 allowance of only 3 percent for uncropped land in irrigable area. Israel also rejected thesis that all Arab lands should be served and Israel receive remainder. It was evident that GOI looks for a larger share than we prepared admit, equivalent to substantially all the upper Jordan flow. Re (2), which may be just as important as quantity, it was evident GOI feared Tiberias storage might be used in some way as a lever to force territorial concessions or adjustments unfavorable to Israel. Furthermore, Israeli engineers now claim total Tiberias storage capacity required to meet needs of Israels own water development program and that accommodation Yarmuk surplus in Tiberias would compel Israel construct excessively expensive storage facilities elsewhere.
GOI emphasized that function of water master would have to be strictly limited to mechanical control.
In effort meet Israel partially on quantity,Johnston proposed diversion allocation from rivers of 430MCM plus Huleh reclamation water approximating 62 or total 492 for Israel, permitting Israeli diversion ex-basin at Banat Yaqub. This proposal unacceptable to Israel.
With respect incorporation groundwater in Jordanian allotment Johnston proposed that Israel agree to presently proposed share for [Page 44] Jordan with assurances US Government would undertake exhaustive explorations for groundwater during given period, and that any amount thus derived would result in release of river water to Israel.
To assuage Israel’s apprehension re polit implication Tiberias storage Johnston assured GOI he prepared give Prime Minister a letter stating no such implications exist and further to incorporate in all agreements a firm proviso that Tiberias storage would neither prejudice status quo nor provide basis for future efforts to do so. We understand this assurance has had marked effect on Israel’s attitude toward Tiberias use, but no definitive understanding was achieved. While Israel may later agree on basis such assurances GOI’s present position remains unfavorable to use of Tiberias.
GOI indicated it would be interested in considering plan for partial allocations leaving unallocated balance to be divided after three to five years.Johnston did not signify interest but privately feels some such approach in final showdown may be productive if Arabs objection total plan are serious.
While in Jerusalem Johnston, Gardiner and Barnes called on General Burns to explain plan and progress.4 In course general discussion General Burns stated that proposed diversions at Banat Yaqub and Adasiya are directly linked in his present opinion and that permission to go ahead with one would necessarily be coupled with similar permission for the other. This assumed in both instances that necessary assurances would be given as to protection of local property rights, water use and similar factors.Burns also said that after study he would not be able to supply earlier Bennike finding re milit advantage to Israel. If obligated to make decision now on Banat Yaqub it probably would be favorable to project resumption. However he had no intention making any decision at present and certainly not while Johnston negotiations under way. In event of any future Security Council action he said he would be guided by positions of France, Britain, United States and would be disinclined to move unless these countries indicated they wished him to.
Comment:Sharett’s attitude so far more hopeful than those of technicians and advisers.Sharett however seems to be in some difficulties with his colleagues and the country in general. Cabinet crisis impended due dispute over current budget, and because of alleged failure of Sharett’s foreign policy. Israelis are disturbed at recent events in Egypt, Iraq and Syria and even more concerned at policy of United States which appears to them to be one of appeasement [Page 45] of Arabs regardless of Israeli rights and interests. Problem remains to convince Israelis that their interests lie in solving JISR Banat Yaqub problem through agreement and in otherwise accommodating themselves to measures that will permit equitable division of water to be enforced to satisfaction of all interests concerned.
Cairo conversations began today.5Johnston privately assured by Fawzi of Egypt’s continued good offices.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 120.1580/2–355. Secret. Repeated to Amman, Damascus, Beirut, Tel Aviv, London, and Paris. Ambassador Johnston assigned his own numbering system to most of his personal telegrams. Incoming telegrams bear the Ambassadors’ signatures.↩
- Summary minutes of Johnston’s discussions in Israel, January 27–31, and related documents areibid.,NEA/IAI Files: Lot 70 D 254,Johnston Mission Minutes of Meetings.↩
- See footnote 2, Document 8.↩
- A summary record of Ambassador Johnston’s conversation of January 31 with General Burns is in Department of State, Central Files, 684A.85322/1–3155.↩
- Johnston arrived in Egypt on February 1.↩