Please send your comments as soon as possible by Top Secret telegram to
the Department, Limited Distribution, with code name Alpha, repeating to
London only.
It is of primary importance to insure absolute secrecy in this matter.
Please limit sight of this letter and its enclosures to the minimum
number of senior members of your staff whom you feel
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you must consult; and, for the present,
keep this letter and all correspondence connected with it in your
private safe.
Before replying, however, please consult your British colleague to whom
the Foreign Office is sending a similar communication. I am sending
similar letters and enclosures to our Chiefs of Mission in Cairo, Amman,
Damascus, Beirut and Baghdad; and for their information only, to our
Ambassadors in Paris and Ankara.
The Secretary and Mr.Macmillan
conferred on this subject in Paris on July 14, and gave their approval
to the enclosed memorandum. Mr.Macmillan is seeking the authority of his Cabinet
colleagues to support the proposal, but until their agreement is
obtained, Her Majesty’s Government is not committed to any particular
course of action.
Enclosure
PALESTINE SETTLEMENT4
The Foreign Office and the Department of State have reached agreement
on the need for an equitable settlement of the Palestine affair and
the best means of attempting to achieve it.
2. The intention had been that the first approach would be made to
the Prime Minister of Egypt. But this has not proved possible,
largely because of Colonel Nasser’s preoccupation with the immediate tension on
the Gaza strip, and we do not think it likely that we should be able
to enlist his interest in moving towards a settlement for some time
to come. Secretary Dulles is
convinced that he cannot refrain much longer from defining the
policy of the United States towards Israel’s security and the Middle
East as a whole. The longer he waits, the more difficult it will
become for him to make a balanced statement on the subject: as the
United States Presidential elections approach, the pressure for a
statement favorable to Israel will increase. He feels that he must
crystallize United States policy on the issue; and that he should
therefore soon make a statement, to which the United States
Administration could hold firmly, on the general lines of the
proposals for a Palestine settlement
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which our two Governments have worked out. It
is our hope that the two parties to the dispute, even though they
may vigorously reject the proposed settlement at first, will, in the
long run, come to see its merits and move slowly towards it. On the
other hand we are not blind to the grave risks which the action
entails.
3. Attached to this memorandum is a copy of a draft of a speech which
Mr.Dulles proposes to deliver early in
September and which contains an outline of the settlement which H.M.
Government and the U.S. Government believe to be the fairest now
possible. Mr.Macmillan is
seeking the authority of his Cabinet colleagues to make a statement
the next day expressing H.M. Government’s support for the principles
enunciated by Mr.Dulles and their readiness to
help in bringing about a settlement and to make a contribution to
the financial commitments which a settlement would involve.
4. In general, we shall avoid being drawn into publishing any fuller
details of the proposed settlement, on the grounds that to do so
would prejudice any negotiations which the parties might wish to
enter into, whether between themselves or through third parties, on
the basis of the principles which we shall have enunciated. The
recipients of this memorandum will be sent guidance for publicity
and help in dealing with enquiries later. Meanwhile, the following
are explanations of some of the specific proposals contained in the
enclosed draft statement:
A. Guarantees
As will be seen from the draft statement, it is intended that these
should be limited to the territorial aspect of the settlement. It
will be made clear, however, that they would not be granted except
in the framework of a comprehensive settlement. (In other words,
acceptance by one party of part or all the plan would not earn the
guarantee.)
B. Boundaries
The Negev. The idea here is that Israel should
cede to Egypt a triangle of territory with its base on the Egyptian
frontier and to Jordan another triangle with its base on the Jordan
frontier. The apex of one triangle would meet the apex of the other
on the Israeli road from the north to Elath. The principle
underlying this solution is that there would be a point at the
junction of the two triangles where the sovereignty would appertain
to both sides. This would make it possible for an East-West Arab
road under complete Arab control to pass over (or under) an Israeli
North-South road under complete Israeli control. We can see no way
of reconciling the vital interests of both parties in the Negev
except by this principle. We should not commit ourselves on the size
and location of the triangles: that would be left for negotiation.
We have, however, got various alternative ideas.
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C. Jerusalem
. . . we should try to get through the United Nations a resolution
providing for the “functional internationalization” of the Holy
Places, on the lines of the Swedish draft resolution of 1950. . .
.
D. The Blockade
It would be essential, as part of any settlement, that the Egyptians
should open the Suez Canal to Israeli ships and Israel-bound
traffic; and that the Arab states should cease to put pressure on
third parties not to trade with Israel. We would not, however, ask
the Arabs to engage in direct trade with Israel themselves, even
after a settlement. The wording of the enclosed draft statement is
designed to allow for this distinction to be made.
