Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1955, Volume XIV

154. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State¹

London,July 12, 1955—6 p.m.

142. From Russell. Subject to considerations mentioned preceding telegram following has been agreed with Foreign Office: (1) text of statement to be made by Secretary, with only minor revisions in draft prepared by him; (2) that Macmillan (or if he on vacation, the Foreign Office) would make rather full statement to press day following Secretary’s statement showing joint nature of proposals and elaborating certain points of special concern to UK; (3) that British and American Chiefs of Mission Cairo, Tel Aviv, Amman, Damascus, Beirut, and Baghdad² should be informed immediately and their views solicited on certain points; (4) text of memorandum as summarized below to be sent Chiefs of Mission. Foreign Office proposed to send it air pouch closing Friday evening subject to decision at meeting between Secretary and Macmillan in Paris. In view of delays in US air pouch service to area I suggest Department authorize me, subject to results Paris meeting, send memo with brief covering letter to US Mission Chiefs at 6 posts in question, through Foreign Office pouch.

Begin summary proposed memorandum.

Foreign Office and Department agreed on need for equitable settlement and best means attempting achieve it. Intention had been approach Nasser first but this not possible. Secretary convinced he cannot refrain much longer from defining policy US administration toward Israel’s security and Middle East as a whole. Longer he waits more difficult it will become for him make balanced statement on subject; should therefore soon make statement, to which US administration could hold firmly. It our hope that parties to dispute even though they may vigorously reject proposal at first will in long run come see its merits and move slowly toward it. On other hand we not blind to grave risks entailed.

Memorandum encloses copy of draft of speech which Secretary would deliver probably on Thursday August 18, containing outline of possible settlement.Macmillan intends give full support to Secretary’s proposals, possibly at press conference, day after publication and express HMG readiness help in bringing about settlement and make financial contribution.

We will avoid being drawn into publishing any fuller details of proposals as this would prejudice any later negotiations. Guidance for publicity will be sent later, meanwhile following explanations of specific points may be useful:

(a) Guarantees: It intended these be limited to territorial aspect of settlement. Will be made clear however that guarantees will not be granted except in framework of actual comprehensive settlement, in other words mere acceptance by one party of part or all plan would not earn guarantee.

(b) Boundaries: (1) Restoration of land to Arab border villages: this should be interpreted flexibly. To restore all such lands would not be possible as Israel would be almost cut in two. On other hand problem must be solved if settlement to endure. A sort of solution which in our minds will be equitable has in fact been worked out but we want avoid any specific mention of these ideas to parties until they can be induced to engage in serious discussion of a settlement.

(2) Road from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem: would entail cession to Israel of part of Latrun Salient and surrounding no man’s land.

(3) Negev: Principle underlying this solution is there would be a point at junction of two triangles where sovereignty would appertain both sides or possibly neither. This would make it possible for east-west Arab road under complete Arab control pass over (or under) Israeli north-south road under complete Israeli control. No other way reconcile vital interests of both parties in Negev. We should not commit ourselves on size and location of triangles which left for negotiation although we have various alternative ideas.

(c) Jerusalem: . . . first we would try get through UN resolution providing for functional internationalization of Holy Places along lines of Swedish 1950 draft. . . .

(d) Blockade: An essential part of any settlement is that Egypt should open Suez Canal to Israel ships and Israel-bound traffic and that Arab States [should cease to?] put pressure on third parties not to trade with Israel. We would not however ask Arabs engage in direct trade with Israel themselves, even after settlement. Wording of draft statement designed make this distinction.

We propose give parties about 24 hours notice that statements are to be made. Substance of statements would not be revealed at that stage but we would say we hoped both sides would receive them in constructive spirit with willingness look seriously for common ground. We would point out that statements do not call for immediate reply or decision on part of govts nor do they carry any suggestion of coercion. We hope indeed that govts will take their time and be prepared discuss our ideas with us further. In meantime we would ask them in their public reactions to exercise restraint and at least not commit themselves against our suggestions until they have had chance discuss with us in greater detail the advantages we believe them to contain.

We would also inform certain other govts and authorities, notably France, Turkey, Commonwealth,UNSYG,Burns and Labouisse, a few days in advance of statements and seek their support. We will want couch our communications to govts in manner best calculated avoid leak. We would solicit support of other UN members at time of publication of plan.

Chiefs of Mission are asked comment on (a) best way of presenting proposals to govts to which accredited; (b) likely response both of govts and people; (c) whether public reaction would be such as necessitate any special preparations or precautions; (d) best lines of publicity; and (e) whether either Chief of Mission or effective head of govt to which accredited will be out of country on or about Aug 18.

Need for absolute secrecy stressed and matter to be revealed only to minimum number senior officers in each mission. Before replying Chiefs of Mission are to consult US or UK colleagues respectively.End summary.

If Dept approves my sending letters as suggested above, subject to decision at Paris meeting, please cable approval for my attention this Emb and also Paris my attention merely stating “Message approved.”

If not please cable views to London and send message Paris “not approved.” In latter case I will return London before going on to Washington.

Aldrich

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 684A.86/7–2155. Top Secret;Niact; Alpha; Limited Distribution.
2. The British Chiefs of Mission were, respectively, Sir Ralph Stevenson, J. W. Nicholls, C. B. Duke, Sir John Gardener, Sir Edwin Chapman-Andrews, and Sir Michael Wright; the American Chiefs of Mission were, respectively,Henry A. Byroade,Edward B. Lawson, Lester D. Mallory,James S. Moose, Jr.,Donald R. Heath, and Waldemar J. Gallman.