178. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, July 29, 19551
SUBJECT
- Egyptian Arms Request; Economic Aid; Sudan; Middle East Defense
PARTICIPANTS
- The Secretary
- Dr. Ahmed Hussein, Ambassador of Egypt
- NEA—Assistant Secretary,George V. Allen
The Ambassador said he was leaving for Cairo tomorrow on consultation and welcomed the opportunity to obtain the Secretary’s views on various United States-Egyptian matters prior to his personal report to Prime Minister Nasser. The first item he wished to present was the pending Egyptian request to purchase arms in the United States. He said Egypt had endeavored to obtain armaments from us on three previous occasions, the first two having been refused pending a Suez settlement and the third, brought to Washington . . . having simply produced no results. (Mr.Allen pointed out that the Egyptian Government had not made a formal application for the arms on the list . . . because Egypt had wanted special terms of payment or perhaps a direct or indirect gift of the armaments, which had complicated the request. Ambassador Hussein smiled his concurrence.)
The Secretary said he knew of no basic political objection to the sale of arms to Egypt for defense purposes. The US was reluctant to contribute to an arms race in the Middle East and was aware that the Israeli Government would probably ask to buy arms as soon as it learned of sales to Egypt. Nevertheless, he did not want Colonel Nasser to think that we were trying to prevent Egypt from being able to defend itself. Instructions would be sent to Ambassador Byroade as soon as cost and availability information were obtained from the Defense Department, which he hoped would be in a few days.
Ambassador Hussein hoped we could make a special price to Egypt. The Secretary said he thought we would have to deal with all countries in the area on an equal basis. For example, Saudi Arabia had recently bought B–26 planes from us. We could hardly sell to Egypt at a different price. Ambassador Hussein pointed out that Israel already had superior armament to Egypt and that some concession to Egypt would merely tend to redress the balance. He was [Page 333] aware that an outright gift of arms could be made only if Egypt signed certain agreements required by US legislation. He wondered if we could not increase our economic aid by, say, $10,000,000 and allow Egypt to pay for the arms with foreign exchange which would be released by this amount. Mr.Allen pointed out that the Egyptian Government had not raised the question of terms of payment in the present case. Ambassador Hussein said, smiling. “I am raising it right now.” Mr.Allen suggested that the first step was to obtain the cost and availability figures.
Ambassador Hussein said his second point was to urge increased economic aid for Egypt. The Secretary asked what the aid amount had been last year. The Ambassador said, “About $40,000,000.” The Secretary thought this was considerable and remarked, pleasantly, that Egypt would be fortunate if its aid during the coming year was not reduced along with most other countries. He emphasized our desire to do everything we could for Egypt but that other requirements and available appropriations must also be taken into consideration.
The Ambassador said his third point concerned the Sudan. He recalled that Foreign Minister Fawzi had spoken to the Secretary on this point in San Francisco, and repeated the Egyptian Government’s desire for US assistance in bringing about closer relations between Egypt and the Sudan. He hoped that some kind of federation could be achieved. The Secretary said that in principle he was inclined to agree that confederation was preferable to the setting up of innumerable weak independent states which could not defend themselves. He was unable to say what we could do in the Sudan, if anything, and thought our political influence there was quite small. However, he would take the Egyptian Government’s views under consideration. Ambassador Hussein said that the most difficult question at the moment concerned the division of the Nile waters. The Secretary asked Mr.Allen to look into this question to see if we could help the negotiations along and agreed that just division of these waters was highly desirable.
Ambassador Hussein’s last point concerned the High Aswan Dam. He said this was the most important element in Egyptian economic development and that without it Egypt could not make progress. He was greatly disappointed that the International Bank seemed to be continually raising new difficulties now related to upper waters in the Sudan, and he hoped the US Government would use its influence with the Bank to speed the negotiations.
At the close of the conversation, the Secretary asked Ambassador Hussein to assure Prime Minister Nasser that while the US Government supported the “northern tier” concept, he had never had in mind doing anything which would challenge Egypt’s place as [Page 334] the leader of the Arab States. He said Egypt was entitled to this both by history and present position and strength. Moreover, he had full confidence in Colonel Nasser and was anxious to do everything possible to help him succeed. The US had many demands from foreign nations for political and economic support and could not always do everything which all nations would like. However, he was determined to conduct the foreign policy of the United States on a moral basis and to deal as honestly and fairly with every nation as he possibly could. He felt it of extreme importance that at least one powerful nation in the world today should base its foreign policy on principle. He asked the Ambassador to remind Colonel Nasser that US policy today, based on justice and fairness to all countries in the Middle East, was much better than it had ever been since the creation of Israel. He hoped the Prime Minister would believe in our genuine support and good will towards him personally.
(Subsequently, Ambassador Hussein told Mr.Allen and Mr.Wilkins, separately, that he was extremely pleased with the Secretary’s statements.)
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 774.5/7–2955. Secret. Drafted by Allen on August 3.↩