17. Telegram From the Embassy in Egypt to the Department of State1

1141. From Johnston. Cairo negotiations ended February 7 with understanding Arab Committee members2 would transmit to respective governments alternative Water Division proposals representing Johnston position. Committee unempowered make decisions but talks clarified technical realities and established basis Arab Committee judgments and recommendations. Question now entirely in political sphere with utmost importance attaching forthcoming discussions political leaders in respective capitals starting Amman February 10.

To summarize position end Cairo talks, solution Water Division unresolved but reduced to two formulas on which Johnston prepared stand. First, contemplating immediate allocation of total estimated supply, proposed 35MCM Lebanon, 1320 Syria, 520 Jordan, remainder over 400 Israel. Second, contemplates partial allocations 35 Lebanon, 132 Syria, 375 Jordan, 350 Israel, leaving about 200MCM to be divided after three-year experience period. These quantities are all from rivers only, not including locally developed resources. Arithmetical summation of quantities depends on complex calculations of return flows, explaining differences in amounts of two proposals.

Arabs agreed in principle on need make use Tiberias but insisted on greater security storage on Yarmuk than economy alone justifies. Six Yarmuk storage may be principal bargaining point Amman. Syria disappointed power potential proposed by B–Harza3 and some alternative power proposals may have to be discussed Damascus.

No serious questions raised as to neutral authority. Although this subject not discussed in detail, Arabs acceptance of necessity was clear.

Syrians exhibited genuine interest seek workable solution water shares and appeared accept implications respecting completion Banat Yacub diversion with equanimity.

Both in Cairo and Tel Aviv negotiations thus far have been mainly holding line technical aspects against all manner objections [Page 49] and counterproposals. This necessary exercise may now be behind us, with Johnston position clear to both sides.

Political factors will dictate final decisions, with strong forces on both sides disposed try agree with Johnston despite serious political hazards both in Israel and Arab states.

Following was country representation Cairo: Jordan—Khairy, Minister Economy; Farhan, Deputy Minister Economy, Taher, Deputy Minister Agriculture, Younes, Irrigation Department; Syria—Ostowani, Secretary General Foreign Minister; Maxloum, Director Irrigation Department; Colonel Kotrash, Senior Delegate Ismac; Lebanon—Chargé d’Affaires Escqiro Dimechkie, Abdel Al, Undersecretary Public Works; Egyptian—General Riad, Chairman; Selim; Mahmoud, Director Legal Department,FonOff; Engineer Farag; Gohar, Director Palestine Department War Ministry.

Johnston and staff have consistently refused press comment. On February 7, however, DotyNew York Times informed Johnston he had full details from other sources and intended file despatch.4 Assuming he has done so, Department might take position information came from sources other than Johnston who declined comment.

Jones
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.85322/2–1055. Confidential. Received at 5:34 p.m. Repeated to Amman, Beirut, Damascus, Tel Aviv, London, Paris, Baghdad, Jidda, Ankara, and Brussels.
  2. The discussions in Cairo began on February 2 and concluded on February 7. Summary minutes of these conversations areibid.,NEA/IAI Files: Lot 70 D 254,Johnston Mission Minutes of Meetings.
  3. See footnote 2, Document 8.
  4. The article in question, “Parley Advances On Jordan Accord”, by Robert C. Doty, appeared in theNew York Times on February 8, 1955, p. 10.