Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1955, Volume XIV

18. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, February 11, 1955¹

Washington, February 11, 1955

SUBJECT

• Operation Alpha

PARTICIPANTS

• Mr. John Foster Dulles, Secretary of State
• Mr. Raymond A. Hare, Director General of the Foreign Service
• Mr. John D. Jernegan, Deputy Assistant Secretary,NEA
• Mr. Francis H. Russell, NEA
• Mr. Parker T. Hart, Director,NE

Mr.Russell inquired as to the Secretary’s views on the letter drafted for him to transmit to Prime Minister Sharett in order to reassure him of the Secretary’s continued personal study of the problem of Israel’s security position.² The Secretary replied that the letter seemed too optimistic and, as a holding operation, inadequate. He asked what basis we had for using the word “encouraging”. He did not know of any developments in the Arab-Israel situation that justified the use of this term. Did we mean simply that we were encouraged by our own mental processes? Mr.Russell replied that the purpose of the letter was to assure the Israeli Prime Minister that he was not being given a “run around” but that the Secretary himself was at work on the problem. The Secretary inquired as to whether it would not be desirable instead of a letter to issue a public statement, perhaps similar to that given some months ago in Parliament by Sir Anthony Eden.Sharett had kept the lid on the situation pretty resolutely and the borders were quiet. The Secretary suggested that he might say that we were working on the problem; that there was a lot to be done; meanwhile, in view of the 1950 Tripartite Declaration, which he herewith reaffirmed, no one should feel that he could commit aggression with impunity. Both Mr.Russell and Mr.Hare felt that reaffirmation of the Tripartite Declaration even in this form needed a “peg” which was missing at the present moment.

The Secretary then inquired whether there was not a good deal of risk vis-à-vis the Arabs in sending a letter only to Sharett. Would it not be desirable to send a letter to Prime Minister Nasser as well? There followed a discussion of the possible contents of a personal letter to Nasser and what Anthony Eden might say to Nasser in Cairo on his way to Bangkok. The Secretary felt that it should be stated to Nasser that the United States Government had been able to provide military aid to Iraq because the latter commanded bases highly strategic in any defense concept for the Middle East and because Iraq had no common frontier with Israel. With respect to other Arab states, however, the U.S. Government was sharply limited in the possibility of providing arms aid due to: (1) Israel’s understandable apprehensions and (2) Arab preoccupation with the Palestine problem to the point of subordinating to it the Communist danger. It was finally agreed that Ambassador Lawson at Tel Aviv would deliver a message from the Secretary by means of a Note Verbale or an Aide-Mémoire. Delivery would be accompanied by a special request to Prime Minister Sharett to observe not only the secrecy of its content but secrecy of its existance.

Mr.Russell raised the question of possible discussions within the U.S. Government prior to his own forthcoming visit to London. Should the London trip take place without some assurance of: (1) a treaty of guaranty of the type discussed during the Shuckburgh meetings at Washington; (2) special economic aid as inducement to the Arabs; notably aid to Egypt for the High Aswan dam; (3) U.S. contribution in the form of a long-term loan to Israel to enable Israel to pay some $200 million in compensation to the Palestine Arab refugees and (4) military aid to Egypt? Mr.Hare interjected that Egypt would have to be “bought” by this type of aid. The Secretary indicated that there should be no discussion with other branches of the U.S. Government until after he had talked to the President. He inquired how compensation to the refugees would be financed.

Mr.Russell replied that he had in mind a loan from the U.S. Government, contributions by American Jewry and a diversion or funding of German reparations. A discussion followed regarding figures submitted by Mr.Russell on the projected costs of present aid programs in the Near East and the additional estimated costs of operation “Alpha”, the grand total being over a billion dollars. The Secretary felt these figures to be depressingly large but asked that they be prepared for him to use in a discussion with the President on Monday in a form which would clearly show (1) what the U.S. Government would be expected to pay in various forms of aid to the Near East in any event and (2) what the additional costs of Alpha would be. He asked that no letter be sent to Prime Minister Sharett until he had talked to the President.

Mr.Hare asked whether the suggested approach by Sir Anthony Eden to Nasser should proceed as planned. The Secretary replied in the affirmative assuming that the President concurred as he expected he would.

The Secretary also asked that in preparation for the Monday conference with the President he be furnished a paragraph on the question of the Treaty of Guaranty of a boundary settlement.³

1. Source: Department of State,S/S–NEA Files: Lot 61 D 417, Alpha Volume 1. Top Secret; Alpha. Drafted by Hart.
2. Reference is presumably to the February 7 draft cited in footnote 2, Document 15. It is identical to the message sent on February 14 (see Document 22), except the last two sentences which read as follows: “You may rest assured that I will communicate with you on a more concrete and detailed basis just as soon as our study of the problem permits. In the meantime I felt that you should know of the encouragement which I feel as a result of our work to date.”
3. Russell on Monday, February 14, submitted a memorandum to Dulles for his conference with the President. Specifically,Russell suggested that the Secretary might wish to say that the American and British officials who had been discussing the prospects for an Arab-Israeli settlement had concluded that the United States and United Kingdom would have to negotiate separate treaties guaranteeing the agreed borders of all the parties, and that an Alpha settlement would require the United States to make substantial additional economic contributions in the Near East, totaling over $1 billion during the next 5 years. (Department of State,S/S–NEA Files: Lot 61 D 417, Alpha Volume 1)