Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1955, Volume XIV

19. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the President’s Special Representative (Johnston), at Amman¹

Tel Aviv , February 12, 1955—2 p.m.

105. As of possible background use while you are conducting negotiations Arab capitals, Embassy submits following preliminary forecast Israel Government reaction two formulas set forth second paragraph Cairo’s 1141 to Department repeated Tel Aviv as 154:²

While it is correct that there are some Israel political elements disposed reach water agreement (or at least to avoid onus failure negotiations), there is little evidence that this disposition extends to point of “giving up” any substantial amount of Jordan water to the HKJ. Reasons for lukewarm character response Israel moderate elements appear to be:

1. In view assertions Israel experts (who have both technical and political influence) that HKJ actual irrigable area lower than our estimates and that inadequate provision made for underground water potential, neither Sharett nor other Israelis appear convinced validity river allocation to HKJ set forth your January 30 proposal.³

2. Resistances both from Mapai “old guard” and from large segments public would be very strong to large waiver Israel of Jordan water, which would be interpreted as permanent sacrifice precious part of national patrimony. This factor especially important at moment when Israel entering election campaign period.

3. With evolution US policy in the area at a transition point where it appears (to Israelis) to jeopardize Israel’s security position, there is little or no compensatory weight to (1) and (2) above from standpoint considerations improving Israel’s relations with US and the Arab states.

The tentative conclusion reached from foregoing is that the chances are negligible of obtaining Israel concurrence to total allocation formula.

On the other hand, a partial allocation approach would appear to hold greater promise of acceptance in Israel. The immediate and foreseeable objections which Israelis may raise to your precise formula are: (1) Total allocations for Lebanon and Syria but only partial for Israel, (2) small amount of “new water” to Israel, and (3) bad precedent for future allocations inherent in Israeli acceptance of 39.2 percent ratio under partial allocation.

Nevertheless, partial allocation has several attractions to Israel, including prospect US financial participation with resultant acceleration getting water on the land, amicable settlement Banat Yaacov controversy, and avoidance onus obstructionism before world opinion. In terms short-term economic development, your partial allocation Israel would permit (assuming Hula drainage savings equate Hula Basin diversion) allocation 130MCM triangle–Tiberias–Beisan areas, with balance 220 diversion to Beit Netufa for use coastal plain and northern Negev. This is all Israelis could possibly utilize next several years and much more than they will if left to their own devices and funds. It is reasonable to expect that during that period actual experience in lower Jordan (as well as with storage possibilities Beit Netufa) may bring views of interested parties closer together re distribution unallocated balance.

Lawson

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 120.1580/2–1255. Confidential; Priority. Repeated to the Department of State, which is the source text.
2. Document 17.
3. Johnston summarized his water allocation proposal, which the Israelis found unacceptable, in Document 14.