Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1955, Volume XIV

192. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Allen) to the Secretary of State¹

Washington,August 15, 1955.

SUBJECT

• Contingency Plans for Action in the Event of Armed Aggression in Palestine

Background

As you will recall,NSC 5428 (Tab C) (the policy paper covering the Near East) provides that if an armed attack occurs by either side in Palestine the United States should impose certain economic sanctions. It further provides that if these sanctions are unsuccessful in causing the aggressor state to withdraw within its own borders, we should consult with the UK and to the extent practicable with other powers on whether to take concerted action to:

(1) Establish a blockade of the attacking state;

(2) Use military forces to compel the attacking state to relinquish any territory seized and to withdraw within its own borders.

Paragraph 11 of the paper calls for the development of plans, including military plans where appropriate, to support the measures set forth above.

When the Gaza situation seemed especially acute last June we submitted a memorandum (Tab A)² suggesting steps looking toward possible implementation of the economic sanctions. You subsequently discussed this matter with Mr.Macmillan and it was agreed that any action taken should be within the United Nations framework.

Although the threat of large-scale hostilities has not materialized, an OCB working group has addressed itself to the mechanics by which we would impose economic sanctions if the occasion should arise. So far as I am aware, however, no action within the United States Government has ever been taken to draw up plans against the contingency that military action would be needed.

Discussion

The British Embassy approached us some time ago with a request for informal discussion of action to be taken by our two governments, in case of need, in both the economic and military fields.³ The Embassy said that the British Government, at the “official level” had worked out plans in both fields. We expressed our willingness to have informal exchanges regarding economic sanctions as soon as our own study was completed but said we did not think discussion of military plans would be useful, since no such plans existed in our government.

I think the British approach serves as a reminder that we may have been remiss in not carrying out the injunction of paragraph 11 of NSC 5428 to develop “military plans as appropriate.” While we all hate to contemplate the possibility of employing military force against either side, it seems to me only prudent to have plans ready against the possibility that at some time the necessity for such action might arise.

In view of the delicacy of the matter, I feel that we should have your personal approval before making a request to the Department of Defense.

Recommendation

That you approve a strictly secret (and probably oral) request to appropriate officers of the Department of Defense for the initiation of plans for the imposition of military sanctions upon an aggressor in the Arab-Israeli conflict.⁴

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/8–1555. Top Secret. Drafted by Jernegan and sent through Murphy, who initialed the memorandum. No Tab B was mentioned or attached to the source text.
2. Document 125.
3. See Document 142.
4. Dulles initialed his approval of the recommendation.