Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1955, Volume XIV

210. Telegram From the Embassy in Egypt to the Department of State¹

Cairo,August 22, 1955—6 p.m.

278. For the Secretary. Deptels 325² and 329³ received and indicated appointments have been requested. Hope it not too late that you consider following 2 suggestions:

As regards presentation here, would be far more hopeful if we could be more specific as regards subject matter covered paragraph 5Deptel 325. Appreciate my recommendation regarding assisting Nasser in some manner on arms purchase is most difficult for Washington. Nevertheless believe subject of such importance as regards U.S.-Egyptian relations in general and possible cooperation on this particular problem that it extremely important Nasser does not obtain impression new matter has been raised requiring prior cooperation on his part before purchase can be consummated.

I fear that as matter now stands he may obtain this impression as he would think decision in principle should have been possible for Washington in time that has elapsed since his request to me on August 14,⁴ which, you will recall, similar to request made by Hussein in conversation with you before his departure.⁵ If at all possible suggest alteration of this paragraph to indicate that, while complying his request produces severe difficulties that will require few more days to overcome, decision in principle has been made that a way will be found to assist him in purchase of some U.S. equipment.

As regards revised text of statement (not yet received) have been encouraged by word from George Allen that specific references to proposed settlement plan might be replaced by more general statements. Think this important in general but particularly so as regards Negev and that text not commit us to any specific formula or even type of solution. Egypt’s reaction to speech will most probably be largely influenced by phraseology regarding this problem and if catch phrase such as “re-establishment of continuity of Arab territory” can possibly be utilized we may not come out too badly. Realize this is extremely difficult without specifically endorsing Israel’s right of access to Elath but believe this issue can become matter of bargaining at later date if statement worded with this objective in mind. Statement would have to be phrased in such a way that it would not evoke strong Egyptian denunciation which would have effect of freezing Arab position from outset.

While above recommendations seem very important here am certain you know we will do our best carry through with whatever decision you feel required from over-all viewpoint.

Byroade

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/8–2255. Top Secret;Niact; Alpha. Received at 7:03 p.m. Repeated priority to London.
2. Document 207.
3. See footnote 3, Document 207.
4. For Byroade’s report, see Document 193.
5. See Document 178.