5. We should propose to give the parties to the dispute about 24
hours’ notice that the statements are to be made. We should not
reveal the substance of the statements at that stage, but we should
say that we hoped that both sides would receive them in a
constructive spirit and with a willingness to look seriously for
common ground. We should point out that the statements do not call
for an immediate reply or decision on the part of the Governments
nor do they carry any suggestion of coercion. We hope indeed that
the Governments will take their time and will be prepared to discuss
our ideas with us further. In the meantime we would ask them in
their public reactions to the statements to exercise restraint and
at least not to commit themselves against the suggestions until they
have had a chance to discuss with us in greater detail the
advantages we believe them to contain.
6. We should also inform certain other Governments and authorities,
notably France, Turkey, the Commonwealth and the Secretary-General
of the United Nations (and through him General Burns and Mr. Labouisse)
a few days in advance of these statements and seek their support for
our proposals. We will want to couch our communications to
Governments in the manner best calculated to avoid leaks. We should
solicit the support of other states members of the United Nations at
the time of the publication of the plan.
Enclosure
DRAFT OF POSSIBLE PUBLIC STATEMENT BY
MR.DULLES ON AN ISRAEL-ARAB SETTLEMENT5
Two years ago last month I returned from a trip which took me to the
Near East. I wanted to see, for myself, that area, so rich in
culture and tradition, yet today so torn by strife and bitterness. I
visited Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, and Saudi
Arabia. Upon my return I spoke of the impressions gathered on that
trip and of the hopes which I hold as a result of talks with leaders
and people there.
Some of those hopes have become realities. Two years ago the Suez
Base was a center of controversy and of potential strife. In my
report to the American people, I expressed the conviction that there
was nothing irreconcilable in the positions of the two Governments,
and the hope that both sides would continue to try to find a
peaceful solution. I said that the United States was prepared to
help in any desired way. Since that time, as a result of patient
effort, in a spirit of conciliation, the problem of the Suez Base
has been successfully resolved.
Another problem which was concerning many of the leaders in the
Middle East was that of securing the area against the menace of
aggression from without the area. It was clear that effective
defense depended upon collective measures and that such measures, to
be dependable, needed to be based on the development within the area
of a sense of common destiny and of common danger. Here, too, there
has been encouraging progress and a growing realization of the need
for cooperation in defense.
A third problem which called for attention was the need for water to
irrigate land. I mentioned in my report the possibility that the
rivers flowing through the Jordan Valley might be used to make this
important and fertile valley a source of livelihood rather than
dispute. Ambassador Eric
Johnston’s talks since that time with the governments
of the countries through which the River Jordan runs have shown an
encouraging willingness on both sides to contemplate the principle
of coordinated arrangements for the use of the waters and plans for
the development of the Valley are well advanced.
A beginning has been made, as you see, in dealing with the obstacles
that stand in the way of the aspirations of the Near Eastern
peoples. It is my hope—and it is that hope of which I would
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now speak—that the time
has come when it is useful to think in terms of further steps toward
stability, tranquillity and progress in the Middle East.
The Arab-Israel Problem
What are the principal remaining problems? There are three that stand
out above the others.
The first is the tragic plight of the 900,000 refugees who formerly
lived in the territory that is now occupied by Israel.
The second is the pall of fear that hangs over the Arab and Israel
people alike. The Arab countries fear that Israel will seek by
violent means to expand at their expense. The Israelis fear that the
Arabs will gradually marshall superior forces to be used to drive
them into the sea and resent the measures of economic blockade which
are now enforced against them.
The third is the lack of fixed permanent boundaries between Israel
and its Arab neighbors.
There are other important problems. But if these three principal
problems could be dealt with, then the way would be paved for the
solution of others.
It seems to me that these three problems are capable of solution, and
surely there is need.
Border clashes take an almost weekly toll of human lives. The
sufferings of the 900,000 Arab refugees are drawn out almost beyond
the point of endurance. The fears which are at work, on each side,
lead to a heavy burden of armament, which constitutes a serious drag
on economic and social progress. Responsible leaders are finding it
hard to turn their full attention and energies to the positive task
of creating the conditions of stability and healthy growth out of
which strong nations could emerge.
Serious as the present situation is, there is a danger that unless it
improves, it will get worse.One ill
leads to another, and cause and effect are hard to sort out. Both
sides suffer greatly from the present situation, and both are
anxious for what they would regard as a just and equitable solution.
