Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1955, Volume XIV

138. Memorandum of a Conversation, San Francisco, June 24, 1955¹

San Francisco, June 24, 1955

BSF MC–11

SUBJECT

• United States-Egyptian Relations; Prospects for an Arab-Israel Settlement

PARTICIPANTS

• Dr. Mahmud Fawzi, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Egypt
• The Secretary
• Assistant Secretary George V. Allen

The Secretary greeted Dr.Fawzi cordially and expressed pleasure at the opportunity of having a discussion with him. Commenting that relations between the United States and Egypt seemed to be slightly less cordial than they have been a few months ago, the Secretary said he regretted this development very genuinely since he had always felt that Prime Minister Nasser was the most promising of the Arab leaders and that Egypt was the logical leader of the Arab States. He asked Dr.Fawzi what he thought the reasons were for Nasser’s reservations about the United States.

Dr.Fawzi said that relations between the United States and Egypt had reached their high point at the time of the signing of the Suez Canal Agreement, but that Egypt had been shocked by the signature of the Iraqi-Turkish Pact. Additional adherence to this pact by other Arab States would make matters worse. The Secretary pointed out that the United States had been given too much credit for bringing about this pact and that he himself had been quite surprised when it occurred. He said that as long ago as June 1953, he had originally used the term “northern tier” as a concept for a collective security arrangement to include the countries between Turkey and Pakistan and that we welcomed any proper step in this direction, but any idea that we were building up Iraq as a counterweight to Egypt among the Arab States had no justification whatever.

Dr.Fawzi said he was now satisfied that the United States was not “interfering in Syria”, but any impression that we supported the adherence of other Arab States to the Turkish-Iraq Pact would create further uncertainties in Egypt with regard to American policy. The Secretary said that far from urging such adherences, we would be embarrassed if they did join since the effect would be bad not only in Egypt but also in Israel. In the latter connection, he asked Dr.Fawzi how Israeli-Egyptian relations stood. Dr.Fawzi said these fell into two categories, the immediate and the long range. As regards the immediate, the problem concerned the Gaza strip. Egypt had agreed to General Burns’ proposals for discussions with Israel and Colonel Nasser had suggested a neutralized zone along the Gaza frontier and arrangements for joint Israeli-Egyptian patrols as possible means for improvement. He hoped these suggestions would bear fruit.

As regards the long-range question, Dr.Fawzi said Egypt’s position was quite straight forward and clear. He did not wish to imply that this was a matter which had been thrashed out in the Egyptian cabinet, since only he and Colonel Nasser had discussed the matter, but he had let Ambassador Byroade know their basic attitude. He said Nasser had two requirements which must be fulfilled before any long-range settlement with Israel could be possible. The first requirement was full material compensation for the losses sustained by the refugees. He emphasized material compensation since, he said, no one could estimate the moral and psychological damage done to these uprooted people. Egypt did not insist that the compensation be paid by Israel, but full compensation was required from some source in order to enable these people to begin a new life, either in Israel for those permitted to return, or elsewhere for those who were not. The second requirement was the physical and geographical union of the Arab States. This meant the surrender of the Negev, “including Beersheba”, by Israel. Egypt did not demand an inch of this territory for herself. It could all be given to Jordan. Moreover, Israel could have Gaza. He said that one often heard reference to the partition of Palestine, but the creation of Israel had in fact partitioned the Arab States, by separating them physically. If he wished to go by car from Egypt to Damascus, he would have to obtain the permission of Mr.Sharett. This was an impossible situation for any Arab to accept. A mere corridor would in no way suffice.

The Secretary remarked that he had not made any basic statement regarding United States policy toward the Middle East since his return from that area two years ago.² Prior to the United States Congressional elections last year, he had been subjected to considerable pressure to make a further statement but he had refused to do so, promising a statement after the elections. Eight months had passed and he now felt that he should not wait much longer to do so.

Dr.Fawzi said he presumed that the reason the Secretary felt a statement necessary was the request he understood Israel had made for a security pact with the United States. He pointed out that a security pact must guarantee certain boundaries; he asked what we proposed to guarantee. Until boundaries were fixed, he did not see how any pact was possible. If the United States signed a security pact with Israel under present circumstances, before boundaries had been agreed upon by the Arab States, the pact would be illegal and he would protest it as such. Moreover, the United States would do irreparable harm to its relations with every Arab State, without exception, if we gave Israel a security pact prior to a permanent boundary settlement. The Secretary commented that, as a lawyer, he was not always impressed by legal arguments but he understood fully the political considerations Dr.Fawzi mentioned.

Dr.Fawzi said he thought efforts for a definitive settlement should be made during 1955 since the United States would find it difficult, “for obvious reasons”, to do anything during 1956. Consequently, if progress was not made during 1955, we might have to wait until 1957. The Secretary commented that even 1957 might not be an easy year since positions might be taken by both sides during the 1956 political campaign which would be difficult to overcome.

Dr.Fawzi said that if the two basic conditions regarding refugees and boundaries were met, he saw no reason why the matter should not go ahead in the near future. The Secretary expressed his appreciation for this encouraging news and repeated his pleasure at the opportunity to discuss the subject with Dr.Fawzi in San Francisco.

1. Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 63 D 123, CF480. Top Secret. Drafted by Allen. Secretary Dulles was in San Francisco, June 19–25, for the Tenth Anniversary of the signing of the U.N. Charter.
2. For documentation on the visit of Dulles and Harold Stassen to the Near and Middle East, May 9–29, 1953, see Foreign Relations, 1952–1954, vol. IX, Part 1, pp. 1 ff. For text of Dulles’ speech of June 1, 1953, which summarized his trip, see Department of StateBulletin, June 15, 1953, p. 831.