196. Telegram From the Embassy in Egypt to the Department of State1
252. Following my meeting with Fawzi2 attended dinner at home Ambassador Hussein with Nasser, General Hakim Amer, Zakaria Muhyi Ad-Din.Hart also present. First half of long evening devoted non-substantive matters in relaxed atmosphere. Fact that Nasser willing devote such amount of time to discussions of personal and small talk matters in general line with some change of relations for better here.
Afterward we covered nearly every facet American-Egyptian political relations without any new subject being raised. I attempted focus attention on points on which Egypt and United States could cooperate. Urged Nasser regard northern tier as solid anti-Communist achievement which in interest Egypt, United States, and West [Page 361] must under no circumstances be allowed disintegrate. It was of basic importance. Iraq should not continue to be attacked for adherence nor worked upon to recant and drop out. In answer to his complaint Iraq and Turkey constantly seeking additional Arab adherences, I again reassured him United States not enthusiastic over such adherences at this time and sought his reflections as to how this inter-Arab tug-of-war could be eased without setting up rival ESS which we felt sure would be viewed by Iraq as well as Turkey as directed against them and would therefore tend to perpetuate cleavage and resultant area weakness which we did not desire. Perhaps because a group was present,Nasser sought to justify necessity ESS, but seemed receptive to idea some reconciliation.
He thought an all-Arab arrangement in which Iraq could also participate might some day eventuate in supplementing northern tier but not as long as Nuri in power. He made clear he detested Nuri and therefore he could not at present take up my further suggestion that Egypt and Iraq bilaterally talk out their differences on basis continuation Iraqi membership northern tier and Iraq-Egyptian understanding. I had impression, however, he would be open minded about composing differences with whoever might be Nuri’s successor.
Considerable time was spent on Egypt’s military weakness vis-à-vis Israel and Western policy of equating Israel with totality Arab States in military aid matters.Hakim Amer obviously very sensitive this point. I told him I felt sure United States would welcome an Egypt strong enough not to fear an Israeli attack, but until Arab-Israel quarrel removed a building up of Egyptian might superior to that of Israel would present grave problem to United States and probably not even be in Egypt’s real interest at this time. After real solution to quarrel had been found, I saw no reason why Egyptian strength should be limited by other than load Egypt’s economy could bear and role she might play in strengthening area. I emphasized importance we attached to Egypt along with Turkey and Pakistan as future foci of strength which we desired in Middle East.
Question of Russian offers did not come up and I thought it best not to pursue question before other members RCC. Fact that Nasser had chosen present these matters through Hussein believed due desire not to discuss his personal problems with other members of RCC directly with me.
Although am somewhat reassured regarding relations here, this does not reduce in importance recommendations Embassy telegram 235.3 Fact that Nasser believes this Embassy trying find some method help him with his dollar problem regarding equipment [Page 362] purchases probably in itself factor for more friendly local relations. Nor does all this reduce in my mind new dangers inherent in Russia’s offers strengthen Egypt, thereby placing her on Arab side of Arab-Israeli conflict.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.74/8–1755. Secret. Received at 6:10 p.m. Repeated to London and Paris.↩
- Byroade reported on this meeting in telegrams 247 and 251 from Cairo, both dated August 17. (Ibid., 120.1580/8–1755 and 611.74/8–1755, respectively) Telegram 247 stated that Fawzi said Nasser had reversed his previous position against Egyptian involvement in Johnston’s negotiations and now felt the matter should be handled by all Arab states jointly. The Secretary General of the Arab League had therefore called a meeting of Arab diplomatic representatives in Cairo which had unanimously supported an approach to the U.S. Government to recommend that Johnston’s trip be delayed.Fawzi requested that Byroade pass this recommendation to Washington, stressing that the delay need be only for a “few weeks” or a month.Byroade asked Fawzi if he would advise that Johnston continue to negotiate directly with the parties most directly concerned.Fawzi replied that this might be useful, but it might be best for Johnston to meet with the entire Arab group together, perhaps in Cairo.↩
- See footnote 3, Document 193.↩