But neither has been able to find that way. This may be a situation
where mutual friends could, through their good offices, serve the
common good.
The United States, as a friend of both Israelis and Arabs, has given
the situation deep thought and has come to certain conclusions, the
expansion of which may help men of good will within the area to
fresh constructive efforts. I speak in this matter with the
authority of the President.
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I.
We find no single and easy answer to the plight of the 900,000 Arab
refugees who formerly lived in the territory that is now Israel, who
fled at the time of the fighting in 1948 and were barred from
returning to their homes and the cost of whose maintenance now falls
directly on the international community. But we do feel that an
answer can be found in a combination of measures which, together,
would reestablish these uprooted people and offer them hope of a new
life.
Compensation by the State of Israel is due for the land and buildings
belonging to the refugees which are now in Israel’s possession.
Perhaps Israel cannot, unaided, now make adequate compensation. If
so, there might be an international loan to Israel of the balance of
the sum necessary. The President would recommend substantial
participation by the United States in such a loan for such a
purpose.
Money alone, however, will not solve the problem. The money must be
used to create more arable land on which the refugees could make
permanent homes and work to produce a self-respecting livelihood.
Many of them would be settled over a period of the next few years as
a result of projects much as the Jordan Valley development plan, the
Sinai project, and as a result of the increased opportunities
provided by the expanding economies of countries of the area. Here,
too, outside help might be required.
II.
The second principal element which I mentioned is that of fear. The
nature of this fear is such that it is not within the capacity of
any single country of the area to take measures to dispel it.
President Eisenhower has
authorized me to say that if a solution can be found to the other
related problems, he would recommend that the United States formally
commit itself to take appropriate action to prevent or thwart any
effort by either side to alter by force the boundaries between
Israel and its Arab neighbors. I hope that other countries would be
willing to join in such a commitment, and it might perhaps be
sponsored by the United Nations.
III.
If there is to be a guarantee of borders, it would be normal that
there should be a prior agreement upon what the borders are. That is
the third major element. The existing lines separating the Arab
states from Israel were fixed by the Armistice Agreements of 1949.
They reflected the status of the fighting at the moment. They were
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not designed to be
permanent frontiers in every respect. They clearly require
rectifications and adjustments.
For example, there should presumably be an allocation of the present
demilitarized zones and “no man’s lands” created by the Armistice
agreements.
The Arab world, which is now separated by Israel possession of the
Negev, understandably desires an unbroken land connection. This
could be provided, without prejudice to any of Israel’s vital
interests, by ceding to one or two Arab nations sovereignty over
triangular portions of the Negev having little or no economic value
and now wholly barren. The Arab triangles could be based on the
Egyptian and Jordanian frontiers respectively so that their apexes
meet at a point on an Israeli route to the south. Thus the now
divided Arabs would reestablish sovereign contact, while the
sovereign connection of Israel with the port of Elath would be
maintained.
IV.
If agreement can be reached on these basic elements—refugees,
boundaries, and the elimination of fear—it should prove possible to
find solutions for other questions, largely economic, and to bring
to an end external economic measures which presently fan the flames
of hostility and resentment.
It should also be possible to reach agreement on the status of
Jerusalem. The United States would give its support to a United
Nations review of this problem.
Conclusion
I have not attempted to enumerate all the issues on which it would be
desirable to have a settlement; nor have I tried to outline in
detail the form which a settlement of any of the elements might
take. I have tried to show that possibilities exist for an
immeasurable improvement without any nation taking action which
would be against its interests whether those interests be measured
in terms of material strength or, what is more important, in terms
of national prestige and honor.
Both sides in this strife have a noble past, a heritage of rich
contributions to civilization; both have fostered progress in
science and the arts. Each side is predominantly representative of
one of the world’s great religions. Both sides desire to achieve a
good life for their people and to share, and contribute to, the
advancements of this century. Both can contribute much to progress
in the coming decades. The people of the United States for their
part could and would contribute much more readily and more happily
if there could
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be ended
the strains which now burden life within the area, a life which, for
most of the people, desperately needs enrichment.
At a time when a great effort is being made to ease the tension which
has long prevailed between the East and the West, can we not hope
that a similar spirit should prevail in the Near East? Indeed, may
not the nations there set an example which would show how the spirit
of conciliation and of the good neighbor brings rich rewards to the
people and to the nations? That is our plea, and if the response
involves some burdens, they are burdens which the United States
would share, just as we would share the satisfaction which would
result to all peoples if happiness, contentment and good will could
drive hatred and misery away from peoples whom we hold in high
respect and honor.
