Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1955, Volume XIV

157. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Allen) to the Secretary of State¹

Washington,July 13, 1955.

SUBJECT

• Comments on Alpha Proposals

The following comments are submitted on the Alpha proposals worked out by Mr.Francis Russell with the British in London (London telegrams 141 and 142,² Tab A).

1. British concern at area reaction to public statement.

We agree that a sharply critical initial reaction may occur. However, we believe the British overstate the strength and possible results of the reaction. Although elements on both sides almost automatically attack any reasonable proposals, it is unlikely that either party will take drastic action. The proposals contain important benefits for Jordan. Assessment by our missions of this problem will be especially helpful.

We question whether grave disturbances will necessarily occur in the refugee camps, particularly since the leaders are offered the attractive prospect of compensation. The point the refugees probably will resent most strongly is the omission from the statement of any mention of their return to Israel. In the absence of an indication that the U.S. and U.K. intend to impose the proposals, Israel is unlikely to erupt. Instead she may well exert extreme pressure to obtain an interpretation of the proposals agreeable to her; endeavor to place the onus for any rejection on the Arabs; and in that context renew her drive for a security guarantee. We doubt that Nuri will risk his newly acquired prestige and leadership won through taking the lead in cooperative area defense arrangements by reacting violently over the Israel problem.

2. British suggestions for U.S. action to counter adverse Iraq reaction.

Neither proposal appears particularly useful in mitigating a genuinely popular reaction; both are actions the U.K. has sought persistently from the U.S. in other contexts.

A summary of the off-shore procurement problem, particularly as it relates to Centurion tanks, is attached (Tab B).³ We recommend replying to the British that the U.S. intends to continue the present policies on offshore procurement; that the present Iraq aid program contemplates no tanks; that we do not see how signing a contract for delivery of tanks at a much later date will influence appreciably Iraq public reaction to the statement. This reply is in accord with the President’s decision on Middle East Defense policy⁴ which we intend to communicate to the British on July 14.

Statement to Nuri on adherence to Turco-Iraqi pact. The President approved on July 11 the following position on U.S. adherence:

Under existing circumstances, the U.S. does not think it wise to adhere or otherwise formally associate itself with the Pact, particularly because this would adversely affect our influence in bringing about a reduction in Arab-Israel tensions. We do not, however, exclude the possibility that we shall eventually adhere, and we shall keep this question under constant review in the light of developments.⁵

We recommend informing Nuri of the substance of the above decision if Embassy Baghdad and the British believe it would be helpful in connection with the Alpha statement. In any event, Nuri will have been informed before the statement is issued that the U.S. will establish close liaison arrangements with the pact organization, which should allay any suspicions on his part that U.S. support for the Turk-Iraq pact is weakening.

3. We should ask the British for a copy of their proposed statement. Since we have considered their views on ours they should be willing to receive our comments.

4. We concur that the views of the U.S. and U.K. Chiefs of Mission at Cairo, Tel Aviv, Amman, Damascus, Beirut and Baghdad should be sought. In addition, we should not single out Jidda for omission.

5. The proposed memorandum is excellent and should be sent to the field. The date of your proposed statement should be changed to read “about August 25”, in accordance with your commitment to Eric Johnston.

6. We agree that a short advance notice to the parties is desirable and that other governments and authorities should be informed also. The approach each mission will use to the foreign government should be carefully worked out to assure the best possible reception. Your talks with Fawzi should prove most helpful in this regard. Leaks will probably occur, but last-minute disclosures need not be harmful. They may serve a useful purpose in focusing public attention, increasing the impact, and also may lessen the chances of a spontaneous unthinking adverse reaction such as might occur if the statement came without warning.

1. Source: Department of State,NEA Files: Lot 59 D 518, Alpha—Memos & corres., July l–Aug. 26 (day of Secy’s speech). Top Secret; Alpha.Burdett forwarded a copy to Russell on July 13. (Ibid.)
2. Documents 153 and 154.
3. Not printed.
4. According to a July 11 memorandum from Hoover to the Secretary, the President that day approved the Department’s position that the United States should continue to procure limited amounts of military equipment for Middle East defense from British sources and should encourage the United Kingdom to provide more resources for the defense of the area. (Department of State, Central Files, 611.80/ 7–1155)
5. This statement is from a memorandum entitled “Defense of the Middle East”, which Hoover gave the President at their meeting on July 11. (Ibid.,NEA Files: Lot 59 D 518, Alpha—Memos & corres., July 1–Aug. 26 (day of Secy’s speech)