195. Telegram From the Embassy in Egypt to the Department of State1
250. General subject Arab-Israeli settlement beginning to appear again in conversation here. When Hussein came to me so concerned re Russian arms situation he stated some dramatic move necessary prevent this controversy from being capitalized on by USSR. Could we for instance he inquired force quick settlement? I stated did not like word “force” but he entirely correct greater efforts should go towards solution basic problem rather than being satisfied with trying to ward off piecemeal dangers arising from controversy itself.Hussein now is pressing for quick and forceful action on our part to bring some type of immediate settlement.
In our discussions last night with Fawzi,Fawzi reiterated his conviction that even at this late date the year 1955 was still the time to act. We went back over our previous discussions in considerable detail. He said his sense urgency was greater than during our previous conversation and he felt that even on GOE side,Nasser might be more willing to act now than “even in six months”.
I stated we always seemed to reach about the same point in these talks. Did he really wish to proceed in detail with such talks and if so how should we proceed? There followed a long talk on the Negev and it became obvious that question was no longer one of tactics as to how to proceed. He was rather giving me GOE position that if solution could be found for the Negev satisfactory to Egypt, Egypt would be ready to move forward to rapid and complete settlement. I have now talked to Fawzi in sufficient detail on elements other than Negev to believe that meeting of minds thereon could be readily reached.
[Page 359]I expressed opinion that any plan to give entire Negev to Jordan was quite out of question, explaining somewhat the obvious reaction and emotions of Israelis. Furthermore, stated that there were concessions elsewhere that should in all logic be made by Israel. One could not contemplate coupling these with such a large loss of territory. For instance if Arabs in addition contemplated return of refugees into Israeli territory thus reduced, he must see how impossible this would be.Fawzi said “don’t quote me, but if we can get a solution to Negev we might be willing take a position that there should be no return of refugees and that Arabs now residing Israel should even have evacuation facilitated”.
Fawzi refused to talk in terms of anything resembling a corridor or access rights. What he stressed was rather a “continuity of territory” in the Arab world. Thus Egypt could not contemplate solution which would allow Israel access to Gulf of Elath. This I said would put Israel at the mercy of Suez Canal. He replied, no more than Greece, Italy or others. I stated he must realize Israel had more reason to fear for the future re the Canal than other countries.Fawzi responded by saying he was not thinking of a settlement that would leave cause for concern but of a real effort being made for establishment of friendly relations which would erase such fears. He remarked that Jews and Arabs had lived together in the past and could do so again if Israel could accept the type of solution he recommended. Israel would really not lose much of a practical value as good lands would not be taken from her. She could under these conditions fulfill her dream of a metropolis for the area if she wished to really cooperate with her neighbors.
Fawzi stated he concerned increasing numbers of individuals who wished come this area as peacemakers. This was not way to handle problem and secret informal discussions such as this between professionals was the only way to start. He mentioned forthcoming visit of Congressman Powell2 with anxiety as to bad propaganda which would probably result. He felt Lester Pearson, whom he greatly admires, was also about to visit both Egypt3 and Israel for same purpose and gave impression he wished he would not.
I made no effort bring matter to conclusion or arrange for further discussions because not certain what Department would wish at this stage. It is subject, however, I did not wish avoid as in my own mind complications of Russian attitude greatly increase dangers continued stalemate. Cannot conceive of being able convince Israel [Page 360] accept this type of solution yet when one weighs the consequences of continued controversy against the value this worthless spot of desert it difficult not to reach conclusion maybe we should try sound out what is furthest Israel could accept under real pressure from US for quick settlement.
Fawzi stated he going on vacation but would be available any time I wished to see him. Would appreciate any comments as to how to handle future discussions this subject which feel will continue to arise.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/8–1755. Top Secret; Priority. Received at 7:30 p.m. Repeated priority to London.↩
- Congressman Adam Clayton Powell announced on July 23 that, after Congress had adjourned, he planned to go to the Near East in an unofficial capacity to promote a peaceful settlement between Egypt and Israel.↩
- Pearson was in Cairo on November 12.↩