Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1955, Volume XIV

142. Memorandum of a Conversation Between the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Jernegan) and the Counselor of the British Embassy (Bailey), Department of State, Washington, July 1, 1955¹

Washington, July 1, 1955

SUBJECT

• Possible Sanctions Against an Aggressor in Egypt–Israel Conflict

Mr.Bailey said the British Government, at the working level, had been preparing contingent plans for action if the Egyptian-Israeli tensions degenerated into open conflict. They had worked out specific actions to be taken to apply both economic and military sanctions.² He recalled in this connection Britain’s special obligations to Jordan and the likelihood that Jordan would become involved if there were fighting between Israel and Egypt.

Mr.Bailey emphasized that the planning which had been done had not been submitted to the Cabinet and could not be considered, therefore, as having governmental approval. He thought it desirable, however, to exchange ideas on this subject with us, it being understood that such exchanges will be strictly informal. He knew that the Department of State had been doing some preliminary thinking about means to be employed to put economic sanctions into effect and he therefore proposed to talk to Mr.Dorsey of NE on this subject. He thought it would also be useful to discuss possible military actions. The British Chiefs of Staff would hope for American cooperation if it became necessary to impose military sanctions,and were of the opinion that United States action could best take the form of providing a task force of aircraft carriers and amphibious troops. Mr.Bailey added that he understood his Government thought it would be well to have such naval forces moved to the eastern Mediterranean in advance of an outbreak of hostilities, to serve as a deterrent.

I replied that I thought it would be desirable to exchange notes with respect to the question of economic sanctions. I pointed out, however, that the Secretary felt quite strongly that the U.S. Government should not impose such sanctions except within the framework of some UN action against the aggressor. He had already explained to Mr.Macmillan the legal and political difficulties which we would face in taking action unless we had the blessing of the UN.

With respect to the sending of a task force to the eastern Mediterranean to act as a deterrent, I recalled that Mr.Bailey had passed this suggestion to me some weeks ago. I had discussed it with the top officers of the Department and had found a general reluctance to take this action. I did not know of any consideration which had been given in the U.S. Government to the use of military force in the event of an outbreak of fighting in Palestine. I rather thought we would be extremely reluctant to come to that point and would certainly hope that UN action plus economic sanctions would be sufficient to meet any situation which might arise. I was afraid, therefore, that any discussions we might have with respect to the military aspect would be very one-sided, with the British doing all the talking. I would, however, explore this question further.

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 674.84A/7–155. Top Secret. Drafted by Jernegan.
2. The British Embassy submitted a memorandum dated June 28 to the Department of State entitled “Economic Sanctions which might be applied against Israel in the event of Israel launching a major attack against Egypt” (Ibid., 684A.86/6–2855), but no British document dealing with military sanctions has been found in Department of State files.