Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1955, Volume XIV

207. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Egypt¹

Washington,August 20, 1955—7:50 p.m.

325. For Ambassador from Secretary. Re Russell letter July 22.²

I have reached decision make statement on Arab-Israel problem evening August 26 before Council Foreign Relations in New York. I have come to believe major move necessary now in order seize initiative in Near East, arresting policy of drift and consequent opportunity for USSR cause trouble. Your reports Soviet efforts in Egypt confirm need for early action. If we delay further we may miss present relatively favorable moment. US is now in position impartial friend both parties but with delay we could be obliged, by Soviet maneuvers or domestic developments, to take steps which would arouse resentment of Arab states. Also we have period of comparative quiet in Arab-Israel relations. With Israel under Ben Gurion calm may not last especially should Israel learn beforehand of my statement. I am encouraged further by your latest talks with Nasser and Fawzi particularly latter’s view US should seize initiative in 1955.

Accordingly you should plan to request meeting with Nasser August 24 and subsequently with Fawzi to make presentation along fol lines (do not make appointments until receipt subsequent instruction that effect):³

1. I have asked you reiterate on my behalf points I made to Fawzi in San Francisco⁴ and Washington,⁵ i.e., our strong support for Nasser personally and his govt; our recognition of Egypt’s natural and legitimate aspirations in Middle East; although we think “northern tier” contains elements essential for defense of area, we do not advocate adherence of additional Arab states at this time and it does not preclude major role for Egypt when Nasser so wishes; our hopes for cooperation with Egypt.

2. In above spirit you wish to tell him confidentially of my plan to make major Arab-Israel statement on Aug 26. US decision to take initiative largely influenced by Egyptian advice as expressed by Fawzi that such action desirable in 1955. Statement will be made as sincere friend both sides and offers great deal to Arabs. You confident Egypt will realize positive benefits from objectives set forth and will take lead among Arab states in working towards them. Statement will outline in broad strokes US views on need for accommodation (not asking formal peace) and matters requiring settlement including borders, refugees, and guarantee of boundaries. (You should not provide further details at this time.) You will be glad further to discuss matter afterwards. You hope Nasser will ponder statement carefully to determine how best to capitalize on opportunity offered and that he will provide constructive leadership to other Arab states.

3. You also bring news other matters in which Nasser expressed interest. On my behalf you may assure him US following scrupulously policy of complete non-interference in Sudan and, whatever results of self-determination, hopes to see and will encourage friendly cooperation between Egyptian and Sudanese people. ln response his request we prepared try bring about agreement between Egypt and Sudan on Nile waters.

4. You able inform him in confidence IBRD has completed economic and technical engineering studies of High Asuan Dam and studies will be reviewed by management near future along with recommendations that GOE be invited further discussions of overall problems of finance and organization connected with problem. We intend urge upon IBRD desirability expeditious consideration. Success in our efforts on Nile waters would assist further favorable decisions by Bank. If Nasser wishes, US economic aid for FY 1956, insofar as feasible, could be programmed to projects and studies supporting high dam.

5. We are exploring with utmost care all possibilities assisting him with respect to financing arms he wishes obtain. His request presents us with severe difficulties but we are making every effort to find ways to help.FYI: From political standpoint difficulties would be greatly increased by hostile reaction to statement and immoderate presentation of exaggerated Negev claims. End FYI.

Revised text statement, instructions re follow-up presentation, timetable and publicity will be telegraphed separately.

You should coordinate your approach with British colleague without, however, revealing substance numbered paras three, four and five. We are informing French FonOff of proposed statement only in most general terms at this time but hope for French endorsement of our proposals. In your discretion you may reveal to your French colleague nature your presentation to Nasser and Fawzi but only in most general terms.

Dulles

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/8–2055. Top Secret; Alpha; Limited Distribution. Drafted by Burdett and Russell on August 19; approved by the Secretary and by Russell, who signed for Dulles. Repeated to London.
2. Document 169.
3. The Department sent a confirmatory instruction to Cairo the following day. (Telegram 329, August 21; Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/8–2155)
4. See Document 138.
5. See footnote 3, Document 150.