Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1955, Volume XIV

194. Telegram From the Embassy in Egypt to the Department of State¹

Cairo,August 15, 1955—3 p.m.

234. Reference Embassy telegram 233 August 15.²Ahmed Hussein called on me yesterday morning in state obvious concern. He began by stating his belief there was beginning to be general improvement in US-Egyptian relations as far as Nasser was concerned. He told me in great detail of his last talks with Nasser and argumentation he had used, including encouraging conversations he had prior to his leaving Washington, particularly with Secretary.³ He felt these talks supplementing my own efforts were beginning to bring positive results. There were new difficulties however which caused him great concern.

They had discussed the internal situation, apparently in extremely blunt terms.Nasser was determined to broaden base of government next January but Hussein was trying to convince Nasser he could not afford to wait that long. He told Nasser he was surrounded by “third raters” and machinery of government under RCC was such that changes must be promptly made. He indicated he had pointed out to Nasser danger of Salem brothers, stressing importance of not losing friendship with west and inadvisability of tactics some top government people, particularly Salah Salem.Nasser later called together Hakim Amer, Salah Salem, Zakaria and others to hear Hussein’s general views as to foreign policy course Egypt should follow.Hussein this time added he was appalled by same anti-American “record” now played every Egyptian officer who visited America and it was perfectly obvious that before leaving Egypt they were being systematically worked on by communists and communist sympathizers.

Following this joint meeting,Nasser saw Hussein again alone and went into detail on internal problems he faced.Nasser said he had to let certain things happen in Egypt with which he did not agree in order to keep support of army and RCC at this stage. He agreed with Hussein that RCC must go and asked his help in trying to plan steps that must be taken to this end. Discussing his need for support army officers Nasser revealed to Hussein magnitude of recent Russian offers which was creating nearly impossible situation for him.Shepilov had brought word Russia prepared go all out in assisting Egypt.⁴ Russia would finance high dam and Egypt could repay in cotton over period up to thirty years and in terms suitable to Egypt. Russia would also be of great assistance to Egypt in economic development and technical assistance and Russia prepared to put large funds in both fields. Egypt need not be fearful of US cotton policy as Russia and communist bloc needed Egyptian cotton and suitable barter arrangements could always be made. As regards military, Russia willing to increase her latest offers substantially and would provide Egypt with MIG aircraft and latest weapons quick delivery payable in cotton. (Hussein states he was not shown details of Russian offer in military field but Nasser did at one point mention 100 MIGs and 200 tanks. He also mentioned jet bombers which Russia is willing to sell for LE 37000.) Military shipments could begin to arrive within 30 days. (Nasser had not given Shepilov definitive reply.)

Nasser told Hussein that 3 or 4 days ago Moscow radio announced USSR prepared give free military assistance to Egypt.Nasser had taken steps keep this out of press although fact such statement made was getting around. He felt compelled bring text of monitored announcement up at RCC meeting. General sentiment had been Egypt should not refuse such an offer if it were in fact officially made.Hussein later brought me a transcript which had been used in RCC meeting. It had been broadcast from Moscow on August 10 in Arabic. Most of transcript was published here after Nasser had crossed out portion dealing with military equipment which translated as follows: “very highly informed sources announced that the Soviet Union is ready to supply Egypt with modern arms and military equipment free. These sources expect that negotiations would take place between the Soviet Union and Egypt about this subject in the coming days.”⁵ Hussein stated Israeli radio had picked up this portion and used it in two broadcasts along with appropriate references about the USSR.

Nasser told Hussein he (Nasser) getting himself in real box on this one. He realized communists had of late directed their activities toward army as controlling factor in determination Egyptian policy. He knew where accepting all these Russian offers would lead. He determined have truly “independent policy” and realized acquisition Soviet arms was road to “domination”. However, his officers were desperate for arms and word was getting out that these new offers had been made. With the army in this mood and with its general lack of confidence in America, and with RCC certainly deeply divided on issue, he had to reckon with fact he would be placing his position in jeopardy in advocating turn-down of Russian offer in favoring use limited Egyptian resources to purchase arms. Such a course would appear nonsensical to average officer who convinced west determined keep Egypt weaker than Israel and who saw no danger accepting arms from any source available. Having Russian made weapons, they argue, would not make them communists so why this hesitation.

Hussein recounted to me argumentation he had given Nasser which was excellently conceived if presented to Nasser as to me. According to Hussein, however,Nasser needed little convincing, he seemed genuinely concerned at Russian motives and primarily interested in how he could marshal sufficient support within RCC and army to turn down Russian offers.

Hussein appealed to me to think of something dramatic to help Nasser in this situation. He stressed that a decision to acquire Soviet arms would not have impact on Egypt alone but could be turning point in history Middle East. He stated that high dam, economic aid, and other matters were obviously important, but paled into relative insignificance compared to question of Russia’s offer of arms under present conditions.

I asked what he thought we could do. Egypt would not accept grant assistance now even if offered. He said this was true but it might be very helpful if our response to Nasser on US purchase terms were as generous as possible. Surely, he said, we could find some way help Nasser with his foreign exchange problem so he could buy weapons from US. He also asked if we would consider a request for Egypt to purchase considerably greater quantities of equipment on list presented. I said I thought this latter point quite unlikely. He must realize from practical point of view Egyptian military could not absorb large amounts of equipment in short period of time. He said he knew this but matter was now more psychological than practical. I also stated it seemed to me not in Egypt’s interests to go too far with military equipment at this stage in view obvious reactions. Also, even if equipment were furnished on gratis basis, maintenance of much larger military establishment could not be afforded by Egypt. He nevertheless pleaded that I try think of something that would help Nasser now.

I told Hussein Middle East had been thrown into chaos, partially if not primarily, by Egyptian tactics, that it obvious Moscow had decided now was time to really move in on this area. He said he completely agreed. However Nasser still by far best thing in Egypt and now needed our help. He felt convinced that if he could get by these present troubles without losing army support, he was determined to get rid of elements that had been causing difficulties.

Byroade

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 774.56/8–1555. Secret; Priority. Received at 4:26 p.m.
2. Supra.
3. See Document 178.
4. Dimitri Trofimovich Shepilov, the editor ofPravda, visited Egypt July 21–29.
5. The Department informed Byroade on August 17 that, according to FBIS, “no broadcast made by USSR on or about August 10 resembling that quoted by Hussein.” (Telegram 300 to Cairo; Department of State, Central Files, 474.118/8–1555)Byroade replied that “There absolutely no doubt my mind that Hussein and Nasser believe broadcast was made and that RCC meeting was held on this subject.” (Telegram 253 from Cairo, August 18;ibid., 774.56/8–1855)